feat: 实现 Sense Brain 控制连接器 (#152)

docs: 同步 #151 机器身份与安全传输 v1

Bell/server/app/bell/integration/machine_identity/registry.go

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+type registryDocument struct {
+	Version    string              `json:"version"`
+	Audience   string              `json:"audience"`
+	Principals []registryPrincipal `json:"principals"`
+}
+
+type registryPrincipal struct {
+	PrincipalID string        `json:"principal_id"`
+	Enabled     bool          `json:"enabled"`
+	Keys        []registryKey `json:"keys"`
+}
+
+type registryKey struct {
+	KeyID     string   `json:"kid"`
+	PublicKey string   `json:"public_key_base64url"`
+	Status    string   `json:"status"`
+	Scopes    []string `json:"scopes"`
+}
+
+func LoadRegistry(filePath, expectedAudience string) (*Registry, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(filePath) == "" || !validAudiences[expectedAudience] {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine principal registry path and audience are required")
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filePath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("read machine principal registry")
+	}
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	var document registryDocument
+	if err = decoder.Decode(&document); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	if err = decoder.Decode(&struct{}{}); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	if document.Version != "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1" || document.Audience != expectedAudience || len(document.Principals) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	records := make([]KeyRecord, 0)
+	for _, principal := range document.Principals {
+		if len(principal.Keys) == 0 {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+		}
+		for _, key := range principal.Keys {
+			publicKey, decodeErr := base64.RawURLEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(key.PublicKey)
+			if decodeErr != nil || len(publicKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize || (key.Status != "active" && key.Status != "revoked") {
+				return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+			}
+			records = append(records, KeyRecord{Principal: principal.PrincipalID, KeyID: key.KeyID, PublicKey: ed25519.PublicKey(publicKey), Audience: document.Audience,
+				Scopes: key.Scopes, Enabled: principal.Enabled, Revoked: key.Status == "revoked"})
+		}
+	}
+	return NewRegistry(records...)
+}

