feat: 建立三项目机器身份与安全传输 v1 (#151)

docs: 同步 #150 标准事件与证据 v1 契约

Bell/server/app/bell/integration/machine_identity/registry.go

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+type registryDocument struct {
+	Version    string              `json:"version"`
+	Audience   string              `json:"audience"`
+	Principals []registryPrincipal `json:"principals"`
+}
+
+type registryPrincipal struct {
+	PrincipalID string        `json:"principal_id"`
+	Enabled     bool          `json:"enabled"`
+	Keys        []registryKey `json:"keys"`
+}
+
+type registryKey struct {
+	KeyID     string   `json:"kid"`
+	PublicKey string   `json:"public_key_base64url"`
+	Status    string   `json:"status"`
+	Scopes    []string `json:"scopes"`
+}
+
+func LoadRegistry(filePath, expectedAudience string) (*Registry, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(filePath) == "" || !validAudiences[expectedAudience] {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine principal registry path and audience are required")
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filePath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("read machine principal registry")
+	}
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	var document registryDocument
+	if err = decoder.Decode(&document); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	if err = decoder.Decode(&struct{}{}); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	if document.Version != "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1" || document.Audience != expectedAudience || len(document.Principals) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	records := make([]KeyRecord, 0)
+	for _, principal := range document.Principals {
+		if len(principal.Keys) == 0 {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+		}
+		for _, key := range principal.Keys {
+			publicKey, decodeErr := base64.RawURLEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(key.PublicKey)
+			if decodeErr != nil || len(publicKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize || (key.Status != "active" && key.Status != "revoked") {
+				return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+			}
+			records = append(records, KeyRecord{Principal: principal.PrincipalID, KeyID: key.KeyID, PublicKey: ed25519.PublicKey(publicKey), Audience: document.Audience,
+				Scopes: key.Scopes, Enabled: principal.Enabled, Revoked: key.Status == "revoked"})
+		}
+	}
+	return NewRegistry(records...)
+}

Bell/server/app/bell/integration/machine_identity/token.go

@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"path"
+	"regexp"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+)
+
+var (
+	principalPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$`)
+	keyIDPattern     = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$`)
+	tokenIDPattern   = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,64}$`)
+	validAudiences   = map[string]bool{"yovision-sense": true, "yovision-brain": true, "yovision-bell": true}
+	validScopes      = map[string]bool{"source-config:write": true, "runtime-status:write": true, "events:ingest": true, "evidence:read": true}
+)
+
+const (
+	Version       = "yovision.machine-identity/v1"
+	TokenType     = "YOVISION-MACHINE+JWT"
+	MaxLifetime   = 5 * time.Minute
+	AllowedSkew   = 30 * time.Second
+	MaxKeyOverlap = 24 * time.Hour
+)
+
+type Error struct{ Code string }
+
+func (e *Error) Error() string { return e.Code }
+
+func codeError(code string) error { return &Error{Code: code} }
+
+// BearerToken deliberately has no cookie or query fallback.
+func BearerToken(authorization string) (string, error) {
+	parts := strings.Split(authorization, " ")
+	if len(parts) != 2 || !strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "Bearer") || parts[1] == "" || strings.ContainsAny(parts[1], " \t\r\n,") {
+		return "", codeError("machine_token_missing")
+	}
+	return parts[1], nil
+}
+
+type Claims struct {
+	Version    string   `json:"ver"`
+	Issuer     string   `json:"iss"`
+	Subject    string   `json:"sub"`
+	Audience   string   `json:"aud"`
+	Scopes     []string `json:"scope"`
+	IssuedAt   int64    `json:"iat"`
+	NotBefore  int64    `json:"nbf"`
+	ExpiresAt  int64    `json:"exp"`
+	TokenID    string   `json:"jti"`
+	Method     string   `json:"htm"`
+	Path       string   `json:"htu"`
+	BodySHA256 string   `json:"body_sha256"`
+}
+
+type protectedHeader struct {
+	Algorithm string `json:"alg"`
+	Type      string `json:"typ"`
+	KeyID     string `json:"kid"`
+	Version   string `json:"ver"`
+}
+
+type KeyRecord struct {
+	Principal string
+	KeyID     string
+	PublicKey ed25519.PublicKey
+	Audience  string
+	Scopes    []string
+	Enabled   bool
+	Revoked   bool
+}
+
+type Registry struct {
+	mu   sync.RWMutex
+	keys map[string]KeyRecord
+}
+
+func NewRegistry(records ...KeyRecord) (*Registry, error) {
+	r := &Registry{keys: make(map[string]KeyRecord, len(records))}
+	for _, record := range records {
+		if !keyIDPattern.MatchString(record.KeyID) || !principalPattern.MatchString(record.Principal) || !validAudiences[record.Audience] || len(record.PublicKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize || !validScopeList(record.Scopes) {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid machine key record")
+		}
+		if _, exists := r.keys[record.KeyID]; exists {
+			return nil, errors.New("duplicate machine key id")
+		}
+		record.PublicKey = slices.Clone(record.PublicKey)
+		record.Scopes = slices.Clone(record.Scopes)
+		r.keys[record.KeyID] = record
+	}
+	return r, nil
+}
+
+func (r *Registry) Lookup(keyID string) (KeyRecord, bool) {
+	r.mu.RLock()
+	defer r.mu.RUnlock()
+	record, ok := r.keys[keyID]
+	record.PublicKey = slices.Clone(record.PublicKey)
+	record.Scopes = slices.Clone(record.Scopes)
+	return record, ok
+}
+
+func (r *Registry) Revoke(keyID string) bool {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	record, ok := r.keys[keyID]
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	record.Revoked = true
+	r.keys[keyID] = record
+	return true
+}
+
+type ReplayStore struct {
+	mu   sync.Mutex
+	used map[string]time.Time
+}
+
+// ReplayCache must atomically persist accepted (principal, jti) pairs until
+// expiry. ReplayStore is process-local and intended for tests or a single
+// uninterrupted process; connector implementations inject a durable store.
+type ReplayCache interface {
+	Consume(principal, tokenID string, expiresAt, now time.Time) bool
+}
+
+func NewReplayStore() *ReplayStore { return &ReplayStore{used: map[string]time.Time{}} }
+
+func (s *ReplayStore) Consume(principal, tokenID string, expiresAt, now time.Time) bool {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	for key, expiry := range s.used {
+		if !expiry.After(now) {
+			delete(s.used, key)
+		}
+	}
+	key := principal + "\x00" + tokenID
+	if _, exists := s.used[key]; exists {
+		return false
+	}
+	s.used[key] = expiresAt
+	return true
+}
+
+type Signer struct {
+	Principal  string
+	KeyID      string
+	PrivateKey ed25519.PrivateKey
+	Now        func() time.Time
+}
+
+func LoadPrivateKey(path string) (ed25519.PrivateKey, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(path) == "" {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key path is required")
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("read machine private key")
+	}
+	block, rest := pem.Decode(raw)
+	if block == nil || len(bytes.TrimSpace(rest)) != 0 || block.Type != "PRIVATE KEY" {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key must be one PKCS#8 PEM block")
+	}
+	parsed, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("parse machine private key")
+	}
+	key, ok := parsed.(ed25519.PrivateKey)
+	if !ok || len(key) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key is not Ed25519")
+	}
+	return slices.Clone(key), nil
+}
+
+func (s Signer) Mint(audience string, scopes []string, method, requestPath string, body []byte) (string, error) {
+	if !principalPattern.MatchString(s.Principal) || !keyIDPattern.MatchString(s.KeyID) || len(s.PrivateKey) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize || !validAudiences[audience] || !validScopeList(scopes) {
+		return "", errors.New("incomplete machine signer configuration")
+	}
+	normalizedPath, err := normalizePath(requestPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	method = strings.ToUpper(method)
+	if !allowedMethod(method) {
+		return "", errors.New("unsupported machine request method")
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	if s.Now != nil {
+		now = s.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	tokenID, err := randomTokenID()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	claims := Claims{Version: Version, Issuer: s.Principal, Subject: s.Principal, Audience: audience,
+		Scopes: slices.Clone(scopes), IssuedAt: now.Unix(), NotBefore: now.Unix(), ExpiresAt: now.Add(MaxLifetime).Unix(),
+		TokenID: tokenID, Method: method, Path: normalizedPath, BodySHA256: hex.EncodeToString(digest[:])}
+	header := protectedHeader{Algorithm: "EdDSA", Type: TokenType, KeyID: s.KeyID, Version: Version}
+	headerJSON, _ := json.Marshal(header)
+	claimsJSON, _ := json.Marshal(claims)
+	signingInput := rawBase64(headerJSON) + "." + rawBase64(claimsJSON)
+	signature := ed25519.Sign(s.PrivateKey, []byte(signingInput))
+	return signingInput + "." + rawBase64(signature), nil
+}
+
+type Verifier struct {
+	Registry *Registry
+	Replay   ReplayCache
+	Now      func() time.Time
+}
+
+func (v Verifier) Verify(token, audience, requiredScope, method, requestPath string, body []byte) (Claims, error) {
+	if v.Registry == nil || v.Replay == nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
+	if len(parts) != 3 || strings.Contains(token, "=") {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	headerBytes, err := decodeRaw(parts[0])
+	if err != nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	var header protectedHeader
+	if err = decodeClosed(headerBytes, &header); err != nil || header.Algorithm != "EdDSA" || header.Type != TokenType || header.Version != Version || !keyIDPattern.MatchString(header.KeyID) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	record, ok := v.Registry.Lookup(header.KeyID)
+	if !ok {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	signature, err := decodeRaw(parts[2])
+	if err != nil || len(signature) != ed25519.SignatureSize || !ed25519.Verify(record.PublicKey, []byte(parts[0]+"."+parts[1]), signature) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if !record.Enabled || record.Revoked {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_identity_revoked")
+	}
+	claimsBytes, err := decodeRaw(parts[1])
+	if err != nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	var claims Claims
+	if err = decodeClosed(claimsBytes, &claims); err != nil || !validClaimsShape(claims) || claims.Issuer != record.Principal || claims.Subject != record.Principal {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	if v.Now != nil {
+		now = v.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	nowUnix := now.Unix()
+	if claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt <= 0 || claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt > int64(MaxLifetime/time.Second) ||
+		claims.NotBefore < claims.IssuedAt || claims.NotBefore > claims.ExpiresAt || claims.IssuedAt > nowUnix+int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if claims.NotBefore > nowUnix+int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) || claims.ExpiresAt < nowUnix-int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_expired")
+	}
+	if claims.Audience != audience || record.Audience != audience {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_audience_denied")
+	}
+	if !slices.Contains(claims.Scopes, requiredScope) || !slices.Contains(record.Scopes, requiredScope) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_scope_denied")
+	}
+	normalizedPath, err := normalizePath(requestPath)
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	if err != nil || claims.Method != strings.ToUpper(method) || claims.Path != normalizedPath || claims.BodySHA256 != hex.EncodeToString(digest[:]) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if !v.Replay.Consume(claims.Issuer, claims.TokenID, time.Unix(claims.ExpiresAt, 0).Add(AllowedSkew), now) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_replayed")
+	}
+	return claims, nil
+}
+
+func decodeClosed(raw []byte, target any) error {
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	if err := decoder.Decode(target); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := decoder.Decode(&struct{}{}); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		if err == nil {
+			return errors.New("trailing JSON value")
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func validClaimsShape(claims Claims) bool {
+	if claims.Version != Version || !principalPattern.MatchString(claims.Issuer) || claims.Subject != claims.Issuer || !validAudiences[claims.Audience] || !tokenIDPattern.MatchString(claims.TokenID) ||
+		len(claims.Scopes) == 0 || len(claims.Scopes) > 4 || !allowedMethod(claims.Method) || claims.Path == "" || len(claims.BodySHA256) != 64 {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !validScopeList(claims.Scopes) {
+		return false
+	}
+	_, err := hex.DecodeString(claims.BodySHA256)
+	return err == nil
+}
+
+func validScopeList(scopes []string) bool {
+	if len(scopes) == 0 || len(scopes) > 4 {
+		return false
+	}
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, scope := range scopes {
+		if !validScopes[scope] || seen[scope] {
+			return false
+		}
+		seen[scope] = true
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func normalizePath(value string) (string, error) {
+	parsed, err := url.ParseRequestURI(value)
+	if err != nil || parsed.IsAbs() || parsed.Host != "" || parsed.RawQuery != "" || parsed.Fragment != "" || parsed.Path == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(parsed.Path, "/") || strings.Contains(parsed.Path, "\\") || strings.Contains(parsed.Path, "//") || path.Clean(parsed.Path) != parsed.Path {
+		return "", errors.New("machine request path must be a normalized absolute path without query or fragment")
+	}
+	return parsed.EscapedPath(), nil
+}
+
+func allowedMethod(method string) bool {
+	switch method {
+	case "GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE":
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
+func randomTokenID() (string, error) {
+	raw := make([]byte, 16)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("generate machine token id: %w", err)
+	}
+	return rawBase64(raw), nil
+}
+
+func rawBase64(value []byte) string { return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(value) }
+
+func decodeRaw(value string) ([]byte, error) {
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(value)
+}

Bell/server/app/bell/integration/machine_identity/token_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type crossLanguageVector struct {
+	PublicKey string `json:"public_key_base64url"`
+	Token     string `json:"token"`
+	Now       int64  `json:"now"`
+	Audience  string `json:"audience"`
+	Scope     string `json:"required_scope"`
+	Method    string `json:"method"`
+	Path      string `json:"path"`
+	Body      string `json:"body_base64"`
+}
+
+func testIdentity(t *testing.T) (Signer, *Registry, time.Time) {
+	t.Helper()
+	publicKey, privateKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	now := time.Unix(1_800_000_000, 0).UTC()
+	registry, err := NewRegistry(KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:sense:site-a", KeyID: "sense-key-0001", PublicKey: publicKey,
+		Audience: "yovision-brain", Scopes: []string{"source-config:write"}, Enabled: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return Signer{Principal: "yv:sense:site-a", KeyID: "sense-key-0001", PrivateKey: privateKey, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}, registry, now
+}
+
+func errorCode(t *testing.T, err error) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	var coded *Error
+	if !errors.As(err, &coded) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected coded error, got %v", err)
+	}
+	return coded.Code
+}
+
+func TestMintAndVerifyRequestBoundToken(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte(`{"revision":7}`)
+	token, err := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	claims, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if claims.Issuer != signer.Principal || claims.Subject != signer.Principal || claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt != 300 {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected claims: %+v", claims)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBearerTokenHasNoCookieOrQueryFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	if token, err := BearerToken("Bearer compact.token.value"); err != nil || token != "compact.token.value" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, value := range []string{"", "compact.token.value", "Bearer", "Bearer one two", "Cookie compact.token.value"} {
+		if _, err := BearerToken(value); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_missing" {
+			t.Fatalf("accepted %q", value)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRejectsReplayWrongAudienceScopeAndRequest(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte(`{"revision":7}`)
+	mint := func() string {
+		token, err := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		return token
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	token := mint()
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_replayed" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-bell", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_audience_denied" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-brain", "events:ingest", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_scope_denied" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", []byte("changed")); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_invalid" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExpiryRevocationAndRotation(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte("{}")
+	token, _ := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	expired := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now.Add(6 * time.Minute) }}
+	if _, err := expired.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_expired" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	oldPublic, oldPrivate, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	newPublic, newPrivate, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	rotation, err := NewRegistry(
+		KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-old-0001", PublicKey: oldPublic, Audience: "yovision-sense", Scopes: []string{"runtime-status:write"}, Enabled: true},
+		KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-new-0002", PublicKey: newPublic, Audience: "yovision-sense", Scopes: []string{"runtime-status:write"}, Enabled: true},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	oldSigner := Signer{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-old-0001", PrivateKey: oldPrivate, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	newSigner := Signer{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-new-0002", PrivateKey: newPrivate, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	oldToken, _ := oldSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	newToken, _ := newSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	verify := Verifier{Registry: rotation, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(oldToken, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(newToken, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !rotation.Revoke("brain-old-0001") {
+		t.Fatal("old key was not revoked")
+	}
+	oldAfterRevoke, _ := oldSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(oldAfterRevoke, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_identity_revoked" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTransportPolicyRejectsUnsafeTLS(t *testing.T) {
+	safe := TransportPolicy{TLSMinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12, VerifyCertificate: true, VerifyHostname: true,
+		ConnectTimeout: time.Second, ResponseHeaderTimeout: time.Second, RequestTimeout: 2 * time.Second, MaxRequestBytes: 1024}
+	if err := safe.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	unsafe := safe
+	unsafe.VerifyHostname = false
+	if err := unsafe.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unsafe hostname policy accepted")
+	}
+	unsafe = safe
+	unsafe.TLSMinVersion = tls.VersionTLS11
+	if err := unsafe.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("TLS 1.1 accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifiesCrossLanguageVector(t *testing.T) {
+	vectorPath := filepath.Join("..", "..", "..", "..", "..", "..", "contracts", "tests", "machine-identity-v1", "cross-language-vector.json")
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(vectorPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var vector crossLanguageVector
+	if err = json.Unmarshal(raw, &vector); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	publicKey, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(vector.PublicKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	body, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(vector.Body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	registry, err := NewRegistry(KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:vector", KeyID: "brain-vector-0001", PublicKey: ed25519.PublicKey(publicKey), Audience: vector.Audience, Scopes: []string{vector.Scope}, Enabled: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return time.Unix(vector.Now, 0) }}
+	claims, err := verifier.Verify(vector.Token, vector.Audience, vector.Scope, vector.Method, vector.Path, body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if claims.Issuer != "yv:brain:vector" {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected issuer: %s", claims.Issuer)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadsExternalPublicRegistryAndRejectsWrongAudience(t *testing.T) {
+	publicKey, _, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	document := map[string]any{
+		"version": "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1", "audience": "yovision-bell",
+		"principals": []any{map[string]any{"principal_id": "yv:sense:site-a", "enabled": true, "keys": []any{map[string]any{
+			"kid": "sense-key-0001", "public_key_base64url": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(publicKey), "status": "active", "scopes": []string{"events:ingest"},
+		}}}},
+	}
+	raw, _ := json.Marshal(document)
+	file := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "principals.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(file, raw, 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	registry, err := LoadRegistry(file, "yovision-bell")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if record, ok := registry.Lookup("sense-key-0001"); !ok || record.Principal != "yv:sense:site-a" {
+		t.Fatal("registry record missing")
+	}
+	if _, err = LoadRegistry(file, "yovision-sense"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("wrong registry audience accepted")
+	}
+}

Bell/server/app/bell/integration/machine_identity/transport.go

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type TransportPolicy struct {
+	TLSMinVersion         uint16
+	VerifyCertificate     bool
+	VerifyHostname        bool
+	ConnectTimeout        time.Duration
+	ResponseHeaderTimeout time.Duration
+	RequestTimeout        time.Duration
+	MaxRequestBytes       int64
+}
+
+func (p TransportPolicy) Validate() error {
+	if p.TLSMinVersion < tls.VersionTLS12 || !p.VerifyCertificate || !p.VerifyHostname || p.ConnectTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.ConnectTimeout > 30*time.Second ||
+		p.ResponseHeaderTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.ResponseHeaderTimeout > 30*time.Second || p.RequestTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.RequestTimeout > 60*time.Second ||
+		p.MaxRequestBytes < 1 || p.MaxRequestBytes > 10*1024*1024 {
+		return errors.New("machine transport policy is unsafe")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (p TransportPolicy) HTTPClient() (*http.Client, error) {
+	if err := p.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	transport := &http.Transport{
+		TLSClientConfig:       &tls.Config{MinVersion: p.TLSMinVersion},
+		TLSHandshakeTimeout:   p.ConnectTimeout,
+		ResponseHeaderTimeout: p.ResponseHeaderTimeout,
+	}
+	return &http.Client{Transport: transport, Timeout: p.RequestTimeout}, nil
+}

Brain/pyproject.toml

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ version = "0.1.0"
 description = "Headless inference delivery unit for YoVision"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = "==3.11.*"
-dependencies = []
+dependencies = ["cryptography==50.0.1"]
 
 [project.optional-dependencies]
 # The wheel backend is selected by the official PyTorch index documented in