Bell/server/app/bell/integration/machine_identity/token.go

@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"path"
+	"regexp"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+)
+
+var (
+	principalPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$`)
+	keyIDPattern     = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$`)
+	tokenIDPattern   = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,64}$`)
+	validAudiences   = map[string]bool{"yovision-sense": true, "yovision-brain": true, "yovision-bell": true}
+	validScopes      = map[string]bool{"source-config:write": true, "runtime-status:write": true, "events:ingest": true, "evidence:read": true}
+)
+
+const (
+	Version       = "yovision.machine-identity/v1"
+	TokenType     = "YOVISION-MACHINE+JWT"
+	MaxLifetime   = 5 * time.Minute
+	AllowedSkew   = 30 * time.Second
+	MaxKeyOverlap = 24 * time.Hour
+)
+
+type Error struct{ Code string }
+
+func (e *Error) Error() string { return e.Code }
+
+func codeError(code string) error { return &Error{Code: code} }
+
+// BearerToken deliberately has no cookie or query fallback.
+func BearerToken(authorization string) (string, error) {
+	parts := strings.Split(authorization, " ")
+	if len(parts) != 2 || !strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "Bearer") || parts[1] == "" || strings.ContainsAny(parts[1], " \t\r\n,") {
+		return "", codeError("machine_token_missing")
+	}
+	return parts[1], nil
+}
+
+type Claims struct {
+	Version    string   `json:"ver"`
+	Issuer     string   `json:"iss"`
+	Subject    string   `json:"sub"`
+	Audience   string   `json:"aud"`
+	Scopes     []string `json:"scope"`
+	IssuedAt   int64    `json:"iat"`
+	NotBefore  int64    `json:"nbf"`
+	ExpiresAt  int64    `json:"exp"`
+	TokenID    string   `json:"jti"`
+	Method     string   `json:"htm"`
+	Path       string   `json:"htu"`
+	BodySHA256 string   `json:"body_sha256"`
+}
+
+type protectedHeader struct {
+	Algorithm string `json:"alg"`
+	Type      string `json:"typ"`
+	KeyID     string `json:"kid"`
+	Version   string `json:"ver"`
+}
+
+type KeyRecord struct {
+	Principal string
+	KeyID     string
+	PublicKey ed25519.PublicKey
+	Audience  string
+	Scopes    []string
+	Enabled   bool
+	Revoked   bool
+}
+
+type Registry struct {
+	mu   sync.RWMutex
+	keys map[string]KeyRecord
+}
+
+func NewRegistry(records ...KeyRecord) (*Registry, error) {
+	r := &Registry{keys: make(map[string]KeyRecord, len(records))}
+	for _, record := range records {
+		if !keyIDPattern.MatchString(record.KeyID) || !principalPattern.MatchString(record.Principal) || !validAudiences[record.Audience] || len(record.PublicKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize || !validScopeList(record.Scopes) {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid machine key record")
+		}
+		if _, exists := r.keys[record.KeyID]; exists {
+			return nil, errors.New("duplicate machine key id")
+		}
+		record.PublicKey = slices.Clone(record.PublicKey)
+		record.Scopes = slices.Clone(record.Scopes)
+		r.keys[record.KeyID] = record
+	}
+	return r, nil
+}
+
+func (r *Registry) Lookup(keyID string) (KeyRecord, bool) {
+	r.mu.RLock()
+	defer r.mu.RUnlock()
+	record, ok := r.keys[keyID]
+	record.PublicKey = slices.Clone(record.PublicKey)
+	record.Scopes = slices.Clone(record.Scopes)
+	return record, ok
+}
+
+func (r *Registry) Revoke(keyID string) bool {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	record, ok := r.keys[keyID]
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	record.Revoked = true
+	r.keys[keyID] = record
+	return true
+}
+
+type ReplayStore struct {
+	mu   sync.Mutex
+	used map[string]time.Time
+}
+
+// ReplayCache must atomically persist accepted (principal, jti) pairs until
+// expiry. ReplayStore is process-local and intended for tests or a single
+// uninterrupted process; connector implementations inject a durable store.
+type ReplayCache interface {
+	Consume(principal, tokenID string, expiresAt, now time.Time) bool
+}
+
+func NewReplayStore() *ReplayStore { return &ReplayStore{used: map[string]time.Time{}} }
+
+func (s *ReplayStore) Consume(principal, tokenID string, expiresAt, now time.Time) bool {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	for key, expiry := range s.used {
+		if !expiry.After(now) {
+			delete(s.used, key)
+		}
+	}
+	key := principal + "\x00" + tokenID
+	if _, exists := s.used[key]; exists {
+		return false
+	}
+	s.used[key] = expiresAt
+	return true
+}
+
+type Signer struct {
+	Principal  string
+	KeyID      string
+	PrivateKey ed25519.PrivateKey
+	Now        func() time.Time
+}
+
+func LoadPrivateKey(path string) (ed25519.PrivateKey, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(path) == "" {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key path is required")
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("read machine private key")
+	}
+	block, rest := pem.Decode(raw)
+	if block == nil || len(bytes.TrimSpace(rest)) != 0 || block.Type != "PRIVATE KEY" {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key must be one PKCS#8 PEM block")
+	}
+	parsed, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("parse machine private key")
+	}
+	key, ok := parsed.(ed25519.PrivateKey)
+	if !ok || len(key) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key is not Ed25519")
+	}
+	return slices.Clone(key), nil
+}
+
+func (s Signer) Mint(audience string, scopes []string, method, requestPath string, body []byte) (string, error) {
+	if !principalPattern.MatchString(s.Principal) || !keyIDPattern.MatchString(s.KeyID) || len(s.PrivateKey) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize || !validAudiences[audience] || !validScopeList(scopes) {
+		return "", errors.New("incomplete machine signer configuration")
+	}
+	normalizedPath, err := normalizePath(requestPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	method = strings.ToUpper(method)
+	if !allowedMethod(method) {
+		return "", errors.New("unsupported machine request method")
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	if s.Now != nil {
+		now = s.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	tokenID, err := randomTokenID()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	claims := Claims{Version: Version, Issuer: s.Principal, Subject: s.Principal, Audience: audience,
+		Scopes: slices.Clone(scopes), IssuedAt: now.Unix(), NotBefore: now.Unix(), ExpiresAt: now.Add(MaxLifetime).Unix(),
+		TokenID: tokenID, Method: method, Path: normalizedPath, BodySHA256: hex.EncodeToString(digest[:])}
+	header := protectedHeader{Algorithm: "EdDSA", Type: TokenType, KeyID: s.KeyID, Version: Version}
+	headerJSON, _ := json.Marshal(header)
+	claimsJSON, _ := json.Marshal(claims)
+	signingInput := rawBase64(headerJSON) + "." + rawBase64(claimsJSON)
+	signature := ed25519.Sign(s.PrivateKey, []byte(signingInput))
+	return signingInput + "." + rawBase64(signature), nil
+}
+
+type Verifier struct {
+	Registry *Registry
+	Replay   ReplayCache
+	Now      func() time.Time
+}
+
+func (v Verifier) Verify(token, audience, requiredScope, method, requestPath string, body []byte) (Claims, error) {
+	if v.Registry == nil || v.Replay == nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
+	if len(parts) != 3 || strings.Contains(token, "=") {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	headerBytes, err := decodeRaw(parts[0])
+	if err != nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	var header protectedHeader
+	if err = decodeClosed(headerBytes, &header); err != nil || header.Algorithm != "EdDSA" || header.Type != TokenType || header.Version != Version || !keyIDPattern.MatchString(header.KeyID) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	record, ok := v.Registry.Lookup(header.KeyID)
+	if !ok {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	signature, err := decodeRaw(parts[2])
+	if err != nil || len(signature) != ed25519.SignatureSize || !ed25519.Verify(record.PublicKey, []byte(parts[0]+"."+parts[1]), signature) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if !record.Enabled || record.Revoked {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_identity_revoked")
+	}
+	claimsBytes, err := decodeRaw(parts[1])
+	if err != nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	var claims Claims
+	if err = decodeClosed(claimsBytes, &claims); err != nil || !validClaimsShape(claims) || claims.Issuer != record.Principal || claims.Subject != record.Principal {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	if v.Now != nil {
+		now = v.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	nowUnix := now.Unix()
+	if claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt <= 0 || claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt > int64(MaxLifetime/time.Second) ||
+		claims.NotBefore < claims.IssuedAt || claims.NotBefore > claims.ExpiresAt || claims.IssuedAt > nowUnix+int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if claims.NotBefore > nowUnix+int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) || claims.ExpiresAt < nowUnix-int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_expired")
+	}
+	if claims.Audience != audience || record.Audience != audience {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_audience_denied")
+	}
+	if !slices.Contains(claims.Scopes, requiredScope) || !slices.Contains(record.Scopes, requiredScope) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_scope_denied")
+	}
+	normalizedPath, err := normalizePath(requestPath)
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	if err != nil || claims.Method != strings.ToUpper(method) || claims.Path != normalizedPath || claims.BodySHA256 != hex.EncodeToString(digest[:]) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if !v.Replay.Consume(claims.Issuer, claims.TokenID, time.Unix(claims.ExpiresAt, 0).Add(AllowedSkew), now) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_replayed")
+	}
+	return claims, nil
+}
+
+func decodeClosed(raw []byte, target any) error {
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	if err := decoder.Decode(target); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := decoder.Decode(&struct{}{}); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		if err == nil {
+			return errors.New("trailing JSON value")
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func validClaimsShape(claims Claims) bool {
+	if claims.Version != Version || !principalPattern.MatchString(claims.Issuer) || claims.Subject != claims.Issuer || !validAudiences[claims.Audience] || !tokenIDPattern.MatchString(claims.TokenID) ||
+		len(claims.Scopes) == 0 || len(claims.Scopes) > 4 || !allowedMethod(claims.Method) || claims.Path == "" || len(claims.BodySHA256) != 64 {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !validScopeList(claims.Scopes) {
+		return false
+	}
+	_, err := hex.DecodeString(claims.BodySHA256)
+	return err == nil
+}
+
+func validScopeList(scopes []string) bool {
+	if len(scopes) == 0 || len(scopes) > 4 {
+		return false
+	}
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, scope := range scopes {
+		if !validScopes[scope] || seen[scope] {
+			return false
+		}
+		seen[scope] = true
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func normalizePath(value string) (string, error) {
+	parsed, err := url.ParseRequestURI(value)
+	if err != nil || parsed.IsAbs() || parsed.Host != "" || parsed.RawQuery != "" || parsed.Fragment != "" || parsed.Path == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(parsed.Path, "/") || strings.Contains(parsed.Path, "\\") || strings.Contains(parsed.Path, "//") || path.Clean(parsed.Path) != parsed.Path {
+		return "", errors.New("machine request path must be a normalized absolute path without query or fragment")
+	}
+	return parsed.EscapedPath(), nil
+}
+
+func allowedMethod(method string) bool {
+	switch method {
+	case "GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE":
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
+func randomTokenID() (string, error) {
+	raw := make([]byte, 16)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("generate machine token id: %w", err)
+	}
+	return rawBase64(raw), nil
+}
+
+func rawBase64(value []byte) string { return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(value) }
+
+func decodeRaw(value string) ([]byte, error) {
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(value)
+}