Brain/src/yovision_brain/integration/machine_identity/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+"""Independent service-to-service machine identity for Brain connectors."""
+
+from .token import (
+    ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS,
+    MAX_KEY_OVERLAP_SECONDS,
+    MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS,
+    VERSION,
+    Claims,
+    KeyRecord,
+    MachineIdentityError,
+    Registry,
+    ReplayStore,
+    Signer,
+    Verifier,
+    load_private_key,
+    load_registry,
+    bearer_token,
+)
+from .transport import TransportPolicy
+
+__all__ = [
+    "ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS",
+    "MAX_KEY_OVERLAP_SECONDS",
+    "MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS",
+    "VERSION",
+    "Claims",
+    "KeyRecord",
+    "MachineIdentityError",
+    "Registry",
+    "ReplayStore",
+    "Signer",
+    "TransportPolicy",
+    "Verifier",
+    "load_private_key",
+    "load_registry",
+    "bearer_token",
+]

Brain/src/yovision_brain/integration/machine_identity/token.py

@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+"""Ed25519 request-bound machine tokens.
+
+This module never accepts browser cookies, GoAdmin JWTs, query tokens, or
+shared secrets. HTTP adapters must obtain the compact token exclusively from
+the Authorization bearer header and pass the request body unchanged.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import json
+import posixpath
+import re
+import secrets
+import threading
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Callable, Iterable, Protocol
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import (
+    Ed25519PrivateKey,
+    Ed25519PublicKey,
+)
+
+VERSION = "yovision.machine-identity/v1"
+TOKEN_TYPE = "YOVISION-MACHINE+JWT"
+MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS = 300
+ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS = 30
+MAX_KEY_OVERLAP_SECONDS = 24 * 60 * 60
+_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"})
+_AUDIENCES = frozenset({"yovision-sense", "yovision-brain", "yovision-bell"})
+_SCOPES = frozenset({"source-config:write", "runtime-status:write", "events:ingest", "evidence:read"})
+_PRINCIPAL = re.compile(r"^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$")
+_KEY_ID = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$")
+_TOKEN_ID = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,64}$")
+
+
+class MachineIdentityError(ValueError):
+    """A stable, non-secret authentication failure."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+def bearer_token(authorization: str) -> str:
+    """Extract only an Authorization bearer token; there is no cookie/query fallback."""
+    parts = authorization.split(" ")
+    if len(parts) != 2 or parts[0].lower() != "bearer" or not parts[1] or any(character in parts[1] for character in " \t\r\n,"):
+        raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_missing")
+    return parts[1]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Claims:
+    ver: str
+    iss: str
+    sub: str
+    aud: str
+    scope: tuple[str, ...]
+    iat: int
+    nbf: int
+    exp: int
+    jti: str
+    htm: str
+    htu: str
+    body_sha256: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class KeyRecord:
+    principal: str
+    key_id: str
+    public_key: Ed25519PublicKey
+    audience: str
+    scopes: frozenset[str]
+    enabled: bool = True
+    revoked: bool = False
+
+
+class Registry:
+    def __init__(self, records: Iterable[KeyRecord]) -> None:
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self._records: dict[str, KeyRecord] = {}
+        for record in records:
+            if not _KEY_ID.fullmatch(record.key_id) or not _PRINCIPAL.fullmatch(record.principal) or record.audience not in _AUDIENCES or not _valid_scopes(record.scopes):
+                raise ValueError("invalid machine key record")
+            if record.key_id in self._records:
+                raise ValueError("duplicate machine key id")
+            self._records[record.key_id] = record
+
+    def lookup(self, key_id: str) -> KeyRecord | None:
+        with self._lock:
+            return self._records.get(key_id)
+
+    def revoke(self, key_id: str) -> bool:
+        with self._lock:
+            record = self._records.get(key_id)
+            if record is None:
+                return False
+            self._records[key_id] = KeyRecord(
+                principal=record.principal,
+                key_id=record.key_id,
+                public_key=record.public_key,
+                audience=record.audience,
+                scopes=record.scopes,
+                enabled=record.enabled,
+                revoked=True,
+            )
+            return True
+
+
+class ReplayStore:
+    """Process-local replay cache for tests or one uninterrupted process."""
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+        self._used: dict[tuple[str, str], int] = {}
+
+    def consume(self, principal: str, token_id: str, expires_at: int, now: int) -> bool:
+        with self._lock:
+            self._used = {key: expiry for key, expiry in self._used.items() if expiry > now}
+            key = (principal, token_id)
+            if key in self._used:
+                return False
+            self._used[key] = expires_at
+            return True
+
+
+class ReplayCache(Protocol):
+    """Connector implementations provide an atomic durable implementation."""
+
+    def consume(self, principal: str, token_id: str, expires_at: int, now: int) -> bool: ...
+
+
+def load_private_key(path: str | Path) -> Ed25519PrivateKey:
+    if not str(path).strip():
+        raise ValueError("machine private key path is required")
+    try:
+        raw = Path(path).read_bytes()
+        key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(raw, password=None)
+    except (OSError, ValueError, TypeError) as exc:
+        raise ValueError("invalid machine private key file") from exc
+    if not isinstance(key, Ed25519PrivateKey):
+        raise ValueError("machine private key is not Ed25519")
+    return key
+
+
+def load_registry(path: str | Path, expected_audience: str) -> Registry:
+    if not str(path).strip() or expected_audience not in _AUDIENCES:
+        raise ValueError("machine principal registry path and audience are required")
+    try:
+        document = json.loads(Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise ValueError("invalid machine principal registry") from exc
+    if not isinstance(document, dict) or set(document) != {"version", "audience", "principals"} or document["version"] != "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1" or document["audience"] != expected_audience or not isinstance(document["principals"], list) or not document["principals"]:
+        raise ValueError("invalid machine principal registry")
+    records: list[KeyRecord] = []
+    try:
+        for principal in document["principals"]:
+            if not isinstance(principal, dict) or set(principal) != {"principal_id", "enabled", "keys"} or not isinstance(principal["enabled"], bool) or not isinstance(principal["keys"], list) or not principal["keys"]:
+                raise ValueError
+            for key in principal["keys"]:
+                if not isinstance(key, dict) or set(key) != {"kid", "public_key_base64url", "status", "scopes"} or key["status"] not in {"active", "revoked"} or not isinstance(key["scopes"], list):
+                    raise ValueError
+                public_key = Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(_b64decode(key["public_key_base64url"]))
+                records.append(KeyRecord(principal["principal_id"], key["kid"], public_key, expected_audience, frozenset(key["scopes"]), principal["enabled"], key["status"] == "revoked"))
+    except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
+        raise ValueError("invalid machine principal registry") from None
+    return Registry(records)
+
+
+class Signer:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        principal: str,
+        key_id: str,
+        private_key: Ed25519PrivateKey,
+        *,
+        clock: Callable[[], int] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        if not _PRINCIPAL.fullmatch(principal) or not _KEY_ID.fullmatch(key_id) or not isinstance(private_key, Ed25519PrivateKey):
+            raise ValueError("incomplete machine signer configuration")
+        self._principal = principal
+        self._key_id = key_id
+        self._private_key = private_key
+        self._clock = clock or (lambda: int(time.time()))
+
+    def mint(self, audience: str, scopes: Iterable[str], method: str, request_path: str, body: bytes) -> str:
+        normalized_path = _normalize_path(request_path)
+        normalized_method = method.upper()
+        scope_values = tuple(scopes)
+        if audience not in _AUDIENCES or not _valid_scopes(scope_values) or normalized_method not in _METHODS:
+            raise ValueError("invalid machine token request")
+        now = int(self._clock())
+        header = {"alg": "EdDSA", "typ": TOKEN_TYPE, "kid": self._key_id, "ver": VERSION}
+        claims = {
+            "ver": VERSION,
+            "iss": self._principal,
+            "sub": self._principal,
+            "aud": audience,
+            "scope": list(scope_values),
+            "iat": now,
+            "nbf": now,
+            "exp": now + MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS,
+            "jti": secrets.token_urlsafe(16),
+            "htm": normalized_method,
+            "htu": normalized_path,
+            "body_sha256": hashlib.sha256(body).hexdigest(),
+        }
+        encoded_header = _encode_json(header)
+        encoded_claims = _encode_json(claims)
+        signing_input = f"{encoded_header}.{encoded_claims}".encode("ascii")
+        signature = self._private_key.sign(signing_input)
+        return f"{encoded_header}.{encoded_claims}.{_b64encode(signature)}"
+
+
+class Verifier:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        registry: Registry,
+        replay_store: ReplayCache,
+        *,
+        clock: Callable[[], int] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self._registry = registry
+        self._replay_store = replay_store
+        self._clock = clock or (lambda: int(time.time()))
+
+    def verify(
+        self,
+        token: str,
+        audience: str,
+        required_scope: str,
+        method: str,
+        request_path: str,
+        body: bytes,
+    ) -> Claims:
+        parts = token.split(".")
+        if len(parts) != 3 or "=" in token:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        header = _decode_object(parts[0], {"alg", "typ", "kid", "ver"})
+        if header.get("alg") != "EdDSA" or header.get("typ") != TOKEN_TYPE or header.get("ver") != VERSION or not isinstance(header.get("kid"), str) or not _KEY_ID.fullmatch(header["kid"]):
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        record = self._registry.lookup(header["kid"])
+        if record is None:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        try:
+            record.public_key.verify(_b64decode(parts[2]), f"{parts[0]}.{parts[1]}".encode("ascii"))
+        except (InvalidSignature, ValueError):
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid") from None
+        if not record.enabled or record.revoked:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_identity_revoked")
+
+        raw = _decode_object(parts[1], {"ver", "iss", "sub", "aud", "scope", "iat", "nbf", "exp", "jti", "htm", "htu", "body_sha256"})
+        claims = _claims_from_object(raw)
+        if claims.iss != record.principal or claims.sub != record.principal:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        now = int(self._clock())
+        if claims.exp - claims.iat <= 0 or claims.exp - claims.iat > MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS or claims.nbf < claims.iat or claims.nbf > claims.exp or claims.iat > now + ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        if claims.nbf > now + ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS or claims.exp < now - ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_expired")
+        if claims.aud != audience or record.audience != audience:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_audience_denied")
+        if required_scope not in claims.scope or required_scope not in record.scopes:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_scope_denied")
+        if claims.htm != method.upper() or claims.htu != _normalize_path(request_path) or claims.body_sha256 != hashlib.sha256(body).hexdigest():
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        if not self._replay_store.consume(claims.iss, claims.jti, claims.exp + ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS, now):
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_replayed")
+        return claims
+
+
+def _claims_from_object(value: dict[str, object]) -> Claims:
+    try:
+        scope = value["scope"]
+        if not isinstance(scope, list) or not _valid_scopes(scope):
+            raise ValueError
+        integer_fields = ("iat", "nbf", "exp")
+        if any(not isinstance(value[field], int) or isinstance(value[field], bool) for field in integer_fields):
+            raise ValueError
+        string_fields = ("ver", "iss", "sub", "aud", "jti", "htm", "htu", "body_sha256")
+        if any(not isinstance(value[field], str) for field in string_fields):
+            raise ValueError
+        claims = Claims(scope=tuple(scope), **{key: value[key] for key in string_fields + integer_fields})
+        if claims.ver != VERSION or not _PRINCIPAL.fullmatch(claims.iss) or claims.iss != claims.sub or claims.aud not in _AUDIENCES or not _TOKEN_ID.fullmatch(claims.jti) or claims.htm not in _METHODS or len(claims.body_sha256) != 64:
+            raise ValueError
+        bytes.fromhex(claims.body_sha256)
+        _normalize_path(claims.htu)
+        return claims
+    except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
+        raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid") from None
+
+
+def _normalize_path(value: str) -> str:
+    split = urlsplit(value)
+    if not value.startswith("/") or split.scheme or split.netloc or split.query or split.fragment or "\\" in split.path or "//" in split.path or posixpath.normpath(split.path) != split.path:
+        raise ValueError("machine request path must be normalized and contain no query or fragment")
+    return split.path
+
+
+def _valid_scopes(scopes: Iterable[str]) -> bool:
+    values = tuple(scopes)
+    return 1 <= len(values) <= 4 and len(set(values)) == len(values) and all(scope in _SCOPES for scope in values)
+
+
+def _encode_json(value: dict[str, object]) -> str:
+    return _b64encode(json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=True, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True).encode("utf-8"))
+
+
+def _decode_object(value: str, expected_keys: set[str]) -> dict[str, object]:
+    try:
+        decoded = json.loads(_b64decode(value).decode("utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid") from None
+    if not isinstance(decoded, dict) or set(decoded) != expected_keys:
+        raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+    return decoded
+
+
+def _b64encode(value: bytes) -> str:
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(value).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
+
+
+def _b64decode(value: str) -> bytes:
+    if not value or "=" in value:
+        raise ValueError("invalid base64url")
+    decoded = base64.b64decode(value + "=" * (-len(value) % 4), altchars=b"-_", validate=True)
+    if _b64encode(decoded) != value:
+        raise ValueError("non-canonical base64url")
+    return decoded

Brain/src/yovision_brain/integration/machine_identity/transport.py

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+"""Fail-closed HTTPS transport policy for Brain connectors."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ssl
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TransportPolicy:
+    tls_min_version: str
+    verify_certificate: bool
+    verify_hostname: bool
+    connect_timeout_ms: int
+    response_header_timeout_ms: int
+    request_timeout_ms: int
+    max_request_bytes: int
+
+    def validate(self) -> None:
+        if (
+            self.tls_min_version not in {"1.2", "1.3"}
+            or not self.verify_certificate
+            or not self.verify_hostname
+            or not 100 <= self.connect_timeout_ms <= 30_000
+            or not 100 <= self.response_header_timeout_ms <= 30_000
+            or not 100 <= self.request_timeout_ms <= 60_000
+            or not 1 <= self.max_request_bytes <= 10 * 1024 * 1024
+        ):
+            raise ValueError("machine transport policy is unsafe")
+
+    def ssl_context(self) -> ssl.SSLContext:
+        self.validate()
+        context = ssl.create_default_context(ssl.Purpose.SERVER_AUTH)
+        context.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_3 if self.tls_min_version == "1.3" else ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
+        context.check_hostname = True
+        context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
+        return context

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/machine_identity/registry.go

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+type registryDocument struct {
+	Version    string              `json:"version"`
+	Audience   string              `json:"audience"`
+	Principals []registryPrincipal `json:"principals"`
+}
+
+type registryPrincipal struct {
+	PrincipalID string        `json:"principal_id"`
+	Enabled     bool          `json:"enabled"`
+	Keys        []registryKey `json:"keys"`
+}
+
+type registryKey struct {
+	KeyID     string   `json:"kid"`
+	PublicKey string   `json:"public_key_base64url"`
+	Status    string   `json:"status"`
+	Scopes    []string `json:"scopes"`
+}
+
+func LoadRegistry(filePath, expectedAudience string) (*Registry, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(filePath) == "" || !validAudiences[expectedAudience] {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine principal registry path and audience are required")
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filePath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("read machine principal registry")
+	}
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	var document registryDocument
+	if err = decoder.Decode(&document); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	if err = decoder.Decode(&struct{}{}); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	if document.Version != "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1" || document.Audience != expectedAudience || len(document.Principals) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	records := make([]KeyRecord, 0)
+	for _, principal := range document.Principals {
+		if len(principal.Keys) == 0 {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+		}
+		for _, key := range principal.Keys {
+			publicKey, decodeErr := base64.RawURLEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(key.PublicKey)
+			if decodeErr != nil || len(publicKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize || (key.Status != "active" && key.Status != "revoked") {
+				return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+			}
+			records = append(records, KeyRecord{Principal: principal.PrincipalID, KeyID: key.KeyID, PublicKey: ed25519.PublicKey(publicKey), Audience: document.Audience,
+				Scopes: key.Scopes, Enabled: principal.Enabled, Revoked: key.Status == "revoked"})
+		}
+	}
+	return NewRegistry(records...)
+}