Bell/server/app/bell/integration/machine_identity/token_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type crossLanguageVector struct {
+	PublicKey string `json:"public_key_base64url"`
+	Token     string `json:"token"`
+	Now       int64  `json:"now"`
+	Audience  string `json:"audience"`
+	Scope     string `json:"required_scope"`
+	Method    string `json:"method"`
+	Path      string `json:"path"`
+	Body      string `json:"body_base64"`
+}
+
+func testIdentity(t *testing.T) (Signer, *Registry, time.Time) {
+	t.Helper()
+	publicKey, privateKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	now := time.Unix(1_800_000_000, 0).UTC()
+	registry, err := NewRegistry(KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:sense:site-a", KeyID: "sense-key-0001", PublicKey: publicKey,
+		Audience: "yovision-brain", Scopes: []string{"source-config:write"}, Enabled: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return Signer{Principal: "yv:sense:site-a", KeyID: "sense-key-0001", PrivateKey: privateKey, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}, registry, now
+}
+
+func errorCode(t *testing.T, err error) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	var coded *Error
+	if !errors.As(err, &coded) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected coded error, got %v", err)
+	}
+	return coded.Code
+}
+
+func TestMintAndVerifyRequestBoundToken(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte(`{"revision":7}`)
+	token, err := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	claims, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if claims.Issuer != signer.Principal || claims.Subject != signer.Principal || claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt != 300 {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected claims: %+v", claims)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBearerTokenHasNoCookieOrQueryFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	if token, err := BearerToken("Bearer compact.token.value"); err != nil || token != "compact.token.value" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, value := range []string{"", "compact.token.value", "Bearer", "Bearer one two", "Cookie compact.token.value"} {
+		if _, err := BearerToken(value); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_missing" {
+			t.Fatalf("accepted %q", value)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRejectsReplayWrongAudienceScopeAndRequest(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte(`{"revision":7}`)
+	mint := func() string {
+		token, err := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		return token
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	token := mint()
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_replayed" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-bell", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_audience_denied" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-brain", "events:ingest", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_scope_denied" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", []byte("changed")); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_invalid" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExpiryRevocationAndRotation(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte("{}")
+	token, _ := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	expired := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now.Add(6 * time.Minute) }}
+	if _, err := expired.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_expired" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	oldPublic, oldPrivate, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	newPublic, newPrivate, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	rotation, err := NewRegistry(
+		KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-old-0001", PublicKey: oldPublic, Audience: "yovision-sense", Scopes: []string{"runtime-status:write"}, Enabled: true},
+		KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-new-0002", PublicKey: newPublic, Audience: "yovision-sense", Scopes: []string{"runtime-status:write"}, Enabled: true},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	oldSigner := Signer{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-old-0001", PrivateKey: oldPrivate, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	newSigner := Signer{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-new-0002", PrivateKey: newPrivate, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	oldToken, _ := oldSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	newToken, _ := newSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	verify := Verifier{Registry: rotation, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(oldToken, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(newToken, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !rotation.Revoke("brain-old-0001") {
+		t.Fatal("old key was not revoked")
+	}
+	oldAfterRevoke, _ := oldSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(oldAfterRevoke, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_identity_revoked" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTransportPolicyRejectsUnsafeTLS(t *testing.T) {
+	safe := TransportPolicy{TLSMinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12, VerifyCertificate: true, VerifyHostname: true,
+		ConnectTimeout: time.Second, ResponseHeaderTimeout: time.Second, RequestTimeout: 2 * time.Second, MaxRequestBytes: 1024}
+	if err := safe.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	unsafe := safe
+	unsafe.VerifyHostname = false
+	if err := unsafe.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unsafe hostname policy accepted")
+	}
+	unsafe = safe
+	unsafe.TLSMinVersion = tls.VersionTLS11
+	if err := unsafe.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("TLS 1.1 accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifiesCrossLanguageVector(t *testing.T) {
+	vectorPath := filepath.Join("..", "..", "..", "..", "..", "..", "contracts", "tests", "machine-identity-v1", "cross-language-vector.json")
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(vectorPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var vector crossLanguageVector
+	if err = json.Unmarshal(raw, &vector); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	publicKey, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(vector.PublicKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	body, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(vector.Body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	registry, err := NewRegistry(KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:vector", KeyID: "brain-vector-0001", PublicKey: ed25519.PublicKey(publicKey), Audience: vector.Audience, Scopes: []string{vector.Scope}, Enabled: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return time.Unix(vector.Now, 0) }}
+	claims, err := verifier.Verify(vector.Token, vector.Audience, vector.Scope, vector.Method, vector.Path, body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if claims.Issuer != "yv:brain:vector" {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected issuer: %s", claims.Issuer)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadsExternalPublicRegistryAndRejectsWrongAudience(t *testing.T) {
+	publicKey, _, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	document := map[string]any{
+		"version": "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1", "audience": "yovision-bell",
+		"principals": []any{map[string]any{"principal_id": "yv:sense:site-a", "enabled": true, "keys": []any{map[string]any{
+			"kid": "sense-key-0001", "public_key_base64url": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(publicKey), "status": "active", "scopes": []string{"events:ingest"},
+		}}}},
+	}
+	raw, _ := json.Marshal(document)
+	file := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "principals.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(file, raw, 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	registry, err := LoadRegistry(file, "yovision-bell")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if record, ok := registry.Lookup("sense-key-0001"); !ok || record.Principal != "yv:sense:site-a" {
+		t.Fatal("registry record missing")
+	}
+	if _, err = LoadRegistry(file, "yovision-sense"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("wrong registry audience accepted")
+	}
+}

Bell/server/app/bell/integration/machine_identity/transport.go

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type TransportPolicy struct {
+	TLSMinVersion         uint16
+	VerifyCertificate     bool
+	VerifyHostname        bool
+	ConnectTimeout        time.Duration
+	ResponseHeaderTimeout time.Duration
+	RequestTimeout        time.Duration
+	MaxRequestBytes       int64
+}
+
+func (p TransportPolicy) Validate() error {
+	if p.TLSMinVersion < tls.VersionTLS12 || !p.VerifyCertificate || !p.VerifyHostname || p.ConnectTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.ConnectTimeout > 30*time.Second ||
+		p.ResponseHeaderTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.ResponseHeaderTimeout > 30*time.Second || p.RequestTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.RequestTimeout > 60*time.Second ||
+		p.MaxRequestBytes < 1 || p.MaxRequestBytes > 10*1024*1024 {
+		return errors.New("machine transport policy is unsafe")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (p TransportPolicy) HTTPClient() (*http.Client, error) {
+	if err := p.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	transport := &http.Transport{
+		TLSClientConfig:       &tls.Config{MinVersion: p.TLSMinVersion},
+		TLSHandshakeTimeout:   p.ConnectTimeout,
+		ResponseHeaderTimeout: p.ResponseHeaderTimeout,
+	}
+	return &http.Client{Transport: transport, Timeout: p.RequestTimeout}, nil
+}

Brain/pyproject.toml

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ version = "0.1.0"
 description = "Headless inference delivery unit for YoVision"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = "==3.11.*"
-dependencies = []
+dependencies = ["cryptography==50.0.1"]
 
 [project.optional-dependencies]
 # The wheel backend is selected by the official PyTorch index documented in

Brain/src/yovision_brain/integration/machine_identity/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+"""Independent service-to-service machine identity for Brain connectors."""
+
+from .token import (
+    ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS,
+    MAX_KEY_OVERLAP_SECONDS,
+    MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS,
+    VERSION,
+    Claims,
+    KeyRecord,
+    MachineIdentityError,
+    Registry,
+    ReplayStore,
+    Signer,
+    Verifier,
+    load_private_key,
+    load_registry,
+    bearer_token,
+)
+from .transport import TransportPolicy
+
+__all__ = [
+    "ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS",
+    "MAX_KEY_OVERLAP_SECONDS",
+    "MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS",
+    "VERSION",
+    "Claims",
+    "KeyRecord",
+    "MachineIdentityError",
+    "Registry",
+    "ReplayStore",
+    "Signer",
+    "TransportPolicy",
+    "Verifier",
+    "load_private_key",
+    "load_registry",
+    "bearer_token",
+]