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/machine_identity/token.go

@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"path"
+	"regexp"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+)
+
+var (
+	principalPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$`)
+	keyIDPattern     = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$`)
+	tokenIDPattern   = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,64}$`)
+	validAudiences   = map[string]bool{"yovision-sense": true, "yovision-brain": true, "yovision-bell": true}
+	validScopes      = map[string]bool{"source-config:write": true, "runtime-status:write": true, "events:ingest": true, "evidence:read": true}
+)
+
+const (
+	Version       = "yovision.machine-identity/v1"
+	TokenType     = "YOVISION-MACHINE+JWT"
+	MaxLifetime   = 5 * time.Minute
+	AllowedSkew   = 30 * time.Second
+	MaxKeyOverlap = 24 * time.Hour
+)
+
+type Error struct{ Code string }
+
+func (e *Error) Error() string { return e.Code }
+
+func codeError(code string) error { return &Error{Code: code} }
+
+// BearerToken deliberately has no cookie or query fallback.
+func BearerToken(authorization string) (string, error) {
+	parts := strings.Split(authorization, " ")
+	if len(parts) != 2 || !strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "Bearer") || parts[1] == "" || strings.ContainsAny(parts[1], " \t\r\n,") {
+		return "", codeError("machine_token_missing")
+	}
+	return parts[1], nil
+}
+
+type Claims struct {
+	Version    string   `json:"ver"`
+	Issuer     string   `json:"iss"`
+	Subject    string   `json:"sub"`
+	Audience   string   `json:"aud"`
+	Scopes     []string `json:"scope"`
+	IssuedAt   int64    `json:"iat"`
+	NotBefore  int64    `json:"nbf"`
+	ExpiresAt  int64    `json:"exp"`
+	TokenID    string   `json:"jti"`
+	Method     string   `json:"htm"`
+	Path       string   `json:"htu"`
+	BodySHA256 string   `json:"body_sha256"`
+}
+
+type protectedHeader struct {
+	Algorithm string `json:"alg"`
+	Type      string `json:"typ"`
+	KeyID     string `json:"kid"`
+	Version   string `json:"ver"`
+}
+
+type KeyRecord struct {
+	Principal string
+	KeyID     string
+	PublicKey ed25519.PublicKey
+	Audience  string
+	Scopes    []string
+	Enabled   bool
+	Revoked   bool
+}
+
+type Registry struct {
+	mu   sync.RWMutex
+	keys map[string]KeyRecord
+}
+
+func NewRegistry(records ...KeyRecord) (*Registry, error) {
+	r := &Registry{keys: make(map[string]KeyRecord, len(records))}
+	for _, record := range records {
+		if !keyIDPattern.MatchString(record.KeyID) || !principalPattern.MatchString(record.Principal) || !validAudiences[record.Audience] || len(record.PublicKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize || !validScopeList(record.Scopes) {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid machine key record")
+		}
+		if _, exists := r.keys[record.KeyID]; exists {
+			return nil, errors.New("duplicate machine key id")
+		}
+		record.PublicKey = slices.Clone(record.PublicKey)
+		record.Scopes = slices.Clone(record.Scopes)
+		r.keys[record.KeyID] = record
+	}
+	return r, nil
+}
+
+func (r *Registry) Lookup(keyID string) (KeyRecord, bool) {
+	r.mu.RLock()
+	defer r.mu.RUnlock()
+	record, ok := r.keys[keyID]
+	record.PublicKey = slices.Clone(record.PublicKey)
+	record.Scopes = slices.Clone(record.Scopes)
+	return record, ok
+}
+
+func (r *Registry) Revoke(keyID string) bool {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	record, ok := r.keys[keyID]
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	record.Revoked = true
+	r.keys[keyID] = record
+	return true
+}
+
+type ReplayStore struct {
+	mu   sync.Mutex
+	used map[string]time.Time
+}
+
+// ReplayCache must atomically persist accepted (principal, jti) pairs until
+// expiry. ReplayStore is process-local and intended for tests or a single
+// uninterrupted process; connector implementations inject a durable store.
+type ReplayCache interface {
+	Consume(principal, tokenID string, expiresAt, now time.Time) bool
+}
+
+func NewReplayStore() *ReplayStore { return &ReplayStore{used: map[string]time.Time{}} }
+
+func (s *ReplayStore) Consume(principal, tokenID string, expiresAt, now time.Time) bool {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	for key, expiry := range s.used {
+		if !expiry.After(now) {
+			delete(s.used, key)
+		}
+	}
+	key := principal + "\x00" + tokenID
+	if _, exists := s.used[key]; exists {
+		return false
+	}
+	s.used[key] = expiresAt
+	return true
+}
+
+type Signer struct {
+	Principal  string
+	KeyID      string
+	PrivateKey ed25519.PrivateKey
+	Now        func() time.Time
+}
+
+func LoadPrivateKey(path string) (ed25519.PrivateKey, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(path) == "" {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key path is required")
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("read machine private key")
+	}
+	block, rest := pem.Decode(raw)
+	if block == nil || len(bytes.TrimSpace(rest)) != 0 || block.Type != "PRIVATE KEY" {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key must be one PKCS#8 PEM block")
+	}
+	parsed, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("parse machine private key")
+	}
+	key, ok := parsed.(ed25519.PrivateKey)
+	if !ok || len(key) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key is not Ed25519")
+	}
+	return slices.Clone(key), nil
+}
+
+func (s Signer) Mint(audience string, scopes []string, method, requestPath string, body []byte) (string, error) {
+	if !principalPattern.MatchString(s.Principal) || !keyIDPattern.MatchString(s.KeyID) || len(s.PrivateKey) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize || !validAudiences[audience] || !validScopeList(scopes) {
+		return "", errors.New("incomplete machine signer configuration")
+	}
+	normalizedPath, err := normalizePath(requestPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	method = strings.ToUpper(method)
+	if !allowedMethod(method) {
+		return "", errors.New("unsupported machine request method")
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	if s.Now != nil {
+		now = s.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	tokenID, err := randomTokenID()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	claims := Claims{Version: Version, Issuer: s.Principal, Subject: s.Principal, Audience: audience,
+		Scopes: slices.Clone(scopes), IssuedAt: now.Unix(), NotBefore: now.Unix(), ExpiresAt: now.Add(MaxLifetime).Unix(),
+		TokenID: tokenID, Method: method, Path: normalizedPath, BodySHA256: hex.EncodeToString(digest[:])}
+	header := protectedHeader{Algorithm: "EdDSA", Type: TokenType, KeyID: s.KeyID, Version: Version}
+	headerJSON, _ := json.Marshal(header)
+	claimsJSON, _ := json.Marshal(claims)
+	signingInput := rawBase64(headerJSON) + "." + rawBase64(claimsJSON)
+	signature := ed25519.Sign(s.PrivateKey, []byte(signingInput))
+	return signingInput + "." + rawBase64(signature), nil
+}
+
+type Verifier struct {
+	Registry *Registry
+	Replay   ReplayCache
+	Now      func() time.Time
+}
+
+func (v Verifier) Verify(token, audience, requiredScope, method, requestPath string, body []byte) (Claims, error) {
+	if v.Registry == nil || v.Replay == nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
+	if len(parts) != 3 || strings.Contains(token, "=") {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	headerBytes, err := decodeRaw(parts[0])
+	if err != nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	var header protectedHeader
+	if err = decodeClosed(headerBytes, &header); err != nil || header.Algorithm != "EdDSA" || header.Type != TokenType || header.Version != Version || !keyIDPattern.MatchString(header.KeyID) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	record, ok := v.Registry.Lookup(header.KeyID)
+	if !ok {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	signature, err := decodeRaw(parts[2])
+	if err != nil || len(signature) != ed25519.SignatureSize || !ed25519.Verify(record.PublicKey, []byte(parts[0]+"."+parts[1]), signature) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if !record.Enabled || record.Revoked {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_identity_revoked")
+	}
+	claimsBytes, err := decodeRaw(parts[1])
+	if err != nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	var claims Claims
+	if err = decodeClosed(claimsBytes, &claims); err != nil || !validClaimsShape(claims) || claims.Issuer != record.Principal || claims.Subject != record.Principal {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	if v.Now != nil {
+		now = v.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	nowUnix := now.Unix()
+	if claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt <= 0 || claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt > int64(MaxLifetime/time.Second) ||
+		claims.NotBefore < claims.IssuedAt || claims.NotBefore > claims.ExpiresAt || claims.IssuedAt > nowUnix+int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if claims.NotBefore > nowUnix+int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) || claims.ExpiresAt < nowUnix-int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_expired")
+	}
+	if claims.Audience != audience || record.Audience != audience {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_audience_denied")
+	}
+	if !slices.Contains(claims.Scopes, requiredScope) || !slices.Contains(record.Scopes, requiredScope) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_scope_denied")
+	}
+	normalizedPath, err := normalizePath(requestPath)
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	if err != nil || claims.Method != strings.ToUpper(method) || claims.Path != normalizedPath || claims.BodySHA256 != hex.EncodeToString(digest[:]) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if !v.Replay.Consume(claims.Issuer, claims.TokenID, time.Unix(claims.ExpiresAt, 0).Add(AllowedSkew), now) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_replayed")
+	}
+	return claims, nil
+}
+
+func decodeClosed(raw []byte, target any) error {
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	if err := decoder.Decode(target); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := decoder.Decode(&struct{}{}); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		if err == nil {
+			return errors.New("trailing JSON value")
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func validClaimsShape(claims Claims) bool {
+	if claims.Version != Version || !principalPattern.MatchString(claims.Issuer) || claims.Subject != claims.Issuer || !validAudiences[claims.Audience] || !tokenIDPattern.MatchString(claims.TokenID) ||
+		len(claims.Scopes) == 0 || len(claims.Scopes) > 4 || !allowedMethod(claims.Method) || claims.Path == "" || len(claims.BodySHA256) != 64 {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !validScopeList(claims.Scopes) {
+		return false
+	}
+	_, err := hex.DecodeString(claims.BodySHA256)
+	return err == nil
+}
+
+func validScopeList(scopes []string) bool {
+	if len(scopes) == 0 || len(scopes) > 4 {
+		return false
+	}
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, scope := range scopes {
+		if !validScopes[scope] || seen[scope] {
+			return false
+		}
+		seen[scope] = true
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func normalizePath(value string) (string, error) {
+	parsed, err := url.ParseRequestURI(value)
+	if err != nil || parsed.IsAbs() || parsed.Host != "" || parsed.RawQuery != "" || parsed.Fragment != "" || parsed.Path == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(parsed.Path, "/") || strings.Contains(parsed.Path, "\\") || strings.Contains(parsed.Path, "//") || path.Clean(parsed.Path) != parsed.Path {
+		return "", errors.New("machine request path must be a normalized absolute path without query or fragment")
+	}
+	return parsed.EscapedPath(), nil
+}
+
+func allowedMethod(method string) bool {
+	switch method {
+	case "GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE":
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
+func randomTokenID() (string, error) {
+	raw := make([]byte, 16)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("generate machine token id: %w", err)
+	}
+	return rawBase64(raw), nil
+}
+
+func rawBase64(value []byte) string { return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(value) }
+
+func decodeRaw(value string) ([]byte, error) {
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(value)
+}

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/machine_identity/token_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type crossLanguageVector struct {
+	PublicKey string `json:"public_key_base64url"`
+	Token     string `json:"token"`
+	Now       int64  `json:"now"`
+	Audience  string `json:"audience"`
+	Scope     string `json:"required_scope"`
+	Method    string `json:"method"`
+	Path      string `json:"path"`
+	Body      string `json:"body_base64"`
+}
+
+func testIdentity(t *testing.T) (Signer, *Registry, time.Time) {
+	t.Helper()
+	publicKey, privateKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	now := time.Unix(1_800_000_000, 0).UTC()
+	registry, err := NewRegistry(KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:sense:site-a", KeyID: "sense-key-0001", PublicKey: publicKey,
+		Audience: "yovision-brain", Scopes: []string{"source-config:write"}, Enabled: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return Signer{Principal: "yv:sense:site-a", KeyID: "sense-key-0001", PrivateKey: privateKey, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}, registry, now
+}
+
+func errorCode(t *testing.T, err error) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	var coded *Error
+	if !errors.As(err, &coded) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected coded error, got %v", err)
+	}
+	return coded.Code
+}
+
+func TestMintAndVerifyRequestBoundToken(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte(`{"revision":7}`)
+	token, err := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	claims, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if claims.Issuer != signer.Principal || claims.Subject != signer.Principal || claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt != 300 {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected claims: %+v", claims)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBearerTokenHasNoCookieOrQueryFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	if token, err := BearerToken("Bearer compact.token.value"); err != nil || token != "compact.token.value" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, value := range []string{"", "compact.token.value", "Bearer", "Bearer one two", "Cookie compact.token.value"} {
+		if _, err := BearerToken(value); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_missing" {
+			t.Fatalf("accepted %q", value)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRejectsReplayWrongAudienceScopeAndRequest(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte(`{"revision":7}`)
+	mint := func() string {
+		token, err := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		return token
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	token := mint()
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_replayed" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-bell", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_audience_denied" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-brain", "events:ingest", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_scope_denied" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", []byte("changed")); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_invalid" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExpiryRevocationAndRotation(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte("{}")
+	token, _ := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	expired := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now.Add(6 * time.Minute) }}
+	if _, err := expired.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_expired" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	oldPublic, oldPrivate, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	newPublic, newPrivate, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	rotation, err := NewRegistry(
+		KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-old-0001", PublicKey: oldPublic, Audience: "yovision-sense", Scopes: []string{"runtime-status:write"}, Enabled: true},
+		KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-new-0002", PublicKey: newPublic, Audience: "yovision-sense", Scopes: []string{"runtime-status:write"}, Enabled: true},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	oldSigner := Signer{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-old-0001", PrivateKey: oldPrivate, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	newSigner := Signer{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-new-0002", PrivateKey: newPrivate, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	oldToken, _ := oldSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	newToken, _ := newSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	verify := Verifier{Registry: rotation, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(oldToken, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(newToken, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !rotation.Revoke("brain-old-0001") {
+		t.Fatal("old key was not revoked")
+	}
+	oldAfterRevoke, _ := oldSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(oldAfterRevoke, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_identity_revoked" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTransportPolicyRejectsUnsafeTLS(t *testing.T) {
+	safe := TransportPolicy{TLSMinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12, VerifyCertificate: true, VerifyHostname: true,
+		ConnectTimeout: time.Second, ResponseHeaderTimeout: time.Second, RequestTimeout: 2 * time.Second, MaxRequestBytes: 1024}
+	if err := safe.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	unsafe := safe
+	unsafe.VerifyHostname = false
+	if err := unsafe.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unsafe hostname policy accepted")
+	}
+	unsafe = safe
+	unsafe.TLSMinVersion = tls.VersionTLS11
+	if err := unsafe.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("TLS 1.1 accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifiesCrossLanguageVector(t *testing.T) {
+	vectorPath := filepath.Join("..", "..", "..", "..", "..", "..", "contracts", "tests", "machine-identity-v1", "cross-language-vector.json")
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(vectorPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var vector crossLanguageVector
+	if err = json.Unmarshal(raw, &vector); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	publicKey, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(vector.PublicKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	body, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(vector.Body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	registry, err := NewRegistry(KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:vector", KeyID: "brain-vector-0001", PublicKey: ed25519.PublicKey(publicKey), Audience: vector.Audience, Scopes: []string{vector.Scope}, Enabled: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return time.Unix(vector.Now, 0) }}
+	claims, err := verifier.Verify(vector.Token, vector.Audience, vector.Scope, vector.Method, vector.Path, body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if claims.Issuer != "yv:brain:vector" {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected issuer: %s", claims.Issuer)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadsExternalPublicRegistryAndRejectsWrongAudience(t *testing.T) {
+	publicKey, _, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	document := map[string]any{
+		"version": "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1", "audience": "yovision-bell",
+		"principals": []any{map[string]any{"principal_id": "yv:sense:site-a", "enabled": true, "keys": []any{map[string]any{
+			"kid": "sense-key-0001", "public_key_base64url": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(publicKey), "status": "active", "scopes": []string{"events:ingest"},
+		}}}},
+	}
+	raw, _ := json.Marshal(document)
+	file := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "principals.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(file, raw, 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	registry, err := LoadRegistry(file, "yovision-bell")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if record, ok := registry.Lookup("sense-key-0001"); !ok || record.Principal != "yv:sense:site-a" {
+		t.Fatal("registry record missing")
+	}
+	if _, err = LoadRegistry(file, "yovision-sense"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("wrong registry audience accepted")
+	}
+}

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/machine_identity/transport.go

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type TransportPolicy struct {
+	TLSMinVersion         uint16
+	VerifyCertificate     bool
+	VerifyHostname        bool
+	ConnectTimeout        time.Duration
+	ResponseHeaderTimeout time.Duration
+	RequestTimeout        time.Duration
+	MaxRequestBytes       int64
+}
+
+func (p TransportPolicy) Validate() error {
+	if p.TLSMinVersion < tls.VersionTLS12 || !p.VerifyCertificate || !p.VerifyHostname || p.ConnectTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.ConnectTimeout > 30*time.Second ||
+		p.ResponseHeaderTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.ResponseHeaderTimeout > 30*time.Second || p.RequestTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.RequestTimeout > 60*time.Second ||
+		p.MaxRequestBytes < 1 || p.MaxRequestBytes > 10*1024*1024 {
+		return errors.New("machine transport policy is unsafe")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (p TransportPolicy) HTTPClient() (*http.Client, error) {
+	if err := p.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	transport := &http.Transport{
+		TLSClientConfig:       &tls.Config{MinVersion: p.TLSMinVersion},
+		TLSHandshakeTimeout:   p.ConnectTimeout,
+		ResponseHeaderTimeout: p.ResponseHeaderTimeout,
+	}
+	return &http.Client{Transport: transport, Timeout: p.RequestTimeout}, nil
+}

contracts/events/v1/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+# Standard event contract v1
+
+`yovision.event/v1` is the only shared representation of an anonymous safety event. It is an immutable fact, not a Bell Alert. Bell owns all rule matching, Alert, acknowledgement, close, notification and user/audit state.
+
+## Identity and idempotency
+
+The permanent idempotency key is the exact UTF-8 pair `(producer_id, source_event_id)`. `producer_id` always names the original producer. A Sense gateway/relay sends its own authenticated transport identity and optional `X-YoVision-Relay-ID`, but it must forward both key fields and the business payload unchanged. A retry is not a new event.
+
+After schema validation, calculate `payload_sha256` from the RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme representation of the complete Event. The checked-in vector fixes the expected digest for supported implementations. Bell stores key, digest and Bell `event_id` permanently:
+
+- absent key: atomically create Event/Receipt and return `201` with `disposition=created`;
+- same key and digest: return the original `event_id` and digest with `200`, `disposition=duplicate`;
+- same key but another digest: return `409 idempotency_conflict`, append an audit fact, and mutate neither Event nor Alert;
+- identity lookup and insert must share a transaction/unique constraint so concurrent duplicates have the same result.
+
+Canonical timestamps in Event v1 are UTC RFC 3339 with exactly three fractional digits and `Z`. Optional members are omitted, never sent as `null`. Producers must reject non-finite numbers before canonicalization.
+
+## Mapper responsibilities
+
+| Role | Required responsibility | Must not do |
+|---|---|---|
+| Brain producer mapper | Convert `brain.internal.event-candidate/v1` into stable original identity, logical site/device/profile/rule/region refs, model version and anonymous observation; generate one `source_event_id` once and persist/reuse it across retries. | Expose internal candidate fields, face/person identity, camera credentials, file paths, Alert state, or regenerate identity during retry. |
+| Sense producer/evidence mapper | When Sense originates an event, apply the same original-identity rule; map its internal evidence record to a logical evidence reference and own later status resolution. | Put local path, RTSP URL, signed URL, credential or Outbox attempt ID into Event. |
+| Sense relay | Authenticate as a transport hop, preserve original `producer_id`, `source_event_id` and payload, retain retry/audit state outside the Event, and return Bell's response unchanged enough for deterministic retry handling. | Replace producer identity, create a new source ID, enrich/reorder semantics, or treat `409`/`422` as a transient retry. |
+| Bell consumer mapper | Validate before persistence; canonicalize; enforce permanent idempotency; map the immutable shared Event into Bell's private Event/Receipt and then independently evaluate rules to create an Alert. Unknown evidence becomes degraded evidence, not a rejected Event. | Persist arbitrary extension fields, import producer internals, or accept shared ack/close/notification/user state. |
+
+Field ownership is deliberately narrow:
+
+| Contract fields | Authoritative writer | Relay/Bell responsibility |
+|---|---|---|
+| `schema_version`, `producer_id`, `source_event_id` | Original Brain or Sense producer mapper | Relay preserves; Bell uses version gate and permanent idempotency key. |
+| `site_ref`, `device_ref`, `profile_ref` | Producer mapper from versioned logical configuration | Relay preserves; Bell treats as opaque external refs. |
+| `event_type`, `occurred_at`, `severity`, `rule`, `model`, `observation`, `region` | Brain/Sense mapper at the detection decision | Relay preserves; Bell validates and stores the immutable snapshot. |
+| `evidence[]` identity and initial status | Evidence-owning producer, normally Sense | Relay preserves; Bell stores the Event snapshot and resolves current metadata separately. |
+| `X-YoVision-Relay-ID` | Authenticated Sense transport hop | Bell audits transport metadata outside the immutable Event. |
+| `event_id`, `disposition`, `payload_sha256` | Bell ingest boundary | Producer/relay retain the receipt for deterministic retries. |
+
+## Errors, compatibility and fallback
+
+- `400 invalid_event`: schema, canonical form, or sensitive/unknown member violation. Terminal until the producer fixes the payload.
+- `409 idempotency_conflict`: same permanent key with a different payload. Terminal and audited; never overwrite the first Event.
+- `422 unsupported_schema_version`: unknown major/revision. Terminal for that payload.
+- Evidence `pending`, `processing`, `success` and `failed` are valid Event states. Bell keeps the Event and resolves/degrades evidence independently.
+
+v1 is closed (`additionalProperties=false`). Producers may enable a compatible revision only after all relays and Bell validate it. Any removed/renamed required field, changed meaning, enum narrowing, identity/canonicalization change, or new required member publishes a new major path such as `/v2`. During the compatibility window Bell keeps the previous version endpoint. Rollback disables the new producer version and resumes the last accepted version; it does not delete Event, Receipt, Outbox or audit facts.
+
+Unknown-version fallback is explicit: Bell returns `422`; relay records the terminal rejection without rewriting the payload; producer may remap the same internal candidate into a supported v1 payload only if it has not previously assigned that `(producer_id, source_event_id)` to a different canonical payload. Otherwise it must stop and require operator reconciliation.
+
+## Reproducible verification
+
+No third-party package is needed:
+
+```powershell
+python contracts/tests/events-v1/test_contract.py
+python contracts/tests/evidence-v1/test_contract.py
+```
+
+The tests validate Schema/OpenAPI references, mapper fixtures, RFC 8785-compatible canonical vectors used by v1 examples, duplicate/conflict behavior, unknown versions and sensitive-field rejection.