Brain/src/yovision_brain/integration/machine_identity/token.py

@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+"""Ed25519 request-bound machine tokens.
+
+This module never accepts browser cookies, GoAdmin JWTs, query tokens, or
+shared secrets. HTTP adapters must obtain the compact token exclusively from
+the Authorization bearer header and pass the request body unchanged.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import json
+import posixpath
+import re
+import secrets
+import threading
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Callable, Iterable, Protocol
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import (
+    Ed25519PrivateKey,
+    Ed25519PublicKey,
+)
+
+VERSION = "yovision.machine-identity/v1"
+TOKEN_TYPE = "YOVISION-MACHINE+JWT"
+MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS = 300
+ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS = 30
+MAX_KEY_OVERLAP_SECONDS = 24 * 60 * 60
+_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"})
+_AUDIENCES = frozenset({"yovision-sense", "yovision-brain", "yovision-bell"})
+_SCOPES = frozenset({"source-config:write", "runtime-status:write", "events:ingest", "evidence:read"})
+_PRINCIPAL = re.compile(r"^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$")
+_KEY_ID = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$")
+_TOKEN_ID = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,64}$")
+
+
+class MachineIdentityError(ValueError):
+    """A stable, non-secret authentication failure."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+def bearer_token(authorization: str) -> str:
+    """Extract only an Authorization bearer token; there is no cookie/query fallback."""
+    parts = authorization.split(" ")
+    if len(parts) != 2 or parts[0].lower() != "bearer" or not parts[1] or any(character in parts[1] for character in " \t\r\n,"):
+        raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_missing")
+    return parts[1]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Claims:
+    ver: str
+    iss: str
+    sub: str
+    aud: str
+    scope: tuple[str, ...]
+    iat: int
+    nbf: int
+    exp: int
+    jti: str
+    htm: str
+    htu: str
+    body_sha256: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class KeyRecord:
+    principal: str
+    key_id: str
+    public_key: Ed25519PublicKey
+    audience: str
+    scopes: frozenset[str]
+    enabled: bool = True
+    revoked: bool = False
+
+
+class Registry:
+    def __init__(self, records: Iterable[KeyRecord]) -> None:
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self._records: dict[str, KeyRecord] = {}
+        for record in records:
+            if not _KEY_ID.fullmatch(record.key_id) or not _PRINCIPAL.fullmatch(record.principal) or record.audience not in _AUDIENCES or not _valid_scopes(record.scopes):
+                raise ValueError("invalid machine key record")
+            if record.key_id in self._records:
+                raise ValueError("duplicate machine key id")
+            self._records[record.key_id] = record
+
+    def lookup(self, key_id: str) -> KeyRecord | None:
+        with self._lock:
+            return self._records.get(key_id)
+
+    def revoke(self, key_id: str) -> bool:
+        with self._lock:
+            record = self._records.get(key_id)
+            if record is None:
+                return False
+            self._records[key_id] = KeyRecord(
+                principal=record.principal,
+                key_id=record.key_id,
+                public_key=record.public_key,
+                audience=record.audience,
+                scopes=record.scopes,
+                enabled=record.enabled,
+                revoked=True,
+            )
+            return True
+
+
+class ReplayStore:
+    """Process-local replay cache for tests or one uninterrupted process."""
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+        self._used: dict[tuple[str, str], int] = {}
+
+    def consume(self, principal: str, token_id: str, expires_at: int, now: int) -> bool:
+        with self._lock:
+            self._used = {key: expiry for key, expiry in self._used.items() if expiry > now}
+            key = (principal, token_id)
+            if key in self._used:
+                return False
+            self._used[key] = expires_at
+            return True
+
+
+class ReplayCache(Protocol):
+    """Connector implementations provide an atomic durable implementation."""
+
+    def consume(self, principal: str, token_id: str, expires_at: int, now: int) -> bool: ...
+
+
+def load_private_key(path: str | Path) -> Ed25519PrivateKey:
+    if not str(path).strip():
+        raise ValueError("machine private key path is required")
+    try:
+        raw = Path(path).read_bytes()
+        key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(raw, password=None)
+    except (OSError, ValueError, TypeError) as exc:
+        raise ValueError("invalid machine private key file") from exc
+    if not isinstance(key, Ed25519PrivateKey):
+        raise ValueError("machine private key is not Ed25519")
+    return key
+
+
+def load_registry(path: str | Path, expected_audience: str) -> Registry:
+    if not str(path).strip() or expected_audience not in _AUDIENCES:
+        raise ValueError("machine principal registry path and audience are required")
+    try:
+        document = json.loads(Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise ValueError("invalid machine principal registry") from exc
+    if not isinstance(document, dict) or set(document) != {"version", "audience", "principals"} or document["version"] != "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1" or document["audience"] != expected_audience or not isinstance(document["principals"], list) or not document["principals"]:
+        raise ValueError("invalid machine principal registry")
+    records: list[KeyRecord] = []
+    try:
+        for principal in document["principals"]:
+            if not isinstance(principal, dict) or set(principal) != {"principal_id", "enabled", "keys"} or not isinstance(principal["enabled"], bool) or not isinstance(principal["keys"], list) or not principal["keys"]:
+                raise ValueError
+            for key in principal["keys"]:
+                if not isinstance(key, dict) or set(key) != {"kid", "public_key_base64url", "status", "scopes"} or key["status"] not in {"active", "revoked"} or not isinstance(key["scopes"], list):
+                    raise ValueError
+                public_key = Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(_b64decode(key["public_key_base64url"]))
+                records.append(KeyRecord(principal["principal_id"], key["kid"], public_key, expected_audience, frozenset(key["scopes"]), principal["enabled"], key["status"] == "revoked"))
+    except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
+        raise ValueError("invalid machine principal registry") from None
+    return Registry(records)
+
+
+class Signer:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        principal: str,
+        key_id: str,
+        private_key: Ed25519PrivateKey,
+        *,
+        clock: Callable[[], int] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        if not _PRINCIPAL.fullmatch(principal) or not _KEY_ID.fullmatch(key_id) or not isinstance(private_key, Ed25519PrivateKey):
+            raise ValueError("incomplete machine signer configuration")
+        self._principal = principal
+        self._key_id = key_id
+        self._private_key = private_key
+        self._clock = clock or (lambda: int(time.time()))
+
+    def mint(self, audience: str, scopes: Iterable[str], method: str, request_path: str, body: bytes) -> str:
+        normalized_path = _normalize_path(request_path)
+        normalized_method = method.upper()
+        scope_values = tuple(scopes)
+        if audience not in _AUDIENCES or not _valid_scopes(scope_values) or normalized_method not in _METHODS:
+            raise ValueError("invalid machine token request")
+        now = int(self._clock())
+        header = {"alg": "EdDSA", "typ": TOKEN_TYPE, "kid": self._key_id, "ver": VERSION}
+        claims = {
+            "ver": VERSION,
+            "iss": self._principal,
+            "sub": self._principal,
+            "aud": audience,
+            "scope": list(scope_values),
+            "iat": now,
+            "nbf": now,
+            "exp": now + MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS,
+            "jti": secrets.token_urlsafe(16),
+            "htm": normalized_method,
+            "htu": normalized_path,
+            "body_sha256": hashlib.sha256(body).hexdigest(),
+        }
+        encoded_header = _encode_json(header)
+        encoded_claims = _encode_json(claims)
+        signing_input = f"{encoded_header}.{encoded_claims}".encode("ascii")
+        signature = self._private_key.sign(signing_input)
+        return f"{encoded_header}.{encoded_claims}.{_b64encode(signature)}"
+
+
+class Verifier:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        registry: Registry,
+        replay_store: ReplayCache,
+        *,
+        clock: Callable[[], int] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self._registry = registry
+        self._replay_store = replay_store
+        self._clock = clock or (lambda: int(time.time()))
+
+    def verify(
+        self,
+        token: str,
+        audience: str,
+        required_scope: str,
+        method: str,
+        request_path: str,
+        body: bytes,
+    ) -> Claims:
+        parts = token.split(".")
+        if len(parts) != 3 or "=" in token:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        header = _decode_object(parts[0], {"alg", "typ", "kid", "ver"})
+        if header.get("alg") != "EdDSA" or header.get("typ") != TOKEN_TYPE or header.get("ver") != VERSION or not isinstance(header.get("kid"), str) or not _KEY_ID.fullmatch(header["kid"]):
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        record = self._registry.lookup(header["kid"])
+        if record is None:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        try:
+            record.public_key.verify(_b64decode(parts[2]), f"{parts[0]}.{parts[1]}".encode("ascii"))
+        except (InvalidSignature, ValueError):
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid") from None
+        if not record.enabled or record.revoked:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_identity_revoked")
+
+        raw = _decode_object(parts[1], {"ver", "iss", "sub", "aud", "scope", "iat", "nbf", "exp", "jti", "htm", "htu", "body_sha256"})
+        claims = _claims_from_object(raw)
+        if claims.iss != record.principal or claims.sub != record.principal:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        now = int(self._clock())