contracts/events/v1/event.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/events/v1/event.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision anonymous safety event v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": [
+    "schema_version", "producer_id", "source_event_id", "site_ref", "device_ref",
+    "profile_ref", "event_type", "occurred_at", "severity", "rule", "model",
+    "observation", "region", "evidence"
+  ],
+  "properties": {
+    "schema_version": {"const": "yovision.event/v1"},
+    "producer_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "source_event_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "site_ref": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "device_ref": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "profile_ref": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "event_type": {"enum": ["dangerous_area_entered", "directional_line_crossed"]},
+    "occurred_at": {"type": "string", "format": "date-time", "pattern": "^[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}T[0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2}\\.[0-9]{3}Z$"},
+    "severity": {"enum": ["low", "medium", "high", "critical"]},
+    "rule": {
+      "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["rule_id", "version"],
+      "properties": {
+        "rule_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+        "version": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 64}
+      }
+    },
+    "model": {
+      "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["name", "version"],
+      "properties": {
+        "name": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 128},
+        "version": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 64}
+      }
+    },
+    "observation": {
+      "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": ["track_id", "category", "confidence"],
+      "properties": {
+        "track_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+        "category": {"enum": ["person", "vehicle", "other"]},
+        "confidence": {"type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 1},
+        "bbox_normalized": {
+          "type": "array", "minItems": 4, "maxItems": 4,
+          "items": {"type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 1}
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "region": {
+      "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": ["region_id", "kind"],
+      "properties": {
+        "region_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+        "kind": {"enum": ["area", "line"]},
+        "crossing_direction": {"enum": ["a_to_b", "b_to_a"]}
+      },
+      "allOf": [
+        {"if": {"properties": {"kind": {"const": "line"}}, "required": ["kind"]}, "then": {"required": ["crossing_direction"]}},
+        {"if": {"properties": {"kind": {"const": "area"}}, "required": ["kind"]}, "then": {"not": {"required": ["crossing_direction"]}}}
+      ]
+    },
+    "evidence": {
+      "type": "array", "maxItems": 8, "uniqueItems": true,
+      "items": {"$ref": "../../evidence/v1/evidence-reference.schema.json"}
+    }
+  },
+  "allOf": [
+    {
+      "if": {"properties": {"event_type": {"const": "dangerous_area_entered"}}, "required": ["event_type"]},
+      "then": {"properties": {"region": {"properties": {"kind": {"const": "area"}}}}}
+    },
+    {
+      "if": {"properties": {"event_type": {"const": "directional_line_crossed"}}, "required": ["event_type"]},
+      "then": {"properties": {"region": {"properties": {"kind": {"const": "line"}}}}}
+    }
+  ]
+}

contracts/events/v1/examples/dangerous-area.json

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.event/v1",
+  "producer_id": "brain-school-a",
+  "source_event_id": "evt-area-20260831-0001",
+  "site_ref": "site-school-a",
+  "device_ref": "camera-east-gate",
+  "profile_ref": "profile-main-stream",
+  "event_type": "dangerous_area_entered",
+  "occurred_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z",
+  "severity": "high",
+  "rule": {"rule_id": "rule-east-danger", "version": "3"},
+  "model": {"name": "anonymous-detector", "version": "2026.08"},
+  "observation": {"track_id": "track-0042", "category": "person", "confidence": 0.93, "bbox_normalized": [0.12, 0.2, 0.31, 0.74]},
+  "region": {"region_id": "region-east-danger", "kind": "area"},
+  "evidence": [
+    {
+      "schema_version": "yovision.evidence-reference/v1",
+      "evidence_id": "ev-school-east-0001",
+      "owner_id": "sense-school-a",
+      "type": "snapshot",
+      "status": "pending",
+      "captured_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z",
+      "status_updated_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z"
+    }
+  ]
+}

contracts/events/v1/examples/directional-line-crossed.json

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.event/v1",
+  "producer_id": "brain-school-a",
+  "source_event_id": "evt-line-20260831-0002",
+  "site_ref": "site-school-a",
+  "device_ref": "camera-north-corridor",
+  "profile_ref": "profile-main-stream",
+  "event_type": "directional_line_crossed",
+  "occurred_at": "2026-08-31T00:03:10.000Z",
+  "severity": "medium",
+  "rule": {"rule_id": "rule-north-one-way", "version": "1"},
+  "model": {"name": "anonymous-detector", "version": "2026.08"},
+  "observation": {"track_id": "track-0088", "category": "person", "confidence": 0.88},
+  "region": {"region_id": "line-north-one-way", "kind": "line", "crossing_direction": "b_to_a"},
+  "evidence": [
+    {
+      "schema_version": "yovision.evidence-reference/v1",
+      "evidence_id": "ev-school-east-0002",
+      "owner_id": "sense-school-a",
+      "type": "clip",
+      "status": "failed",
+      "captured_at": "2026-08-31T00:03:10.000Z",
+      "status_updated_at": "2026-08-31T00:03:13.100Z",
+      "failure": {"code": "processing_failed", "retryable": true}
+    }
+  ]
+}

contracts/events/v1/examples/duplicate-result.json

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{
+  "event_id": "bell-event-00000042",
+  "producer_id": "brain-school-a",
+  "source_event_id": "evt-area-20260831-0001",
+  "disposition": "duplicate",
+  "payload_sha256": "4cc1e93820195caf713ea675ff33f178c9d4997dd8a81cb61287e9fea0e3d5e1"
+}

contracts/events/v1/examples/idempotency-conflict-problem.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "code": "idempotency_conflict",
+  "message": "idempotency key already belongs to another canonical payload",
+  "existing_event_id": "bell-event-00000042"
+}

contracts/events/v1/examples/unsupported-version-problem.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "code": "unsupported_schema_version",
+  "message": "schema_version yovision.event/v2 is not accepted",
+  "field": "schema_version"
+}

contracts/events/v1/ingest-result.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/events/v1/ingest-result.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision Bell event ingest result v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": ["event_id", "producer_id", "source_event_id", "disposition", "payload_sha256"],
+  "properties": {
+    "event_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "producer_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "source_event_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "disposition": {"enum": ["created", "duplicate"]},
+    "payload_sha256": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-f0-9]{64}$"}
+  }
+}

contracts/events/v1/openapi.json

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+{
+  "openapi": "3.1.0",
+  "info": {"title": "YoVision standard event ingest API", "version": "1.0.0"},
+  "paths": {
+    "/v1/events": {
+      "post": {
+        "summary": "Ingest one immutable anonymous safety event",
+        "parameters": [
+          {"name": "X-YoVision-Relay-ID", "in": "header", "required": false, "description": "Audited transport hop. A relay must not change producer_id or source_event_id.", "schema": {"type": "string", "maxLength": 128}}
+        ],
+        "requestBody": {"required": true, "content": {"application/json": {"schema": {"$ref": "./event.schema.json"}}}},
+        "responses": {
+          "201": {"description": "Created", "content": {"application/json": {"schema": {"$ref": "./ingest-result.schema.json"}}}},
+          "200": {"description": "Exact duplicate; returns the original Bell Event identity", "content": {"application/json": {"schema": {"$ref": "./ingest-result.schema.json"}}}},
+          "400": {"description": "Invalid or sensitive payload", "content": {"application/problem+json": {"schema": {"$ref": "./problem.schema.json"}}}},
+          "409": {"description": "Same idempotency key with a different canonical payload", "content": {"application/problem+json": {"schema": {"$ref": "./problem.schema.json"}}}},
+          "422": {"description": "Unsupported schema major version", "content": {"application/problem+json": {"schema": {"$ref": "./problem.schema.json"}}}}
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

contracts/events/v1/problem.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/events/v1/problem.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision contract problem v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": ["code", "message"],
+  "properties": {
+    "code": {"enum": ["invalid_event", "unsupported_schema_version", "idempotency_conflict", "evidence_not_found", "evidence_expired"]},
+    "message": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 512},
+    "field": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9_.\\[\\]-]{1,128}$"},
+    "existing_event_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"}
+  }
+}

contracts/evidence/v1/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# Evidence reference contract v1
+
+This contract shares metadata about a logical evidence object. It never grants object access. `owner_id` identifies the service that owns resolution; `evidence_id` is opaque to every consumer. Neither field may be interpreted as a URL or local path.
+
+## State and degradation
+
+- `pending`: capture was accepted but no processing started.
+- `processing`: capture or encoding is in progress.
+- `success`: capture completed; `content_type` and SHA-256 `integrity` are required. Access authorization is negotiated outside this payload by the machine-identity/connector work.
+- `failed`: `failure.code` and `retryable` are required. Bell keeps the immutable Event and renders evidence unavailable; it must not reject or close the Alert because evidence failed.
+- HTTP `404` means an unknown logical reference. `410` means expired evidence. Both degrade evidence only, not the Event.
+
+The payload forbids arbitrary properties, so filesystem paths, camera credentials, bearer/user tokens, signed URLs, face templates and notification/Alert state fail schema validation. Do not add access URLs to v1. A short-lived download grant, if later required, needs a separately reviewed endpoint and security contract.
+
+## Ownership
+
+- Brain may request evidence but maps only logical metadata it actually knows.
+- Sense is the default evidence owner and advances the status monotonically for a given capture attempt: `pending -> processing -> success|failed`. It must retain the same `evidence_id` while status changes.
+- A relay transports the reference unchanged and must not resolve it into a path or URL.
+- Bell stores the latest evidence metadata separately from its immutable Event. Evidence failure/expiry never changes Alert ack/close state.
+
+## Compatibility and rollback
+
+v1 consumers ignore no unknown fields because the v1 schema is closed. Additive fields therefore require a new schema revision that producers enable only after consumers accept it. Changed meaning, removed fields, or new required fields require `/v2`. Rollback disables the new producer and continues resolving stored v1 references; it never deletes Event, Receipt, Outbox, or evidence audit facts.
+
+Run the standalone contract check from the repository root:
+
+```powershell
+python contracts/tests/evidence-v1/test_contract.py
+```

contracts/evidence/v1/evidence-reference.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/evidence/v1/evidence-reference.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision evidence logical reference v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": [
+    "schema_version",
+    "evidence_id",
+    "owner_id",
+    "type",
+    "status",
+    "captured_at",
+    "status_updated_at"
+  ],
+  "properties": {
+    "schema_version": {"const": "yovision.evidence-reference/v1"},
+    "evidence_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "owner_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "type": {"enum": ["snapshot", "clip"]},
+    "status": {"enum": ["pending", "processing", "success", "failed"]},
+    "captured_at": {"type": "string", "format": "date-time"},
+    "status_updated_at": {"type": "string", "format": "date-time"},
+    "expires_at": {"type": "string", "format": "date-time"},
+    "content_type": {"enum": ["image/jpeg", "image/png", "video/mp4"]},
+    "integrity": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": ["algorithm", "digest", "size_bytes"],
+      "properties": {
+        "algorithm": {"const": "sha256"},
+        "digest": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-f0-9]{64}$"},
+        "size_bytes": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 0}
+      }
+    },
+    "failure": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": ["code", "retryable"],
+      "properties": {
+        "code": {"enum": ["capture_failed", "processing_failed", "expired", "unavailable"]},
+        "retryable": {"type": "boolean"}
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "allOf": [
+    {
+      "if": {"properties": {"status": {"const": "success"}}, "required": ["status"]},
+      "then": {"required": ["content_type", "integrity"], "not": {"required": ["failure"]}}
+    },
+    {
+      "if": {"properties": {"status": {"const": "failed"}}, "required": ["status"]},
+      "then": {"required": ["failure"], "not": {"anyOf": [{"required": ["content_type"]}, {"required": ["integrity"]}]}}
+    },
+    {
+      "if": {"properties": {"status": {"enum": ["pending", "processing"]}}, "required": ["status"]},
+      "then": {"not": {"anyOf": [{"required": ["content_type"]}, {"required": ["integrity"]}, {"required": ["failure"]}]}}
+    }
+  ]
+}

contracts/evidence/v1/examples/failed.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.evidence-reference/v1",
+  "evidence_id": "ev-school-east-0002",
+  "owner_id": "sense-school-a",
+  "type": "clip",
+  "status": "failed",
+  "captured_at": "2026-08-31T00:03:10.000Z",
+  "status_updated_at": "2026-08-31T00:03:13.100Z",
+  "failure": {"code": "processing_failed", "retryable": true}
+}

contracts/evidence/v1/examples/pending.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.evidence-reference/v1",
+  "evidence_id": "ev-school-east-0001",
+  "owner_id": "sense-school-a",
+  "type": "snapshot",
+  "status": "pending",
+  "captured_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z",
+  "status_updated_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z"
+}

contracts/evidence/v1/examples/success.json

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.evidence-reference/v1",
+  "evidence_id": "ev-school-east-0001",
+  "owner_id": "sense-school-a",
+  "type": "snapshot",
+  "status": "success",
+  "captured_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z",
+  "status_updated_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:02.450Z",
+  "expires_at": "2026-09-07T00:00:01.125Z",
+  "content_type": "image/jpeg",
+  "integrity": {
+    "algorithm": "sha256",
+    "digest": "2f77668a9dfbf8d5848b9e6d7da867800b7b6790625f16b45a101f1ca1f7da75",
+    "size_bytes": 48215
+  }
+}

contracts/evidence/v1/openapi.json

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+{
+  "openapi": "3.1.0",
+  "info": {"title": "YoVision evidence reference API", "version": "1.0.0"},
+  "paths": {
+    "/v1/evidence/{evidence_id}": {
+      "get": {
+        "summary": "Resolve current metadata for a logical evidence reference",
+        "parameters": [
+          {"name": "evidence_id", "in": "path", "required": true, "schema": {"type": "string"}}
+        ],
+        "responses": {
+          "200": {"description": "Current metadata, including pending, processing, success or failed states", "content": {"application/json": {"schema": {"$ref": "./evidence-reference.schema.json"}}}},
+          "404": {"description": "Unknown logical reference", "content": {"application/problem+json": {"schema": {"$ref": "../../events/v1/problem.schema.json"}}}},
+          "410": {"description": "Evidence expired; event remains valid", "content": {"application/problem+json": {"schema": {"$ref": "../../events/v1/problem.schema.json"}}}}
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

contracts/machine-identity/v1/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# Machine identity contract v1
+
+`yovision.machine-identity/v1` defines service-to-service identity for YoVision connectors. It is deliberately separate from Sense and Bell users, GoAdmin JWT/Cookie state, database roles and operating-system accounts.
+
+## Authentication mechanism
+
+Every request uses HTTPS and one compact Ed25519 JWS in `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. The protected header is closed and contains `alg=EdDSA`, `typ=YOVISION-MACHINE+JWT`, `kid` and `ver=yovision.machine-identity/v1`. The closed claims object contains:
+
+mTLS is not the primary v1 identity mechanism. A customer PKI may add mTLS later as transport hardening, but it cannot replace or weaken the v1 principal, audience, scope, request binding, replay and revocation checks.
+
+- one instance-specific `iss`/`sub` principal;
+- one exact service `aud`;
+- the minimum required `scope` values;
+- `iat`, `nbf`, `exp` and a single-use random `jti`;
+- uppercase HTTP method `htm`, normalized absolute-path reference `htu`, and lowercase SHA-256 `body_sha256`.
+
+Tokens live for at most 300 seconds. Consumers allow at most 30 seconds of clock skew, verify the signature and active key/principal before authorization, then atomically consume `jti` until `exp + skew`. Retrying transport creates a new token and `jti`; business idempotency keys remain unchanged.
+
+Production consumers persist the replay key `(principal, jti)` in their own durable store so a process restart cannot reopen the replay window. The checked-in process-local replay stores are adapter test/default primitives only; connector tasks must inject an atomic durable implementation and test restart behavior without sharing a database across products.
+
+The v1 scopes are:
+
+| Caller | Audience | Scope |
+|---|---|---|
+| Sense | `yovision-brain` | `source-config:write` |
+| Brain | `yovision-sense` | `runtime-status:write` |
+| Brain or Sense | `yovision-bell` | `events:ingest` |
+| Bell | `yovision-sense` | `evidence:read` |
+
+No wildcard audience or scope exists. A relay authenticates as its own transport principal and never replaces the original event producer identity.
+
+## Key lifecycle
+
+Private Ed25519 keys are generated per product instance and stored outside the repository in an OS-protected file or secret store. Runtime configuration contains only the private-key path. Public registries are local consumer configuration, not a shared database.
+
+Rotation first registers a new `kid`, switches the caller, and removes the old key after an overlap no longer than 24 hours. A disabled principal or revoked `kid` is rejected on every request, including tokens that have not expired. Emergency rollback disables the connector; it never enables a shared password, browser token, query token, plaintext transport or signature bypass.
+
+## Threat boundary
+
+v1 protects against token modification, wrong audience/scope, expired or premature tokens, captured-token replay, key/principal revocation and accidental credential mixing. It does not protect a host after administrator/root compromise, a stolen usable private key before revocation, compromised TLS trust roots, endpoint implementation flaws or denial of service. Rate and body-size limits remain consumer responsibilities.
+
+See `../transport/v1/README.md` for HTTPS and request policy. Stable failures are defined in `errors.md`; callers and logs must expose only the stable code, principal/kid when already authenticated, and correlation ID—never the token, signature, private/public key material or complete Authorization header.
+
+## Compatibility
+
+v1 is closed. New optional claims require all consumers to accept them before producers emit them. Any change to signing input, algorithm, claim meaning, replay semantics, maximum lifetime, audience or scope meaning publishes a new major version. Consumers keep the last accepted major during a controlled migration; rollback disables the new producer version without weakening verification.
+
+## Reproducible verification
+
+From the repository root:
+
+```powershell
+pwsh -NoProfile -File contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/run.ps1
+
+cd Sense/server
+go test -race ./app/sense/integration/machine_identity
+
+cd ../../Bell/server
+go test -race ./app/bell/integration/machine_identity
+```
+
+The isolated contract test validates both JSON Schemas, the fixed Go/Python Ed25519 vector, request binding, exact audience/scope, expiry, replay, rotation overlap, revocation, bearer-only extraction and verified TLS policy. Product connector tasks remain responsible for injecting a durable replay store and testing restart recovery.

contracts/machine-identity/v1/errors.md

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Machine identity v1 stable errors
+
+| Code | Meaning | Retry |
+|---|---|---|
+| `machine_token_missing` | Authorization bearer token is absent or malformed | No, fix request |
+| `machine_token_invalid` | Header, claims, signature, request binding or key is invalid | No |
+| `machine_token_expired` | Token is outside its accepted time window | Mint a new token |
+| `machine_audience_denied` | Exact audience does not match | No |
+| `machine_scope_denied` | Required scope is absent or not granted to the key | No |
+| `machine_identity_revoked` | Principal or key is disabled/revoked | No; operator action |
+| `machine_token_replayed` | The same principal/jti was already accepted | Retry with a new token and the same business idempotency key |
+| `machine_transport_required` | HTTPS policy is not satisfied | No; fix deployment |
+
+Responses and audit facts never include the token, signature, key material or Authorization header.

contracts/machine-identity/v1/machine-token.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/machine-identity/v1/machine-token.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision machine token claims v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": ["ver", "iss", "sub", "aud", "scope", "iat", "nbf", "exp", "jti", "htm", "htu", "body_sha256"],
+  "properties": {
+    "ver": {"const": "yovision.machine-identity/v1"},
+    "iss": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$"},
+    "sub": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$"},
+    "aud": {"enum": ["yovision-sense", "yovision-brain", "yovision-bell"]},
+    "scope": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "minItems": 1,
+      "maxItems": 4,
+      "uniqueItems": true,
+      "items": {"enum": ["source-config:write", "runtime-status:write", "events:ingest", "evidence:read"]}
+    },
+    "iat": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 0},
+    "nbf": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 0},
+    "exp": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 0},
+    "jti": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,64}$"},
+    "htm": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^(GET|POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)$"},
+    "htu": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^/[A-Za-z0-9._~!$&'()*+,;=:@%/-]*$"},
+    "body_sha256": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-f0-9]{64}$"}
+  }
+}

contracts/machine-identity/v1/principal-registry.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/machine-identity/v1/principal-registry.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision machine principal registry v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": ["version", "audience", "principals"],
+  "properties": {
+    "version": {"const": "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1"},
+    "audience": {"enum": ["yovision-sense", "yovision-brain", "yovision-bell"]},
+    "principals": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "items": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "additionalProperties": false,
+        "required": ["principal_id", "enabled", "keys"],
+        "properties": {
+          "principal_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$"},
+          "enabled": {"type": "boolean"},
+          "keys": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "items": {
+              "type": "object",
+              "additionalProperties": false,
+              "required": ["kid", "public_key_base64url", "status", "scopes"],
+              "properties": {
+                "kid": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$"},
+                "public_key_base64url": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$"},
+                "status": {"enum": ["active", "revoked"]},
+                "scopes": {"type": "array", "minItems": 1, "maxItems": 4, "uniqueItems": true, "items": {"enum": ["source-config:write", "runtime-status:write", "events:ingest", "evidence:read"]}}
+              }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

contracts/runtime-status/v1/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# Brain → Sense 运行与健康状态契约 v1
+
+本目录是 Brain 运行状态到 Sense 运维投影的版本化事实源。Brain 只发布脱敏状态事实；Sense 不读取 Brain 的缓存、数据库或内部运行对象，也不能借此契约执行远程命令。
+
+## 消息与时间语义
+
+- `schema_version` 固定为 `yovision.runtime-status/v1`。生产者必须先通过 `runtime-status.schema.json` 再发布。
+- `status_id` 是消息幂等键；`sequence` 在单个 `brain_instance_ref` 内单调递增。重复消息可忽略；小于当前已保存 sequence 的消息不得覆盖投影。
+- `observed_at` 是 Brain 完成该次观测的 UTC RFC 3339 时间，不是 Sense 的接收时间。允许最大 30 秒未来时钟偏差；超过时拒绝该消息，并保留最后已知投影。
+- Brain 的推荐发布周期是 30 秒。Sense 以 `evaluation_time - observed_at > 90 秒` 推导 `stale`；恰好 90 秒仍为 fresh。`stale` 和 `offline` 都是 Sense 的传输/时间投影，不是 Brain 写入的运行状态。
+- 未收到任何有效状态时显示 `not_received`；传输断开但最后状态未过期时显示 `offline_fresh`；传输断开或无新消息且超过 90 秒时显示 `offline_stale` / `stale`，同时保留最后已知状态及其观测时间。
+
+## 状态机
+
+Brain 报告的 `runtime.state` 和每个输入的 `state` 使用同一枚举：
+
+| 状态 | 含义 | 允许的下一状态 |
+|---|---|---|
+| `unconfigured` | 尚无可运行配置 | `starting`, `stopped` |
+| `starting` | 已接受启动，资源准备中 | `running`, `degraded`, `failed`, `stopped` |
+| `running` | 正常提供推理 | `degraded`, `failed`, `stopped` |
+| `degraded` | 仍提供有限服务 | `running`, `failed`, `stopped` |
+| `failed` | 无法继续提供服务 | `starting`, `stopped` |
+| `stopped` | 已有序停止 | `starting`, `unconfigured` |
+
+首次有效消息可为任一状态；Sense 只校验同实例连续消息的迁移。`stale`、`offline_*` 不参与 Brain 状态迁移。恢复连接后，只有 schema、时间、sequence 和状态迁移均有效的新消息才能更新投影。
+
+## 配置流与 revision
+
+`configurations` 按 #148 的配置流报告，可以为空，也可以包含多个配置。每项 `config_id` 必须唯一，并与 `yovision.source-config/v1` 的 `config_id` 一致；重复 ID 使整条状态无效，不能覆盖最后已知投影。`applied_revision` 是 Brain 对该配置流已实际应用的 integer revision。Sense 必须逐个 `config_id` 与自己已投递的期望 revision 比较：相等为 synchronized，不相等为 mismatch；Sense 的期望 revision 不进入本消息，避免产生第二事实源。
+
+- `not_configured`：尚未应用该配置，revision 必须为 null。
+- `applying`：正在应用；revision 为 null 或仍在运行的上一个 revision。
+- `applied`：应用成功，revision 必须是大于等于 1 的整数。
+- `rejected`：本次应用被拒绝；revision 为 null 或最后成功 revision，且必须带稳定错误码。
+
+## 兼容与回退
+
+- v1 字段语义冻结，未知字段被拒绝。新增可选字段或错误码前必须更新本契约及双方测试；改变字段语义或删除字段发布新主版本。
+- 消费者必须按 `schema_version` 先分派到对应版本验证器。未知主版本停止摄取并记录 `UNSUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSION`，不得清空或覆盖最后已知投影。
+- 回退时 Sense 停止摄取新版本，继续使用上一冻结版本的 adapter 和最后已知投影。回退不触发 Brain 重启或运行态修改。
+
+## 安全边界
+
+只允许 Schema 列出的字段。逻辑引用不允许 `/` 或 `\\`，因此不能携带绝对路径。消息不得包含凭据/token、堆栈、内部路径、用户会话、客户视频/图像、人脸信息或业务 Alert。结构化错误只传稳定错误码，不传自由文本错误详情。
+
+错误码、映射责任和可复制验证分别见 `error-codes.md`、`mapping.md` 与 `../../tests/runtime-status-v1/README.md`。

contracts/runtime-status/v1/error-codes.md

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# v1 稳定错误码
+
+生产者可以发布以下稳定错误码。消费者遇到符合格式但尚未认识的 v1 错误码时显示“未识别的远端错误”，保留原始代码用于排障，不把它转换成业务 Alert。
+
+| 错误码 | 责任域 | 含义 |
+|---|---|---|
+| `CONFIG_INVALID` | 配置 | 配置结构或值无效 |
+| `CONFIG_REVISION_UNAVAILABLE` | 配置 | 指定 revision 无法取得 |
+| `INPUT_UNREACHABLE` | 输入 | 逻辑输入暂时不可达 |
+| `INPUT_DECODE_FAILED` | 输入 | 输入解码失败 |
+| `MODEL_LOAD_FAILED` | 模型 | 模型载入失败 |
+| `INFERENCE_FAILED` | 推理 | 推理管线失败 |
+| `RESOURCE_PRESSURE` | 运行 | 资源压力导致降级 |
+| `INTERNAL_COMPONENT_FAILED` | 运行 | 内部组件失败；不随消息暴露组件路径或堆栈 |
+
+`UNSUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSION`、`FUTURE_OBSERVATION`、`OUT_OF_ORDER_STATUS` 与 `INVALID_STATUS_TRANSITION` 是 Sense adapter 的本地摄取错误，不由 Brain 发布。

contracts/runtime-status/v1/examples/invalid/business-alert.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.runtime-status/v1",
+  "status_id": "018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d205",
+  "brain_instance_ref": "brain-east-01",
+  "sequence": 1,
+  "observed_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:00Z",
+  "runtime": { "state": "running", "version": "1.0.0", "started_at": null },
+  "model": { "model_ref": "people-detection", "version": "1.0.0" },
+  "configurations": [
+    { "config_id": "gate-primary", "apply_state": "applied", "applied_revision": 1, "error_code": null }
+  ],
+  "health": { "overall": "healthy", "error_codes": [], "metrics": { "load_percent": 1, "queue_depth": 0, "latency_ms": 1 } },
+  "inputs": [],
+  "alert": { "kind": "intrusion" }
+}

contracts/runtime-status/v1/examples/invalid/credential.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.runtime-status/v1",
+  "status_id": "018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d202",
+  "brain_instance_ref": "brain-east-01",
+  "sequence": 1,
+  "observed_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:00Z",
+  "runtime": { "state": "running", "version": "1.0.0", "started_at": null },
+  "model": { "model_ref": "people-detection", "version": "1.0.0" },
+  "configurations": [
+    { "config_id": "gate-primary", "apply_state": "applied", "applied_revision": 1, "error_code": null }
+  ],
+  "health": { "overall": "healthy", "error_codes": [], "metrics": { "load_percent": 1, "queue_depth": 0, "latency_ms": 1 } },
+  "inputs": [],
+  "access_token": "forbidden-example"
+}

contracts/runtime-status/v1/examples/invalid/duplicate-config-id.json

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.runtime-status/v1",
+  "status_id": "018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d206",
+  "brain_instance_ref": "brain-east-01",
+  "sequence": 47,
+  "observed_at": "2026-08-31T00:05:00Z",
+  "runtime": { "state": "degraded", "version": "1.0.0", "started_at": "2026-08-30T23:55:00Z" },
+  "model": { "model_ref": "people-detection", "version": "2026.08.1" },
+  "configurations": [
+    { "config_id": "gate-primary", "apply_state": "applied", "applied_revision": 21, "error_code": null },
+    { "config_id": "gate-primary", "apply_state": "rejected", "applied_revision": 20, "error_code": "CONFIG_INVALID" }
+  ],
+  "health": {
+    "overall": "degraded",
+    "error_codes": ["CONFIG_INVALID"],
+    "metrics": { "load_percent": 42, "queue_depth": 1, "latency_ms": 31 }
+  },
+  "inputs": []
+}

contracts/runtime-status/v1/examples/invalid/internal-path.json

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.runtime-status/v1",
+  "status_id": "018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d203",
+  "brain_instance_ref": "brain-east-01",
+  "sequence": 1,
+  "observed_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:00Z",
+  "runtime": { "state": "running", "version": "1.0.0", "started_at": null },
+  "model": { "model_ref": "C:\\models\\private.pt", "version": "1.0.0" },
+  "configurations": [
+    { "config_id": "gate-primary", "apply_state": "applied", "applied_revision": 1, "error_code": null }
+  ],
+  "health": { "overall": "healthy", "error_codes": [], "metrics": { "load_percent": 1, "queue_depth": 0, "latency_ms": 1 } },
+  "inputs": []
+}

contracts/runtime-status/v1/examples/invalid/unknown-major.json

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.runtime-status/v2",
+  "status_id": "018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d201",
+  "brain_instance_ref": "brain-east-01",
+  "sequence": 1,
+  "observed_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:00Z",
+  "runtime": { "state": "running", "version": "1.0.0", "started_at": null },
+  "model": { "model_ref": "people-detection", "version": "1.0.0" },
+  "configurations": [
+    { "config_id": "gate-primary", "apply_state": "applied", "applied_revision": 1, "error_code": null }
+  ],
+  "health": { "overall": "healthy", "error_codes": [], "metrics": { "load_percent": 1, "queue_depth": 0, "latency_ms": 1 } },
+  "inputs": []
+}

contracts/runtime-status/v1/examples/invalid/user-session.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.runtime-status/v1",
+  "status_id": "018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d204",
+  "brain_instance_ref": "brain-east-01",
+  "sequence": 1,
+  "observed_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:00Z",
+  "runtime": { "state": "running", "version": "1.0.0", "started_at": null },
+  "model": { "model_ref": "people-detection", "version": "1.0.0" },
+  "configurations": [
+    { "config_id": "gate-primary", "apply_state": "applied", "applied_revision": 1, "error_code": null }
+  ],
+  "health": { "overall": "healthy", "error_codes": [], "metrics": { "load_percent": 1, "queue_depth": 0, "latency_ms": 1 } },
+  "inputs": [],
+  "user_session": { "user": "forbidden" }
+}

contracts/runtime-status/v1/examples/valid/config-mismatch.json

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.runtime-status/v1",
+  "status_id": "018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d103",
+  "brain_instance_ref": "brain-east-01",
+  "sequence": 43,
+  "observed_at": "2026-08-31T00:01:00Z",
+  "runtime": { "state": "running", "version": "1.0.0", "started_at": "2026-08-30T23:55:00Z" },
+  "model": { "model_ref": "people-detection", "version": "2026.08.1" },
+  "configurations": [
+    { "config_id": "gate-primary", "apply_state": "applied", "applied_revision": 20, "error_code": null }
+  ],
+  "health": {
+    "overall": "healthy",
+    "error_codes": [],
+    "metrics": { "load_percent": 40.0, "queue_depth": 0, "latency_ms": 22.0 }
+  },
+  "inputs": []
+}

contracts/runtime-status/v1/examples/valid/configuration-states.json

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.runtime-status/v1",
+  "status_id": "018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d107",
+  "brain_instance_ref": "brain-east-01",
+  "sequence": 46,
+  "observed_at": "2026-08-31T00:04:30Z",
+  "runtime": { "state": "degraded", "version": "1.0.0", "started_at": "2026-08-30T23:55:00Z" },
+  "model": { "model_ref": "people-detection", "version": "2026.08.1" },
+  "configurations": [
+    { "config_id": "new-stream", "apply_state": "not_configured", "applied_revision": null, "error_code": null },
+    { "config_id": "yard-secondary", "apply_state": "applying", "applied_revision": 8, "error_code": null },
+    { "config_id": "gate-primary", "apply_state": "applied", "applied_revision": 21, "error_code": null },
+    { "config_id": "warehouse", "apply_state": "rejected", "applied_revision": 3, "error_code": "CONFIG_INVALID" }
+  ],
+  "health": {
+    "overall": "degraded",
+    "error_codes": ["CONFIG_INVALID"],
+    "metrics": { "load_percent": 42, "queue_depth": 1, "latency_ms": 31 }
+  },
+  "inputs": []
+}

contracts/runtime-status/v1/examples/valid/degraded.json

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.runtime-status/v1",
+  "status_id": "018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d102",
+  "brain_instance_ref": "brain-east-01",
+  "sequence": 42,
+  "observed_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:30Z",
+  "runtime": { "state": "degraded", "version": "1.0.0", "started_at": "2026-08-30T23:55:00Z" },
+  "model": { "model_ref": "people-detection", "version": "2026.08.1" },
+  "configurations": [
+    { "config_id": "gate-primary", "apply_state": "applied", "applied_revision": 21, "error_code": null },
+    { "config_id": "yard-secondary", "apply_state": "applying", "applied_revision": 8, "error_code": null }
+  ],
+  "health": {
+    "overall": "degraded",
+    "error_codes": ["RESOURCE_PRESSURE"],
+    "metrics": { "load_percent": 91.5, "queue_depth": 7, "latency_ms": 115.0 }
+  },
+  "inputs": [
+    {
+      "input_ref": "camera-gate-01",
+      "state": "degraded",
+      "error_codes": ["INPUT_DECODE_FAILED"],
+      "metrics": { "load_percent": 5.2, "queue_depth": 3, "latency_ms": 92.0 }
+    }
+  ]
+}

contracts/runtime-status/v1/examples/valid/empty-configurations.json

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.runtime-status/v1",
+  "status_id": "018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d106",
+  "brain_instance_ref": "brain-east-02",
+  "sequence": 1,
+  "observed_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:00Z",
+  "runtime": { "state": "unconfigured", "version": "1.0.0", "started_at": null },
+  "model": { "model_ref": "people-detection", "version": "2026.08.1" },
+  "configurations": [],
+  "health": {
+    "overall": "healthy",
+    "error_codes": [],
+    "metrics": { "load_percent": 0, "queue_depth": 0, "latency_ms": 0 }
+  },
+  "inputs": []
+}

contracts/runtime-status/v1/examples/valid/offline-last-known.json

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.runtime-status/v1",
+  "status_id": "018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d104",
+  "brain_instance_ref": "brain-east-01",
+  "sequence": 44,
+  "observed_at": "2026-08-31T00:01:30Z",
+  "runtime": { "state": "degraded", "version": "1.0.0", "started_at": "2026-08-30T23:55:00Z" },
+  "model": { "model_ref": "people-detection", "version": "2026.08.1" },
+  "configurations": [
+    { "config_id": "gate-primary", "apply_state": "applied", "applied_revision": 21, "error_code": null }
+  ],
+  "health": {
+    "overall": "degraded",
+    "error_codes": ["INPUT_UNREACHABLE"],
+    "metrics": { "load_percent": 30.0, "queue_depth": 1, "latency_ms": 30.0 }
+  },
+  "inputs": []
+}

contracts/runtime-status/v1/examples/valid/recovered.json

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.runtime-status/v1",
+  "status_id": "018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d105",
+  "brain_instance_ref": "brain-east-01",
+  "sequence": 45,
+  "observed_at": "2026-08-31T00:04:00Z",
+  "runtime": { "state": "running", "version": "1.0.0", "started_at": "2026-08-30T23:55:00Z" },
+  "model": { "model_ref": "people-detection", "version": "2026.08.1" },
+  "configurations": [
+    { "config_id": "gate-primary", "apply_state": "applied", "applied_revision": 21, "error_code": null }
+  ],
+  "health": {
+    "overall": "healthy",
+    "error_codes": [],
+    "metrics": { "load_percent": 36.0, "queue_depth": 0, "latency_ms": 20.0 }
+  },
+  "inputs": []
+}

contracts/runtime-status/v1/examples/valid/running.json

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.runtime-status/v1",
+  "status_id": "018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d101",
+  "brain_instance_ref": "brain-east-01",
+  "sequence": 41,
+  "observed_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:00Z",
+  "runtime": { "state": "running", "version": "1.0.0", "started_at": "2026-08-30T23:55:00Z" },
+  "model": { "model_ref": "people-detection", "version": "2026.08.1" },
+  "configurations": [
+    { "config_id": "gate-primary", "apply_state": "applied", "applied_revision": 21, "error_code": null }
+  ],
+  "health": {
+    "overall": "healthy",
+    "error_codes": [],
+    "metrics": { "load_percent": 38.5, "queue_depth": 0, "latency_ms": 21.4 }
+  },
+  "inputs": [
+    {
+      "input_ref": "camera-gate-01",
+      "state": "running",
+      "error_codes": [],
+      "metrics": { "load_percent": 5.2, "queue_depth": 0, "latency_ms": 18.1 }
+    }
+  ]
+}

contracts/runtime-status/v1/mapping.md

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Brain → Sense mapper 字段责任
+
+| 契约字段 | Brain 生产者责任 | Sense 消费者投影责任 |
+|---|---|---|
+| `schema_version` | 固定发布 `yovision.runtime-status/v1` | 先按主版本分派；未知版本不覆盖最后投影 |
+| `status_id` | 每次观测生成唯一幂等键 | 去重，不把重复消息当成新观测 |
+| `brain_instance_ref` | 发布部署时分配的逻辑引用 | 映射到内部 edge node；不把它当数据库主键 |
+| `sequence` | 同实例单调递增 | 拒绝倒序消息，保留最后已知投影 |
+| `observed_at` | 发布观测完成时间 | 校验未来偏差；用它推导 fresh/stale，不用接收时间覆盖 |
+| `runtime.*` | 报告真实运行状态和脱敏版本 | 校验迁移并形成只读运维状态 |
+| `model.*` | 报告逻辑模型引用及版本，不报告文件路径 | 显示版本差异，不推导模型下载或重启命令 |
+| `configurations[]` | 每个 `config_id` 报告真实应用结果和 integer revision；同一消息内 ID 唯一 | 按 `config_id` 与 Sense 内部期望 revision 比较；拒绝重复 ID，不回写 Brain 状态 |
+| `health.*` | 聚合无敏感健康与有界指标 | 展示健康、指标和稳定错误码，不生成业务 Alert |
+| `inputs[]` | 按逻辑输入发布安全摘要 | 按 `input_ref` 映射运维投影，不读取视频或检测内容 |
+
+## 契约测试责任
+
+- Brain：对所有发布消息执行 Schema 校验；覆盖各运行状态、配置应用结果、降级/失败以及敏感字段拒绝。
+- Sense：使用同一有效/无效样例；覆盖版本分派、幂等与倒序、30 秒未来偏差、90 秒陈旧边界、状态迁移、offline/recovery、revision mismatch 及回退不覆盖最后投影。
+- 协调契约：`contracts/tests/runtime-status-v1/test_contract.py` 是双方最小共同测试。产品 adapter 仍需在各自工单中增加本地模型映射测试。

contracts/runtime-status/v1/runtime-status.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/runtime-status/v1/runtime-status.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision Brain runtime status v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": [
+    "schema_version",
+    "status_id",
+    "brain_instance_ref",
+    "sequence",
+    "observed_at",
+    "runtime",
+    "model",
+    "configurations",
+    "health",
+    "inputs"
+  ],
+  "properties": {
+    "schema_version": { "const": "yovision.runtime-status/v1" },
+    "status_id": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-4[0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$"
+    },
+    "brain_instance_ref": { "$ref": "#/$defs/logicalRef" },
+    "sequence": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 0 },
+    "observed_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
+    "runtime": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": ["state", "version"],
+      "properties": {
+        "state": { "$ref": "#/$defs/runtimeState" },
+        "version": { "$ref": "#/$defs/version" },
+        "started_at": { "type": ["string", "null"], "format": "date-time" }
+      }
+    },
+    "model": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": ["model_ref", "version"],
+      "properties": {
+        "model_ref": { "$ref": "#/$defs/logicalRef" },
+        "version": { "$ref": "#/$defs/version" }
+      }
+    },
+    "configurations": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "maxItems": 4096,
+      "items": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "additionalProperties": false,
+        "required": ["config_id", "apply_state", "applied_revision", "error_code"],
+        "properties": {
+          "config_id": { "$ref": "#/$defs/configId" },
+          "apply_state": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "enum": ["not_configured", "applying", "applied", "rejected"]
+          },
+          "applied_revision": {
+            "type": ["integer", "null"],
+            "minimum": 1
+          },
+          "error_code": { "$ref": "#/$defs/nullableErrorCode" }
+        },
+        "allOf": [
+          {
+            "if": {
+              "required": ["apply_state"],
+              "properties": { "apply_state": { "const": "not_configured" } }
+            },
+            "then": { "properties": { "applied_revision": { "type": "null" } } }
+          },
+          {
+            "if": {
+              "required": ["apply_state"],
+              "properties": { "apply_state": { "const": "applied" } }
+            },
+            "then": { "properties": { "applied_revision": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 1 } } }
+          },
+          {
+            "if": {
+              "required": ["apply_state"],
+              "properties": { "apply_state": { "const": "rejected" } }
+            },
+            "then": { "properties": { "error_code": { "$ref": "#/$defs/errorCode" } } }
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    },
+    "health": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": ["overall", "error_codes", "metrics"],
+      "properties": {
+        "overall": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "enum": ["healthy", "degraded", "unhealthy"]
+        },
+        "error_codes": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "uniqueItems": true,
+          "maxItems": 32,
+          "items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/errorCode" }
+        },
+        "metrics": { "$ref": "#/$defs/metrics" }
+      }
+    },
+    "inputs": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "maxItems": 4096,
+      "items": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "additionalProperties": false,
+        "required": ["input_ref", "state", "error_codes", "metrics"],
+        "properties": {
+          "input_ref": { "$ref": "#/$defs/logicalRef" },
+          "state": { "$ref": "#/$defs/runtimeState" },
+          "error_codes": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "uniqueItems": true,
+            "maxItems": 16,
+            "items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/errorCode" }
+          },
+          "metrics": { "$ref": "#/$defs/metrics" }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "$defs": {
+    "configId": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "minLength": 1,
+      "maxLength": 128,
+      "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._~-]*$"
+    },
+    "logicalRef": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "minLength": 1,
+      "maxLength": 128,
+      "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"
+    },
+    "version": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "minLength": 1,
+      "maxLength": 64,
+      "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._+-]{0,63}$"
+    },
+    "runtimeState": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "enum": ["unconfigured", "starting", "running", "degraded", "failed", "stopped"]
+    },
+    "errorCode": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,63}$"
+    },
+    "nullableErrorCode": {
+      "type": ["string", "null"],
+      "pattern": "^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,63}$"
+    },
+    "metrics": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": ["load_percent", "queue_depth", "latency_ms"],
+      "properties": {
+        "load_percent": { "type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 100 },
+        "queue_depth": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 0 },
+        "latency_ms": { "type": "number", "minimum": 0 }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

contracts/tests/events-v1/contract_support.py

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+"""Small dependency-free validator for the JSON Schema keywords used by v1 contracts."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import math
+import re
+from datetime import datetime
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+
+def load_json(path: Path) -> Any:
+    return json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+
+
+def canonical_bytes(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    """Canonical bytes for checked-in JCS vectors (all vector numbers are JCS-safe)."""
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), allow_nan=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def validate(instance: Any, schema: dict[str, Any], schema_path: Path, location: str = "$") -> list[str]:
+    if "$ref" in schema:
+        ref = schema["$ref"]
+        if ref.startswith("#"):
+            return [f"{location}: local fragments are not supported by the contract checker"]
+        target = (schema_path.parent / ref).resolve()
+        return validate(instance, load_json(target), target, location)
+
+    errors: list[str] = []
+    for subschema in schema.get("allOf", []):
+        errors.extend(validate(instance, subschema, schema_path, location))
+    if "anyOf" in schema and not any(not validate(instance, item, schema_path, location) for item in schema["anyOf"]):
+        errors.append(f"{location}: does not match anyOf")
+    if "not" in schema and not validate(instance, schema["not"], schema_path, location):
+        errors.append(f"{location}: matches forbidden schema")
+    if "if" in schema and not validate(instance, schema["if"], schema_path, location):
+        errors.extend(validate(instance, schema.get("then", {}), schema_path, location))
+
+    expected = schema.get("type")
+    type_ok = {
+        "object": lambda x: isinstance(x, dict),
+        "array": lambda x: isinstance(x, list),
+        "string": lambda x: isinstance(x, str),
+        "integer": lambda x: isinstance(x, int) and not isinstance(x, bool),
+        "number": lambda x: isinstance(x, (int, float)) and not isinstance(x, bool) and math.isfinite(x),
+        "boolean": lambda x: isinstance(x, bool),
+    }
+    if expected and (expected not in type_ok or not type_ok[expected](instance)):
+        return errors + [f"{location}: expected {expected}"]
+    if "const" in schema and instance != schema["const"]:
+        errors.append(f"{location}: expected constant {schema['const']!r}")
+    if "enum" in schema and instance not in schema["enum"]:
+        errors.append(f"{location}: value not in enum")
+
+    if isinstance(instance, dict):
+        required = schema.get("required", [])
+        errors.extend(f"{location}: missing {name}" for name in required if name not in instance)
+        properties = schema.get("properties", {})
+        if schema.get("additionalProperties") is False:
+            errors.extend(f"{location}: unknown property {name}" for name in instance if name not in properties)
+        for name, value in instance.items():
+            if name in properties:
+                errors.extend(validate(value, properties[name], schema_path, f"{location}.{name}"))
+    elif isinstance(instance, list):
+        if len(instance) < schema.get("minItems", 0):
+            errors.append(f"{location}: too few items")
+        if "maxItems" in schema and len(instance) > schema["maxItems"]:
+            errors.append(f"{location}: too many items")
+        if schema.get("uniqueItems") and len({canonical_bytes(item) for item in instance}) != len(instance):
+            errors.append(f"{location}: duplicate items")
+        for index, value in enumerate(instance):
+            errors.extend(validate(value, schema.get("items", {}), schema_path, f"{location}[{index}]"))
+    elif isinstance(instance, str):
+        if len(instance) < schema.get("minLength", 0):
+            errors.append(f"{location}: string too short")
+        if "maxLength" in schema and len(instance) > schema["maxLength"]:
+            errors.append(f"{location}: string too long")
+        if "pattern" in schema and re.fullmatch(schema["pattern"], instance) is None:
+            errors.append(f"{location}: pattern mismatch")
+        if schema.get("format") == "date-time":
+            try:
+                datetime.fromisoformat(instance.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+            except ValueError:
+                errors.append(f"{location}: invalid date-time")
+    elif isinstance(instance, (int, float)) and not isinstance(instance, bool):
+        if "minimum" in schema and instance < schema["minimum"]:
+            errors.append(f"{location}: below minimum")
+        if "maximum" in schema and instance > schema["maximum"]:
+            errors.append(f"{location}: above maximum")
+    return errors

contracts/tests/events-v1/fixtures/sensitive-field.json

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.event/v1",
+  "producer_id": "brain-school-a",
+  "source_event_id": "evt-sensitive-0001",
+  "site_ref": "site-school-a",
+  "device_ref": "camera-east-gate",
+  "profile_ref": "profile-main-stream",
+  "event_type": "dangerous_area_entered",
+  "occurred_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z",
+  "severity": "high",
+  "rule": {"rule_id": "rule-east-danger", "version": "3"},
+  "model": {"name": "anonymous-detector", "version": "2026.08"},
+  "observation": {"track_id": "track-0042", "category": "person", "confidence": 0.93, "face_feature": "forbidden"},
+  "region": {"region_id": "region-east-danger", "kind": "area"},
+  "evidence": [],
+  "camera_password": "forbidden"
+}

contracts/tests/events-v1/fixtures/unknown-version.json

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.event/v2",
+  "producer_id": "brain-school-a",
+  "source_event_id": "evt-unknown-version-0001",
+  "site_ref": "site-school-a",
+  "device_ref": "camera-east-gate",
+  "profile_ref": "profile-main-stream",
+  "event_type": "dangerous_area_entered",
+  "occurred_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z",
+  "severity": "high",
+  "rule": {"rule_id": "rule-east-danger", "version": "3"},
+  "model": {"name": "anonymous-detector", "version": "2026.08"},
+  "observation": {"track_id": "track-0042", "category": "person", "confidence": 0.93},
+  "region": {"region_id": "region-east-danger", "kind": "area"},
+  "evidence": []
+}

contracts/tests/events-v1/idempotency-vectors.json

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "algorithm": "RFC8785-JCS+SHA-256",
+  "vectors": [
+    {
+      "name": "dangerous-area-original-and-reordered-duplicate",
+      "fixture": "../../events/v1/examples/dangerous-area.json",
+      "idempotency_key": ["brain-school-a", "evt-area-20260831-0001"],
+      "payload_sha256": "4cc1e93820195caf713ea675ff33f178c9d4997dd8a81cb61287e9fea0e3d5e1",
+      "conflict_patch": {"severity": "critical"},
+      "conflict_payload_sha256": "7076771f7827d97ef45831ae221046b8cb347f152dd222c2edd6f14a58e173b2"
+    }
+  ]
+}

contracts/tests/events-v1/test_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import copy
+import hashlib
+import sys
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+CONTRACTS = HERE.parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(HERE))
+
+from contract_support import canonical_bytes, load_json, validate  # noqa: E402
+
+
+class EventV1ContractTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    schema_path = CONTRACTS / "events" / "v1" / "event.schema.json"
+    schema = load_json(schema_path)
+
+    def assert_valid(self, payload: object) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual([], validate(payload, self.schema, self.schema_path))
+
+    def test_anonymous_area_and_line_examples_are_valid(self) -> None:
+        for name in ("dangerous-area.json", "directional-line-crossed.json"):
+            with self.subTest(name=name):
+                self.assert_valid(load_json(CONTRACTS / "events" / "v1" / "examples" / name))
+
+    def test_idempotency_vector_duplicate_and_conflict(self) -> None:
+        vectors = load_json(HERE / "idempotency-vectors.json")["vectors"]
+        for vector in vectors:
+            payload = load_json((HERE / vector["fixture"]).resolve())
+            self.assertEqual(vector["idempotency_key"], [payload["producer_id"], payload["source_event_id"]])
+            digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_bytes(payload)).hexdigest()
+            self.assertEqual(vector["payload_sha256"], digest)
+            reordered = dict(reversed(list(payload.items())))
+            self.assertEqual(digest, hashlib.sha256(canonical_bytes(reordered)).hexdigest())
+            conflict = copy.deepcopy(payload)
+            conflict.update(vector["conflict_patch"])
+            conflict_digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_bytes(conflict)).hexdigest()
+            self.assertEqual(vector["conflict_payload_sha256"], conflict_digest)
+            self.assertNotEqual(digest, conflict_digest)
+
+    def test_unknown_version_is_rejected(self) -> None:
+        payload = load_json(HERE / "fixtures" / "unknown-version.json")
+        self.assertTrue(validate(payload, self.schema, self.schema_path))
+
+    def test_brain_producer_sense_relay_and_bell_consumer_fixture(self) -> None:
+        produced = load_json(CONTRACTS / "events" / "v1" / "examples" / "dangerous-area.json")
+        self.assert_valid(produced)
+        relayed = copy.deepcopy(produced)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            (produced["producer_id"], produced["source_event_id"]),
+            (relayed["producer_id"], relayed["source_event_id"]),
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(canonical_bytes(produced), canonical_bytes(relayed))
+        bell_allowed = set(self.schema["properties"])
+        self.assertEqual(set(produced), bell_allowed)
+        self.assertNotIn("alert", produced)
+        self.assertNotIn("receipt", produced)
+
+    def test_sensitive_and_internal_fields_are_rejected(self) -> None:
+        payload = load_json(HERE / "fixtures" / "sensitive-field.json")
+        errors = validate(payload, self.schema, self.schema_path)
+        self.assertTrue(any("camera_password" in error for error in errors))
+        self.assertTrue(any("face_feature" in error for error in errors))
+        base = load_json(CONTRACTS / "events" / "v1" / "examples" / "dangerous-area.json")
+        for forbidden, value in {
+            "user_token": "forbidden", "ack_state": "acked", "local_path": "C:/forbidden",
+            "signed_url": "https://forbidden.invalid/object?signature=forbidden"
+        }.items():
+            with self.subTest(forbidden=forbidden):
+                candidate = copy.deepcopy(base)
+                candidate[forbidden] = value
+                self.assertTrue(validate(candidate, self.schema, self.schema_path))
+
+    def test_openapi_references_exist_and_responses_are_explicit(self) -> None:
+        path = CONTRACTS / "events" / "v1" / "openapi.json"
+        spec = load_json(path)
+        operation = spec["paths"]["/v1/events"]["post"]
+        self.assertEqual({"200", "201", "400", "409", "422"}, set(operation["responses"]))
+        refs: list[str] = []
+
+        def collect(value: object) -> None:
+            if isinstance(value, dict):
+                refs.extend(item for key, item in value.items() if key == "$ref")
+                for item in value.values(): collect(item)
+            elif isinstance(value, list):
+                for item in value: collect(item)
+
+        collect(spec)
+        self.assertTrue(refs)
+        for ref in refs:
+            self.assertTrue((path.parent / ref).resolve().is_file(), ref)
+
+    def test_duplicate_conflict_and_unknown_version_response_examples(self) -> None:
+        directory = CONTRACTS / "events" / "v1"
+        cases = (
+            ("duplicate-result.json", "ingest-result.schema.json"),
+            ("idempotency-conflict-problem.json", "problem.schema.json"),
+            ("unsupported-version-problem.json", "problem.schema.json"),
+        )
+        for fixture_name, schema_name in cases:
+            with self.subTest(fixture=fixture_name):
+                schema_path = directory / schema_name
+                errors = validate(load_json(directory / "examples" / fixture_name), load_json(schema_path), schema_path)
+                self.assertEqual([], errors)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main(verbosity=2)

contracts/tests/evidence-v1/fixtures/sensitive-field.json

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.evidence-reference/v1",
+  "evidence_id": "ev-sensitive-0001",
+  "owner_id": "sense-school-a",
+  "type": "snapshot",
+  "status": "success",
+  "captured_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z",
+  "status_updated_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:02.450Z",
+  "content_type": "image/jpeg",
+  "integrity": {"algorithm": "sha256", "digest": "2f77668a9dfbf8d5848b9e6d7da867800b7b6790625f16b45a101f1ca1f7da75", "size_bytes": 48215},
+  "local_path": "forbidden"
+}

contracts/tests/evidence-v1/test_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import copy
+import sys
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+CONTRACTS = HERE.parents[1]
+EVENT_SUPPORT = HERE.parent / "events-v1"
+sys.path.insert(0, str(EVENT_SUPPORT))
+
+from contract_support import load_json, validate  # noqa: E402
+
+
+class EvidenceV1ContractTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    schema_path = CONTRACTS / "evidence" / "v1" / "evidence-reference.schema.json"
+    schema = load_json(schema_path)
+
+    def errors_for(self, payload: object) -> list[str]:
+        return validate(payload, self.schema, self.schema_path)
+
+    def test_pending_success_and_failed_examples_are_valid(self) -> None:
+        for name in ("pending.json", "success.json", "failed.json"):
+            with self.subTest(name=name):
+                payload = load_json(CONTRACTS / "evidence" / "v1" / "examples" / name)
+                self.assertEqual([], self.errors_for(payload))
+
+    def test_state_specific_metadata_is_enforced(self) -> None:
+        success = load_json(CONTRACTS / "evidence" / "v1" / "examples" / "success.json")
+        for required in ("content_type", "integrity"):
+            with self.subTest(success_requires=required):
+                candidate = copy.deepcopy(success)
+                del candidate[required]
+                self.assertTrue(self.errors_for(candidate))
+
+        legacy_available = copy.deepcopy(success)
+        legacy_available["status"] = "available"
+        self.assertTrue(self.errors_for(legacy_available))
+
+        failed = load_json(CONTRACTS / "evidence" / "v1" / "examples" / "failed.json")
+        del failed["failure"]
+        self.assertTrue(self.errors_for(failed))
+
+        pending = load_json(CONTRACTS / "evidence" / "v1" / "examples" / "pending.json")
+        pending["content_type"] = "image/jpeg"
+        self.assertTrue(self.errors_for(pending))
+
+    def test_sensitive_access_material_and_unknown_version_are_rejected(self) -> None:
+        fixture = load_json(HERE / "fixtures" / "sensitive-field.json")
+        self.assertTrue(any("local_path" in error for error in self.errors_for(fixture)))
+        base = load_json(CONTRACTS / "evidence" / "v1" / "examples" / "pending.json")
+        for forbidden, value in {
+            "camera_password": "forbidden",
+            "user_token": "forbidden",
+            "signed_url": "https://forbidden.invalid/object?signature=forbidden",
+            "face_feature": "forbidden",
+            "alert_state": "acked"
+        }.items():
+            with self.subTest(forbidden=forbidden):
+                candidate = copy.deepcopy(base)
+                candidate[forbidden] = value
+                self.assertTrue(self.errors_for(candidate))
+        unknown = copy.deepcopy(base)
+        unknown["schema_version"] = "yovision.evidence-reference/v2"
+        self.assertTrue(self.errors_for(unknown))
+
+    def test_openapi_refs_and_degradation_responses(self) -> None:
+        path = CONTRACTS / "evidence" / "v1" / "openapi.json"
+        spec = load_json(path)
+        operation = spec["paths"]["/v1/evidence/{evidence_id}"]["get"]
+        self.assertEqual({"200", "404", "410"}, set(operation["responses"]))
+        refs: list[str] = []
+
+        def collect(value: object) -> None:
+            if isinstance(value, dict):
+                refs.extend(item for key, item in value.items() if key == "$ref")
+                for item in value.values(): collect(item)
+            elif isinstance(value, list):
+                for item in value: collect(item)
+
+        collect(spec)
+        for ref in refs:
+            self.assertTrue((path.parent / ref).resolve().is_file(), ref)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main(verbosity=2)

contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/cross-language-vector.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "version": "yovision.machine-token-vector/v1",
+  "public_key_base64url": "ebVWLo_mVPlAeLES6KmLp5AfhTrmlb7X4OORC60ElmQ",
+  "token": "eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIsImtpZCI6ImJyYWluLXZlY3Rvci0wMDAxIiwidHlwIjoiWU9WSVNJT04tTUFDSElORStKV1QiLCJ2ZXIiOiJ5b3Zpc2lvbi5tYWNoaW5lLWlkZW50aXR5L3YxIn0.eyJhdWQiOiJ5b3Zpc2lvbi1zZW5zZSIsImJvZHlfc2hhMjU2IjoiNDA5NDQzYTZlZTVhYTI5NmRjY2Q2YzBkMTkzZTIxNDU2OGRhYTAwNTNiNjYxNTVmYmE4YWRjYTk5NWI3ODIzZCIsImV4cCI6MTgwMDAwMDMwMCwiaHRtIjoiUE9TVCIsImh0dSI6Ii9tYWNoaW5lL3YxL3J1bnRpbWUtc3RhdHVzIiwiaWF0IjoxODAwMDAwMDAwLCJpc3MiOiJ5djpicmFpbjp2ZWN0b3IiLCJqdGkiOiJBUUlEQkFVR0J3Z0pDZ3NNRFE0UEVBIiwibmJmIjoxODAwMDAwMDAwLCJzY29wZSI6WyJydW50aW1lLXN0YXR1czp3cml0ZSJdLCJzdWIiOiJ5djpicmFpbjp2ZWN0b3IiLCJ2ZXIiOiJ5b3Zpc2lvbi5tYWNoaW5lLWlkZW50aXR5L3YxIn0.zrvo_7lRiDX1D6po6OlfQg4hDg6XXlyUEmNMYgpuRl3ArXSjvGuOLivDousIyLtRO4bYJu9xMAWX1cea7MdVBQ",
+  "now": 1800000000,
+  "audience": "yovision-sense",
+  "required_scope": "runtime-status:write",
+  "method": "POST",
+  "path": "/machine/v1/runtime-status",
+  "body_base64": "eyJzdGF0dXMiOiJydW5uaW5nIn0="
+}

contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/requirements.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+cryptography==50.0.1
+jsonschema==4.25.1

contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/run.ps1

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+[CmdletBinding()]
+param()
+
+$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
+$testDirectory = $PSScriptRoot
+$requirements = Join-Path $testDirectory 'requirements.txt'
+$tempRoot = [IO.Path]::GetFullPath([IO.Path]::GetTempPath())
+$workDirectory = Join-Path $tempRoot ("yovision-machine-identity-v1-{0}" -f [Guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N'))
+
+try {
+    New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $workDirectory | Out-Null
+    $virtualEnvironment = Join-Path $workDirectory '.venv'
+    python -m venv $virtualEnvironment
+    if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'Failed to create the isolated Python environment.' }
+
+    $python = Join-Path $virtualEnvironment 'Scripts\python.exe'
+    $env:PIP_DISABLE_PIP_VERSION_CHECK = '1'
+    $env:PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE = '1'
+    & $python -m pip install --quiet --requirement $requirements
+    if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'Failed to install pinned machine-identity test dependencies.' }
+
+    & $python $testDirectory\test_contract.py
+    if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'Machine-identity v1 contract tests failed.' }
+}
+finally {
+    $resolvedWorkDirectory = [IO.Path]::GetFullPath($workDirectory)
+    if (-not $resolvedWorkDirectory.StartsWith($tempRoot, [StringComparison]::OrdinalIgnoreCase)) {
+        throw "Refusing to remove a temporary directory outside $tempRoot"
+    }
+    if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $resolvedWorkDirectory) {
+        Remove-Item -LiteralPath $resolvedWorkDirectory -Recurse -Force
+    }
+}

contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/test_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import base64
+import ssl
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "Brain" / "src"))
+
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
+from jsonschema import Draft202012Validator
+
+from yovision_brain.integration.machine_identity import (
+    KeyRecord,
+    MachineIdentityError,
+    Registry,
+    ReplayStore,
+    Signer,
+    TransportPolicy,
+    Verifier,
+    load_registry,
+    bearer_token,
+)
+
+
+class ContractFilesTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_closed_claim_and_registry_schemas(self) -> None:
+        claims = json.loads((ROOT / "contracts/machine-identity/v1/machine-token.schema.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        registry = json.loads((ROOT / "contracts/machine-identity/v1/principal-registry.schema.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        transport = json.loads((ROOT / "contracts/transport/v1/transport-policy.schema.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        Draft202012Validator.check_schema(claims)
+        Draft202012Validator.check_schema(registry)
+        Draft202012Validator.check_schema(transport)
+        self.assertFalse(claims["additionalProperties"])
+        self.assertEqual(claims["properties"]["ver"]["const"], "yovision.machine-identity/v1")
+        self.assertEqual(claims["properties"]["scope"]["items"]["enum"], [
+            "source-config:write", "runtime-status:write", "events:ingest", "evidence:read"
+        ])
+        self.assertFalse(registry["additionalProperties"])
+        self.assertEqual(transport["properties"]["verify_certificate"]["const"], True)
+        self.assertEqual(transport["properties"]["verify_hostname"]["const"], True)
+
+        vector = json.loads((ROOT / "contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/cross-language-vector.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        claims_object = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(vector["token"].split(".")[1] + "=="))
+        Draft202012Validator(claims).validate(claims_object)
+        Draft202012Validator(transport).validate({
+            "version": "yovision.transport/v1", "tls_min_version": "1.2", "verify_certificate": True,
+            "verify_hostname": True, "connect_timeout_ms": 1000, "response_header_timeout_ms": 1000,
+            "request_timeout_ms": 5000, "max_request_bytes": 1048576,
+        })
+
+    def test_brain_dependency_is_frozen(self) -> None:
+        pyproject = (ROOT / "Brain/pyproject.toml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        self.assertIn('dependencies = ["cryptography==50.0.1"]', pyproject)
+
+    def test_contract_documents_fail_closed(self) -> None:
+        identity = (ROOT / "contracts/machine-identity/v1/README.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        transport = (ROOT / "contracts/transport/v1/README.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        for required in ("300 seconds", "30 seconds", "24 hours", "jti", "revoked", "browser token"):
+            self.assertIn(required, identity)
+        for required in ("TLS 1.2", "hostname verification", "query-string credentials", "disables the connector"):
+            self.assertIn(required, transport)
+
+    def test_python_verifies_cross_language_vector(self) -> None:
+        vector = json.loads((ROOT / "contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/cross-language-vector.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        raw_key = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(vector["public_key_base64url"] + "=")
+        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PublicKey
+        registry = Registry([KeyRecord("yv:brain:vector", "brain-vector-0001", Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(raw_key), vector["audience"], frozenset({vector["required_scope"]}))])
+        verifier = Verifier(registry, ReplayStore(), clock=lambda: vector["now"])
+        claims = verifier.verify(vector["token"], vector["audience"], vector["required_scope"], vector["method"], vector["path"], base64.b64decode(vector["body_base64"]))
+        self.assertEqual(claims.iss, "yv:brain:vector")
+
+
+class BrainAdapterTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.now = 1_800_000_000
+        self.private = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
+        self.record = KeyRecord(
+            principal="yv:brain:node-a",
+            key_id="brain-key-0001",
+            public_key=self.private.public_key(),
+            audience="yovision-sense",
+            scopes=frozenset({"runtime-status:write"}),
+        )
+        self.registry = Registry([self.record])
+        self.signer = Signer("yv:brain:node-a", "brain-key-0001", self.private, clock=lambda: self.now)
+
+    def mint(self, body: bytes = b"{}") -> str:
+        return self.signer.mint("yovision-sense", ["runtime-status:write"], "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+
+    def verify(self, token: str, body: bytes = b"{}", **changes: str):
+        verifier = Verifier(self.registry, changes.pop("replay", ReplayStore()), clock=lambda: int(changes.pop("now", self.now)))
+        return verifier.verify(
+            token,
+            changes.pop("audience", "yovision-sense"),
+            changes.pop("scope", "runtime-status:write"),
+            changes.pop("method", "POST"),
+            changes.pop("path", "/machine/v1/runtime-status"),
+            body,
+        )
+
+    def assert_code(self, code: str, callback) -> None:
+        with self.assertRaises(MachineIdentityError) as caught:
+            callback()
+        self.assertEqual(caught.exception.code, code)
+        self.assertEqual(str(caught.exception), code)
+
+    def test_valid_token_and_replay_rejection(self) -> None:
+        token = self.mint()
+        replay = ReplayStore()
+        first = Verifier(self.registry, replay, clock=lambda: self.now)
+        claims = first.verify(token, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", b"{}")
+        self.assertEqual(claims.iss, "yv:brain:node-a")
+        self.assert_code("machine_token_replayed", lambda: first.verify(token, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", b"{}"))
+
+    def test_bearer_token_has_no_cookie_or_query_fallback(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(bearer_token("Bearer compact.token.value"), "compact.token.value")
+        for value in ("", "compact.token.value", "Bearer", "Bearer one two", "Cookie compact.token.value"):
+            self.assert_code("machine_token_missing", lambda value=value: bearer_token(value))
+
+    def test_wrong_audience_scope_body_and_expiry(self) -> None:
+        self.assert_code("machine_audience_denied", lambda: self.verify(self.mint(), audience="yovision-bell"))
+        self.assert_code("machine_scope_denied", lambda: self.verify(self.mint(), scope="events:ingest"))
+        self.assert_code("machine_token_invalid", lambda: self.verify(self.mint(), body=b"changed"))
+        self.assert_code("machine_token_expired", lambda: self.verify(self.mint(), now=str(self.now + 361)))
+
+    def test_tampering_revocation_and_rotation(self) -> None:
+        token = self.mint()
+        parts = token.split(".")
+        tampered = f"{parts[0]}.{parts[1][:-1]}A.{parts[2]}"
+        self.assert_code("machine_token_invalid", lambda: self.verify(tampered))
+        self.assertTrue(self.registry.revoke("brain-key-0001"))
+        self.assert_code("machine_identity_revoked", lambda: self.verify(self.mint()))
+
+        new_private = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
+        overlap = Registry([
+            self.record,
+            KeyRecord("yv:brain:node-a", "brain-key-0002", new_private.public_key(), "yovision-sense", frozenset({"runtime-status:write"})),
+        ])
+        new_signer = Signer("yv:brain:node-a", "brain-key-0002", new_private, clock=lambda: self.now)
+        verifier = Verifier(overlap, ReplayStore(), clock=lambda: self.now)
+        verifier.verify(self.mint(), "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", b"{}")
+        verifier.verify(new_signer.mint("yovision-sense", ["runtime-status:write"], "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", b"{}"), "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", b"{}")
+
+    def test_transport_policy_requires_verified_tls(self) -> None:
+        policy = TransportPolicy("1.2", True, True, 1000, 1000, 2000, 1024)
+        context = policy.ssl_context()
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(context.minimum_version, ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2)
+        self.assertTrue(context.check_hostname)
+        self.assertEqual(context.verify_mode, ssl.CERT_REQUIRED)
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            TransportPolicy("1.1", True, True, 1000, 1000, 2000, 1024).validate()
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            TransportPolicy("1.2", True, False, 1000, 1000, 2000, 1024).validate()
+
+    def test_loads_external_public_registry_and_rejects_wrong_audience(self) -> None:
+        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+        raw_public = self.private.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.Raw, serialization.PublicFormat.Raw)
+        document = {
+            "version": "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1",
+            "audience": "yovision-sense",
+            "principals": [{
+                "principal_id": "yv:brain:node-a", "enabled": True,
+                "keys": [{"kid": "brain-key-0001", "public_key_base64url": base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw_public).rstrip(b"=").decode(), "status": "active", "scopes": ["runtime-status:write"]}],
+            }],
+        }
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
+            path = Path(directory) / "principals.json"
+            path.write_text(json.dumps(document), encoding="utf-8")
+            registry = load_registry(path, "yovision-sense")
+            self.assertIsNotNone(registry.lookup("brain-key-0001"))
+            with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+                load_registry(path, "yovision-bell")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main(verbosity=2)

contracts/tests/runtime-status-v1/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# yovision.runtime-status/v1 契约测试
+
+从仓库根目录运行：
+
+```powershell
+python -m unittest discover -s contracts/tests/runtime-status-v1 -p "test_*.py" -v
+```
+
+测试只使用 Python 标准库，不安装依赖、不访问网络。它对冻结 Schema 的已用关键字执行验证，并覆盖状态迁移、时间/陈旧边界、offline/recovery、空/多配置流、四种配置应用状态、重复 `config_id`、integer revision mismatch、未知主版本、倒序消息、回退保留和敏感字段拒绝。产品 adapter 还需在各自工单中运行本地模型映射测试。

contracts/tests/runtime-status-v1/test_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+import copy
+import json
+import re
+import unittest
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+TEST_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+CONTRACT_DIR = TEST_DIR.parents[1] / "runtime-status" / "v1"
+SCHEMA = json.loads((CONTRACT_DIR / "runtime-status.schema.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+VALID_DIR = CONTRACT_DIR / "examples" / "valid"
+INVALID_DIR = CONTRACT_DIR / "examples" / "invalid"
+
+
+def parse_datetime(value):
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise ValueError("not a string")
+    parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise ValueError("timezone is required")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def matches_type(value, expected):
+    if expected == "null":
+        return value is None
+    if expected == "object":
+        return isinstance(value, dict)
+    if expected == "array":
+        return isinstance(value, list)
+    if expected == "string":
+        return isinstance(value, str)
+    if expected == "integer":
+        return isinstance(value, int) and not isinstance(value, bool)
+    if expected == "number":
+        return isinstance(value, (int, float)) and not isinstance(value, bool)
+    if expected == "boolean":
+        return isinstance(value, bool)
+    raise AssertionError(f"unsupported schema type in test validator: {expected}")
+
+
+def resolve_ref(ref):
+    if not ref.startswith("#/"):
+        raise AssertionError(f"external refs are not supported: {ref}")
+    node = SCHEMA
+    for part in ref[2:].split("/"):
+        node = node[part.replace("~1", "/").replace("~0", "~")]
+    return node
+
+
+def validate(instance, schema=None, path="$", errors=None):
+    schema = SCHEMA if schema is None else schema
+    errors = [] if errors is None else errors
+    if "$ref" in schema:
+        return validate(instance, resolve_ref(schema["$ref"]), path, errors)
+
+    for subschema in schema.get("allOf", []):
+        validate(instance, subschema, path, errors)
+    if "if" in schema:
+        condition_errors = validate(instance, schema["if"], path, [])
+        branch = schema.get("then") if not condition_errors else schema.get("else")
+        if branch is not None:
+            validate(instance, branch, path, errors)
+
+    if "type" in schema:
+        allowed = schema["type"] if isinstance(schema["type"], list) else [schema["type"]]
+        if not any(matches_type(instance, expected) for expected in allowed):
+            errors.append(f"{path}: expected {allowed}")
+            return errors
+
+    if "const" in schema and instance != schema["const"]:
+        errors.append(f"{path}: expected constant {schema['const']!r}")
+    if "enum" in schema and instance not in schema["enum"]:
+        errors.append(f"{path}: value is not in enum")
+
+    if isinstance(instance, dict):
+        required = schema.get("required", [])
+        for name in required:
+            if name not in instance:
+                errors.append(f"{path}: missing required property {name}")
+        properties = schema.get("properties", {})
+        if schema.get("additionalProperties") is False:
+            for name in instance:
+                if name not in properties:
+                    errors.append(f"{path}: additional property {name}")
+        for name, value in instance.items():
+            if name in properties:
+                validate(value, properties[name], f"{path}.{name}", errors)
+
+    if isinstance(instance, list):
+        if "maxItems" in schema and len(instance) > schema["maxItems"]:
+            errors.append(f"{path}: too many items")
+        if schema.get("uniqueItems"):
+            encoded = [json.dumps(item, sort_keys=True) for item in instance]
+            if len(encoded) != len(set(encoded)):
+                errors.append(f"{path}: duplicate items")
+        if "items" in schema:
+            for index, value in enumerate(instance):
+                validate(value, schema["items"], f"{path}[{index}]", errors)
+
+    if isinstance(instance, str):
+        if "minLength" in schema and len(instance) < schema["minLength"]:
+            errors.append(f"{path}: string is too short")
+        if "maxLength" in schema and len(instance) > schema["maxLength"]:
+            errors.append(f"{path}: string is too long")
+        if "pattern" in schema and re.fullmatch(schema["pattern"], instance) is None:
+            errors.append(f"{path}: pattern mismatch")
+        if schema.get("format") == "date-time":
+            try:
+                parse_datetime(instance)
+            except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                errors.append(f"{path}: invalid date-time")
+
+    if isinstance(instance, (int, float)) and not isinstance(instance, bool):
+        if "minimum" in schema and instance < schema["minimum"]:
+            errors.append(f"{path}: below minimum")
+        if "maximum" in schema and instance > schema["maximum"]:
+            errors.append(f"{path}: above maximum")
+    return errors
+
+
+def load(path):
+    return json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+
+
+def validate_contract(instance):
+    errors = validate(instance)
+    configurations = instance.get("configurations") if isinstance(instance, dict) else None
+    if isinstance(configurations, list):
+        config_ids = [item.get("config_id") for item in configurations if isinstance(item, dict)]
+        duplicates = {config_id for config_id in config_ids if config_ids.count(config_id) > 1}
+        if duplicates:
+            errors.append(f"$.configurations: duplicate config_id {sorted(duplicates)!r}")
+    return errors
+
+
+def freshness(observed_at, evaluation_time):
+    age = evaluation_time - parse_datetime(observed_at)
+    if age < timedelta(seconds=-30):
+        return "future_rejected"
+    return "stale" if age > timedelta(seconds=90) else "fresh"
+
+
+ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS = {
+    "unconfigured": {"starting", "stopped"},
+    "starting": {"running", "degraded", "failed", "stopped"},
+    "running": {"degraded", "failed", "stopped"},
+    "degraded": {"running", "failed", "stopped"},
+    "failed": {"starting", "stopped"},
+    "stopped": {"starting", "unconfigured"},
+}
+
+
+def may_transition(previous, current):
+    return previous == current or current in ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS[previous]
+
+
+def may_replace(previous, candidate, evaluation_time):
+    if candidate["schema_version"] != "yovision.runtime-status/v1":
+        return False
+    if validate_contract(candidate):
+        return False
+    if freshness(candidate["observed_at"], evaluation_time) == "future_rejected":
+        return False
+    if candidate["brain_instance_ref"] != previous["brain_instance_ref"]:
+        return False
+    if candidate["sequence"] <= previous["sequence"]:
+        return False
+    return may_transition(previous["runtime"]["state"], candidate["runtime"]["state"])
+
+
+class RuntimeStatusV1ContractTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    @classmethod
+    def setUpClass(cls):
+        cls.running = load(VALID_DIR / "running.json")
+
+    def test_schema_declares_frozen_version_and_closed_objects(self):
+        self.assertEqual(SCHEMA["$schema"], "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema")
+        self.assertEqual(SCHEMA["properties"]["schema_version"]["const"], "yovision.runtime-status/v1")
+        self.assertFalse(SCHEMA["additionalProperties"])
+        for name in ("runtime", "model", "health"):
+            self.assertFalse(SCHEMA["properties"][name]["additionalProperties"])
+        self.assertFalse(SCHEMA["properties"]["configurations"]["items"]["additionalProperties"])
+
+    def test_all_valid_examples_satisfy_schema(self):
+        paths = sorted(VALID_DIR.glob("*.json"))
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(len(paths), 7)
+        for path in paths:
+            with self.subTest(path=path.name):
+                self.assertEqual(validate_contract(load(path)), [])
+
+    def test_all_invalid_examples_are_rejected(self):
+        paths = sorted(INVALID_DIR.glob("*.json"))
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(len(paths), 6)
+        for path in paths:
+            with self.subTest(path=path.name):
+                self.assertNotEqual(validate_contract(load(path)), [])
+
+    def test_every_runtime_state_is_schema_valid(self):
+        for state in ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS:
+            message = copy.deepcopy(self.running)
+            message["runtime"]["state"] = state
+            with self.subTest(state=state):
+                self.assertEqual(validate_contract(message), [])
+
+    def test_state_transition_matrix(self):
+        self.assertTrue(may_transition("unconfigured", "starting"))
+        self.assertTrue(may_transition("starting", "running"))
+        self.assertTrue(may_transition("running", "degraded"))
+        self.assertTrue(may_transition("degraded", "running"))
+        self.assertTrue(may_transition("running", "failed"))
+        self.assertTrue(may_transition("failed", "stopped"))
+        self.assertFalse(may_transition("unconfigured", "running"))
+        self.assertFalse(may_transition("stopped", "running"))
+
+    def test_stale_and_future_boundaries(self):
+        observed = parse_datetime(self.running["observed_at"])
+        self.assertEqual(freshness(self.running["observed_at"], observed + timedelta(seconds=90)), "fresh")
+        self.assertEqual(freshness(self.running["observed_at"], observed + timedelta(seconds=91)), "stale")
+        self.assertEqual(freshness(self.running["observed_at"], observed - timedelta(seconds=30)), "fresh")
+        self.assertEqual(freshness(self.running["observed_at"], observed - timedelta(seconds=31)), "future_rejected")
+
+    def test_offline_keeps_last_known_and_recovery_replaces_it(self):
+        last_known = load(VALID_DIR / "offline-last-known.json")
+        evaluation = parse_datetime(last_known["observed_at"]) + timedelta(seconds=180)
+        self.assertEqual(freshness(last_known["observed_at"], evaluation), "stale")
+        self.assertEqual(last_known["runtime"]["state"], "degraded")
+        recovered = load(VALID_DIR / "recovered.json")
+        self.assertTrue(may_replace(last_known, recovered, parse_datetime(recovered["observed_at"])))
+
+    def test_unknown_version_and_out_of_order_do_not_replace_projection(self):
+        unknown = load(INVALID_DIR / "unknown-major.json")
+        evaluation = parse_datetime(self.running["observed_at"])
+        self.assertFalse(may_replace(self.running, unknown, evaluation))
+        older = copy.deepcopy(self.running)
+        older["sequence"] = self.running["sequence"] - 1
+        self.assertFalse(may_replace(self.running, older, evaluation))
+        duplicate = load(INVALID_DIR / "duplicate-config-id.json")
+        self.assertFalse(may_replace(self.running, duplicate, parse_datetime(duplicate["observed_at"])))
+
+    def test_configuration_revision_mismatch_is_consumer_derived(self):
+        message = load(VALID_DIR / "config-mismatch.json")
+        desired_revisions = {"gate-primary": 21}
+        self.assertEqual(validate_contract(message), [])
+        report = message["configurations"][0]
+        self.assertNotEqual(report["applied_revision"], desired_revisions[report["config_id"]])
+        self.assertNotIn("desired_revision", report)
+
+    def test_configuration_apply_state_invariants(self):
+        valid_cases = [
+            ("not_configured", None, None),
+            ("applying", None, None),
+            ("applying", 1, None),
+            ("applied", 1, None),
+            ("rejected", None, "CONFIG_INVALID"),
+            ("rejected", 1, "CONFIG_INVALID"),
+        ]
+        for apply_state, revision, error_code in valid_cases:
+            message = copy.deepcopy(self.running)
+            message["configurations"] = [{
+                "config_id": "gate-primary",
+                "apply_state": apply_state,
+                "applied_revision": revision,
+                "error_code": error_code,
+            }]
+            with self.subTest(apply_state=apply_state):
+                self.assertEqual(validate_contract(message), [])
+
+        invalid_cases = [
+            ("not_configured", 1, None),
+            ("applied", None, None),
+            ("rejected", 1, None),
+        ]
+        for apply_state, revision, error_code in invalid_cases:
+            message = copy.deepcopy(self.running)
+            message["configurations"] = [{
+                "config_id": "gate-primary",
+                "apply_state": apply_state,
+                "applied_revision": revision,
+                "error_code": error_code,
+            }]
+            with self.subTest(invalid_apply_state=apply_state):
+                self.assertNotEqual(validate_contract(message), [])
+
+    def test_empty_multiple_and_duplicate_configuration_streams(self):
+        empty = load(VALID_DIR / "empty-configurations.json")
+        multiple = load(VALID_DIR / "configuration-states.json")
+        duplicate = load(INVALID_DIR / "duplicate-config-id.json")
+        self.assertEqual(validate_contract(empty), [])
+        self.assertEqual(validate_contract(multiple), [])
+        self.assertEqual(len(multiple["configurations"]), 4)
+        self.assertTrue(any("duplicate config_id" in error for error in validate_contract(duplicate)))
+
+    def test_sensitive_and_business_fields_are_rejected_by_name(self):
+        for forbidden in ("access_token", "password", "credential", "internal_path", "stack", "user_session", "video", "face", "alert"):
+            message = copy.deepcopy(self.running)
+            message[forbidden] = "forbidden"
+            with self.subTest(forbidden=forbidden):
+                self.assertTrue(any("additional property" in error for error in validate_contract(message)))
+
+    def test_logical_references_reject_paths(self):
+        for value in ("C:\\models\\private.pt", "/srv/models/private.pt", "../private.pt"):
+            message = copy.deepcopy(self.running)
+            message["model"]["model_ref"] = value
+            with self.subTest(value=value):
+                self.assertNotEqual(validate_contract(message), [])
+
+    def test_mapper_responsibilities_are_documented(self):
+        mapping = (CONTRACT_DIR / "mapping.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        for field in ("schema_version", "status_id", "brain_instance_ref", "sequence", "observed_at", "runtime.*", "model.*", "configurations[]", "health.*", "inputs[]"):
+            self.assertIn(f"`{field}`", mapping)
+        self.assertIn("Brain", mapping)
+        self.assertIn("Sense", mapping)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

contracts/transport/v1/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# Machine transport policy v1
+
+`yovision.transport/v1` applies to every connector protected by machine identity v1.
+
+- HTTPS is mandatory. TLS 1.2 is the minimum and TLS 1.3 is preferred.
+- Certificate-chain and hostname verification are mandatory. `InsecureSkipVerify`, plaintext fallback and query-string credentials are forbidden.
+- Connection, response-header and total request timeouts are explicit and bounded; consumers enforce a route-specific body limit before decoding.
+- `X-Request-ID` is an opaque 16–128 character correlation value. It may be generated by the caller or first trusted hop, is never an authentication factor, and must not contain credentials or personal data.
+- Retry only timeout, connection loss, `429` and `5xx` according to the connector policy. Authentication/authorization failures and contract `4xx` responses are terminal until configuration changes.
+- Each retry signs a new machine token and `jti`. The business idempotency key and payload remain unchanged.
+
+Transport failures must not start Sense, Brain or Bell with weakened authentication. Rollback disables the connector and preserves local facts, Outbox/Receipt state and last-known-good configuration.

contracts/transport/v1/transport-policy.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/transport/v1/transport-policy.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision machine transport policy v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": ["version", "tls_min_version", "verify_certificate", "verify_hostname", "connect_timeout_ms", "response_header_timeout_ms", "request_timeout_ms", "max_request_bytes"],
+  "properties": {
+    "version": {"const": "yovision.transport/v1"},
+    "tls_min_version": {"enum": ["1.2", "1.3"]},
+    "verify_certificate": {"const": true},
+    "verify_hostname": {"const": true},
+    "connect_timeout_ms": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 100, "maximum": 30000},
+    "response_header_timeout_ms": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 100, "maximum": 30000},
+    "request_timeout_ms": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 100, "maximum": 60000},
+    "max_request_bytes": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 10485760}
+  }
+}

docs/02-architecture-and-code-map.md

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 generated: true (请先修改 Gitea Wiki，禁止直接编辑本文件)
 wiki_page: Architecture-and-Code-Map
 wiki_url: https://git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/wiki/Architecture-and-Code-Map.-
-wiki_revision: 14b961599d6954357142713a5667fb37d38e86b7
-synchronized_at: 2026-08-29T12:37:31Z
+wiki_revision: 812e822990d8c8e82445bd19ced67aca8c10aba4
+synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:58:55Z
 <!-- gitea-wiki-mirror:end -->
 
 # 架构与代码地图
@@ -296,3 +296,51 @@ Brain 解码层位于 `Brain/src/yovision_brain/decode/`，只依赖 #11 的内
 
 内部候选包含逻辑输入引用、规则/模型版本、发生时间、匿名框和解释原因，不包含摄像头凭据、客户隐私、人脸、生物特征、机器绝对路径或证据引用。该格式不是 Brain→Bell 共享契约；Bell API、Outbox、机器身份、证据和跨项目投递必须由协调工单另行实现。
 <!-- brain-local-events-v1:end -->
+
+<!-- sense-brain-contracts-v1:start -->
+## Sense↔Brain v1 契约边界
+
+- Sense→Brain 配置：`contracts/source-config/v1/source-config.schema.json`；版本 `yovision.source-config/v1`。
+- Brain→Sense 状态：`contracts/runtime-status/v1/runtime-status.schema.json`；版本 `yovision.runtime-status/v1`。
+- 共同测试：`contracts/tests/source-config-v1/`、`contracts/tests/runtime-status-v1/`。
+- 生产者/消费者 mapper 责任分别记录在 `mapper-fields.md` 与 `mapping.md`；产品 adapter 后续由 #152 实现。
+
+数据流固定为：
+
+```text
+Sense Device/Profile/Area 内部事实
+  → source-config/v1 mapper
+  → Brain adapter（后续 #152）
+  → Brain 内部配置与运行
+  → runtime-status/v1 mapper
+  → Sense 只读运维投影（后续 #152）
+```
+
+共享契约统一使用 snake_case 与 `schema_version: yovision.<contract>/v1`。源配置使用 `config_id + integer revision`；运行状态以 `configurations[]` 按 `config_id` 回报实际应用 revision。未知主版本、重复配置 ID、倒序状态、摘要失败或敏感字段必须拒绝，且不得覆盖最后已知有效配置/投影。
+
+协议不得包含摄像头凭据、RTSP URL、query token、内部绝对路径、数据库模型、用户/JWT/Cookie 或 Bell Alert 语义。当前只冻结契约，没有新增网络端点、机器身份或跨端 connector。
+<!-- sense-brain-contracts-v1:end -->
+
+<!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:start -->
+## 标准事件与证据 v1 契约边界
+
+- Event Schema：`contracts/events/v1/event.schema.json`，版本 `yovision.event/v1`。
+- Bell 接入描述：`contracts/events/v1/openapi.json`，返回创建、重复、幂等冲突和不支持版本等明确结果。
+- Evidence Schema/API：`contracts/evidence/v1/evidence-reference.schema.json`、`openapi.json`，版本 `yovision.evidence-reference/v1`。
+- 共同测试：`contracts/tests/events-v1/`、`contracts/tests/evidence-v1/`。
+
+后续 #153 的映射流固定为：
+
+```text
+Brain internal candidate / Sense local event
+  → yovision.event/v1 producer mapper
+  → Sense Outbox relay（默认拓扑，保持原 producer/source ID）
+  → Bell v1 ingress
+  → Bell private immutable Event + permanent Receipt
+  → Bell private Rule / Alert / ack / close
+```
+
+规范载荷使用 RFC 8785 JCS 与 SHA-256 形成稳定摘要。同键同摘要返回原 Event；同键不同摘要返回冲突并审计，不覆盖原事实。Evidence 只提供逻辑引用与状态/完整性元数据，不授予访问权限，不包含本机路径、签名 URL 或凭据；取证授权由后续机器身份和 connector 工单实现。
+
+Brain candidate、Sense candidate/Outbox 与 Bell Event/Receipt/Alert 继续是各自内部模型。当前没有新增可运行的跨端 ingress/relay，不能把冻结 Schema 解释为端到端链路已完成。
+<!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:end -->

docs/03-business-rules-and-glossary.md

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 generated: true (请先修改 Gitea Wiki，禁止直接编辑本文件)
 wiki_page: Business-Rules-and-Glossary
 wiki_url: https://git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/wiki/Business-Rules-and-Glossary.-
-wiki_revision: 27749cbf699093d997284afc277ea53e73a5876f
-synchronized_at: 2026-08-29T12:37:41Z
+wiki_revision: bc4a1a7be268028fa85717b71f48f7dd75cc7e52
+synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:59:04Z
 <!-- gitea-wiki-mirror:end -->
 
 # 业务规则与术语
@@ -233,3 +233,32 @@ synchronized_at: 2026-08-29T12:37:41Z
 - 确认和恢复都要求 6–256 字符原因、当前版本和允许的状态；旧版本或错误状态返回冲突。所有动作写入独立流转历史和 GoAdmin 操作审计。
 - 运维告警永远设置为 Sense 内部运维记录，不创建本地安全事件或 Bell Alert，不进入跨项目 Outbox，也不实现通知升级。
 <!-- sense-ops-alerts:end -->
+
+<!-- sense-brain-contracts-v1:start -->
+## Sense↔Brain 配置与状态规则
+
+- **配置流**：由稳定 `config_id` 和严格递增的正整数 `revision` 标识；revision 不得复用或倒退。
+- **无凭据媒体引用**：`media.ref` 是由后续 connector 解析的不透明逻辑引用，不是 RTSP URL、本机路径或数据库主键。
+- **Profile 绑定**：规则集必须与 Profile ID、宽高一致；Profile 变化必须形成新 revision，并在需要时标记 `recalibration_required`，旧几何不得静默重投影。
+- **规则坐标**：区域与方向线使用 0–1 归一化坐标，规则 ID 在同一规则集内唯一；退化多边形和重合线端点无效。
+- **完整性**：源配置对移除 `integrity` 后的 JCS 表示计算 SHA-256；校验失败保留上一有效 revision。
+- **配置应用状态**：Brain 在 `configurations[]` 中按 `config_id` 报告 `not_configured/applying/applied/rejected` 与实际 `applied_revision`；同一消息重复 ID 整条拒绝。
+- **状态时序**：Brain 实例 sequence 单调递增；Sense 拒绝倒序消息。观测时间超过约定 90 秒时由 Sense 标记陈旧，不用未知值覆盖最后已知投影。
+- **状态边界**：运行/健康错误只形成 Sense 运维投影，不是业务 Event 或 Bell Alert；不得包含用户会话、凭据、内部路径或客户视频。
+- **版本兼容**：v1 只接受已冻结语义；破坏性字段或语义变化发布新主版本。未知主版本停止摄取并保留上一有效事实。
+<!-- sense-brain-contracts-v1:end -->
+
+<!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:start -->
+## 标准事件、证据和幂等规则
+
+- **标准 Event**：匿名、不可变的跨产品安全事实，不是 Bell Alert，也不携带处置或通知状态。
+- **原始生产者**：`producer_id` 始终标识最初产生事件的 Brain 或 Sense 实例；relay 使用独立传输身份，但不得替换业务生产者。
+- **永久幂等键**：精确 UTF-8 对 `(producer_id, source_event_id)`。重试沿用同一键，不生成新事件。
+- **规范摘要**：完整 Event 使用 RFC 8785 JCS 规范化后计算 SHA-256。同键同摘要为重复成功；同键异摘要为终止性冲突，并追加脱敏审计。
+- **时间格式**：Event v1 使用 UTC RFC 3339、三位毫秒和 `Z`；可选字段缺失时省略，不发送 null。
+- **证据引用**：`evidence_id` 与 `owner_id` 是不透明逻辑引用，不是 URL、文件路径或访问凭据。
+- **证据状态**：`pending → processing → success|failed`。success 要求内容类型和摘要/大小；failed 要求稳定错误码和是否可重试。
+- **降级原则**：证据失败、未知或过期不删除 Event，不自动关闭 Alert，也不伪装成完整成功。
+- **Bell 所有权**：Bell 独占内部 Event/Receipt、规则、Alert、ack、close、通知与用户审计；上游不得写入这些状态。
+- **兼容与回退**：未知主版本终止接收但保留已有事实；破坏性变化发布新主版本。回退停用新生产者版本，不删除 Outbox、Receipt、Event 或审计。
+<!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:end -->

docs/04-local-development-and-verification.md

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 generated: true (请先修改 Gitea Wiki，禁止直接编辑本文件)
 wiki_page: Local-Development-and-Verification
 wiki_url: https://git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/wiki/Local-Development-and-Verification.-
-wiki_revision: e6068ff0e42765d32ff4e0ee0e8e51cf7d79b7da
-synchronized_at: 2026-08-29T12:37:58Z
+wiki_revision: d11757b202117e028878802e1e8a9ba9df1a8e89
+synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:59:13Z
 <!-- gitea-wiki-mirror:end -->
 
 # 本地开发与验证
@@ -624,3 +624,58 @@ Brain\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m yovision_brain.app --config Brain\tests\fixtur
 
 CLI 将内部事件 JSON Lines 写入 stdout，并把 completed/cancelled、帧数、检测数和事件数摘要写入 stderr。配置文件必须显式提供，当前使用 JSON；无命中正常返回零事件，读取/配置/模块失败返回非零且不回显机器路径。命令不启动 Sense/Bell、不连接摄像头或网络。
 <!-- brain-local-events-v1:end -->
+
+<!-- sense-brain-contracts-v1:start -->
+## Sense↔Brain v1 契约验证
+
+源/规则配置契约：
+
+```powershell
+pwsh -NoProfile -File contracts/tests/source-config-v1/run.ps1
+```
+
+脚本在系统临时目录创建隔离虚拟环境，按固定依赖运行 Schema、跨字段语义、JCS/SHA-256、版本/重校准和秘密拒绝测试，结束后清理所属临时目录。
+
+运行状态契约不需要第三方包：
+
+```powershell
+python contracts/tests/runtime-status-v1/test_contract.py
+```
+
+测试覆盖六态运行状态、30 秒未来时间偏差、90 秒陈旧边界、空/多配置流、四种配置应用状态、重复 `config_id`、integer revision mismatch、倒序消息、未知主版本、回退保留和敏感字段拒绝。
+
+仓库级复核：
+
+```powershell
+python -m unittest discover -s tests -v
+python dev_scripts/harness.py check --strict
+git diff --check
+```
+
+这些命令只验证冻结契约，不验证 #152 产品 adapter、真实网络传输、机器身份、现场断网恢复或端到端链路。
+<!-- sense-brain-contracts-v1:end -->
+
+<!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:start -->
+## 标准事件与证据 v1 契约验证
+
+两组测试均只使用 Python 标准库：
+
+```powershell
+python contracts/tests/events-v1/test_contract.py
+python contracts/tests/evidence-v1/test_contract.py
+```
+
+事件测试覆盖匿名危险区域/方向越线样例、Brain producer→Sense relay→Bell consumer mapper fixture、RFC 8785/SHA-256 幂等向量、重复/冲突、未知版本、敏感字段拒绝和 OpenAPI 引用。
+
+证据测试覆盖 `pending/processing/success/failed` 状态约束、success 完整性、失败降级、旧 `available` 状态拒绝、敏感访问材料拒绝和证据 API 响应引用。
+
+仓库级复核：
+
+```powershell
+python -m unittest discover -s tests -v
+python dev_scripts/harness.py check --strict
+git diff --check
+```
+
+这些测试只验证冻结契约，不验证 #153 产品 mapper/relay/ingress、#151 机器身份、实际证据存储/授权、网络断线补投或跨项目 E2E。
+<!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:end -->

docs/09-product-requirements.md

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 generated: true (请先修改 Gitea Wiki，禁止直接编辑本文件)
 wiki_page: Product-Requirements
 wiki_url: https://git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/wiki/Product-Requirements.-
-wiki_revision: eac307b5aa55ff770ff034c53a65b70dc01cb00d
-synchronized_at: 2026-08-29T12:39:32Z
+wiki_revision: c9970b0ee8b677b6be13f31af67b3206a3faf956
+synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T02:00:00Z
 <!-- gitea-wiki-mirror:end -->
 
 # 产品需求
@@ -272,3 +272,23 @@ BRN-002 的首个解码阶段已通过工单 #13 验收。Brain 通过可替换
 
 内部候选只含逻辑输入引用、规则/模型版本、发生时间、匿名观测和解释原因，不含摄像头凭据、客户隐私、人脸、生物特征、机器绝对路径或伪造证据。该格式不是正式 Brain→Bell 契约；证据、机器身份、Outbox/可靠投递和跨项目 E2E 仍须协调工单实现。
 <!-- brain-local-events-delivery:end -->
+
+<!-- sense-brain-contracts-v1:start -->
+## Sense↔Brain 首批冻结契约
+
+工单 #148、#149 已于 2026-08-31 通过用户验收并合入 `dev`。Sense→Brain 源/规则配置的唯一共享事实源为 `contracts/source-config/v1/`，版本标识为 `yovision.source-config/v1`；Brain→Sense 运行状态的唯一共享事实源为 `contracts/runtime-status/v1/`，版本标识为 `yovision.runtime-status/v1`。
+
+源配置按 `config_id + integer revision` 形成不可复用的配置流，携带逻辑站点/设备/Profile、无凭据媒体引用、归一化区域/方向线、规则版本与完整性摘要。运行状态按同一 `config_id` 在 `configurations[]` 中报告实际应用 revision，并包含 Brain 实例、运行/模型版本、健康、输入和稳定错误码。
+
+这两项只冻结协议和测试，不表示 #152 connector 已实现。Sense 与 Brain 仍可独立运行；Brain 不读取 Sense 数据库，Sense 不读取 Brain 内部状态。既有 `brain.internal.*`、Sense GORM 模型和运维投影继续是项目内部实现，不得直接作为共享协议。
+<!-- sense-brain-contracts-v1:end -->
+
+<!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:start -->
+## 标准事件与证据引用冻结契约
+
+工单 #150 已于 2026-08-31 通过用户验收并合入 `dev`。Sense/Brain→Bell 标准匿名安全事件的唯一共享事实源为 `contracts/events/v1/`，版本标识 `yovision.event/v1`；证据逻辑引用的唯一共享事实源为 `contracts/evidence/v1/`，版本标识 `yovision.evidence-reference/v1`。
+
+事件以原始 `(producer_id, source_event_id)` 永久幂等，Sense relay 不改变原始身份或业务载荷。事件只携带逻辑站点/设备/Profile、事件类型、发生时间、规则/模型版本、匿名观测、区域和证据逻辑引用，不携带用户会话、摄像头凭据、内部路径、人脸特征或 Alert/ack/close 状态。
+
+证据状态为 `pending/processing/success/failed`；`success` 必须包含内容类型和 SHA-256 完整性元数据，失败或过期只降级证据，不改写不可变 Event 或 Bell Alert 生命周期。此工单只冻结契约和测试，#153 可靠 connector、机器身份、证据存储与实际授权取证尚未实现。
+<!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:end -->

docs/delivery/deployment-and-operations.md

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 generated: true (请先修改 Gitea Wiki，禁止直接编辑本文件)
 wiki_page: Deployment-and-Operations
 wiki_url: https://git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/wiki/Deployment-and-Operations.-
-wiki_revision: b21bbc64f323f465b78b557537c38e334de31f45
-synchronized_at: 2026-08-29T12:41:01Z
+wiki_revision: 0a772b0511044d98430ebd93304faa3dee57183d
+synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:39:35Z
 <!-- gitea-wiki-mirror:end -->
 
 # YoVision 部署与运维
@@ -134,3 +134,11 @@ Sense\start_sense.bat
 
 运维告警排错不得粘贴设备地址、Stream URI、摄像头凭据、JWT、Cookie 或数据库连接。需要回退时可停止使用刷新/处置入口，但不得删除 `sense_ops_alerts` 或 `sense_ops_alert_transitions` 历史；规则语义变化必须另建工单。
 <!-- sense-ops-alerts:end -->
+
+<!-- sense-brain-contracts-v1:start -->
+## Sense↔Brain 契约部署边界
+
+`yovision.source-config/v1` 与 `yovision.runtime-status/v1` 已冻结，但当前没有因此新增监听端口、服务进程、机器凭据或根级编排。#148/#149 只交付 `contracts/**` Schema、样例、兼容说明和契约测试；实际 Sense↔Brain 传输、认证、超时、退避、重启恢复及配置/状态 adapter 由后续 #151、#152 实现和验收。
+
+因此现阶段部署仍按 Sense、Brain 各自独立入口进行，不得手工共享数据库、用户 JWT/Cookie、摄像头凭据、文件目录或临时 JSON 字段来提前打通。需要停用或回退时保持两端独立运行，并保留上一已确认的配置与最后已知状态；未知协议主版本必须停止摄取而不是覆盖投影。
+<!-- sense-brain-contracts-v1:end -->