+        if claims.exp - claims.iat <= 0 or claims.exp - claims.iat > MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS or claims.nbf < claims.iat or claims.nbf > claims.exp or claims.iat > now + ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        if claims.nbf > now + ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS or claims.exp < now - ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_expired")
+        if claims.aud != audience or record.audience != audience:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_audience_denied")
+        if required_scope not in claims.scope or required_scope not in record.scopes:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_scope_denied")
+        if claims.htm != method.upper() or claims.htu != _normalize_path(request_path) or claims.body_sha256 != hashlib.sha256(body).hexdigest():
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        if not self._replay_store.consume(claims.iss, claims.jti, claims.exp + ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS, now):
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_replayed")
+        return claims
+
+
+def _claims_from_object(value: dict[str, object]) -> Claims:
+    try:
+        scope = value["scope"]
+        if not isinstance(scope, list) or not _valid_scopes(scope):
+            raise ValueError
+        integer_fields = ("iat", "nbf", "exp")
+        if any(not isinstance(value[field], int) or isinstance(value[field], bool) for field in integer_fields):
+            raise ValueError
+        string_fields = ("ver", "iss", "sub", "aud", "jti", "htm", "htu", "body_sha256")
+        if any(not isinstance(value[field], str) for field in string_fields):
+            raise ValueError
+        claims = Claims(scope=tuple(scope), **{key: value[key] for key in string_fields + integer_fields})
+        if claims.ver != VERSION or not _PRINCIPAL.fullmatch(claims.iss) or claims.iss != claims.sub or claims.aud not in _AUDIENCES or not _TOKEN_ID.fullmatch(claims.jti) or claims.htm not in _METHODS or len(claims.body_sha256) != 64:
+            raise ValueError
+        bytes.fromhex(claims.body_sha256)
+        _normalize_path(claims.htu)
+        return claims
+    except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
+        raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid") from None
+
+
+def _normalize_path(value: str) -> str:
+    split = urlsplit(value)
+    if not value.startswith("/") or split.scheme or split.netloc or split.query or split.fragment or "\\" in split.path or "//" in split.path or posixpath.normpath(split.path) != split.path:
+        raise ValueError("machine request path must be normalized and contain no query or fragment")
+    return split.path
+
+
+def _valid_scopes(scopes: Iterable[str]) -> bool:
+    values = tuple(scopes)
+    return 1 <= len(values) <= 4 and len(set(values)) == len(values) and all(scope in _SCOPES for scope in values)
+
+
+def _encode_json(value: dict[str, object]) -> str:
+    return _b64encode(json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=True, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True).encode("utf-8"))
+
+
+def _decode_object(value: str, expected_keys: set[str]) -> dict[str, object]:
+    try:
+        decoded = json.loads(_b64decode(value).decode("utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid") from None
+    if not isinstance(decoded, dict) or set(decoded) != expected_keys:
+        raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+    return decoded
+
+
+def _b64encode(value: bytes) -> str:
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(value).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
+
+
+def _b64decode(value: str) -> bytes:
+    if not value or "=" in value:
+        raise ValueError("invalid base64url")
+    decoded = base64.b64decode(value + "=" * (-len(value) % 4), altchars=b"-_", validate=True)
+    if _b64encode(decoded) != value:
+        raise ValueError("non-canonical base64url")
+    return decoded

Brain/src/yovision_brain/integration/machine_identity/transport.py

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+"""Fail-closed HTTPS transport policy for Brain connectors."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ssl
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TransportPolicy:
+    tls_min_version: str
+    verify_certificate: bool
+    verify_hostname: bool
+    connect_timeout_ms: int
+    response_header_timeout_ms: int
+    request_timeout_ms: int
+    max_request_bytes: int
+
+    def validate(self) -> None:
+        if (
+            self.tls_min_version not in {"1.2", "1.3"}
+            or not self.verify_certificate
+            or not self.verify_hostname
+            or not 100 <= self.connect_timeout_ms <= 30_000
+            or not 100 <= self.response_header_timeout_ms <= 30_000
+            or not 100 <= self.request_timeout_ms <= 60_000
+            or not 1 <= self.max_request_bytes <= 10 * 1024 * 1024
+        ):
+            raise ValueError("machine transport policy is unsafe")
+
+    def ssl_context(self) -> ssl.SSLContext:
+        self.validate()
+        context = ssl.create_default_context(ssl.Purpose.SERVER_AUTH)
+        context.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_3 if self.tls_min_version == "1.3" else ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
+        context.check_hostname = True
+        context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
+        return context

Brain/src/yovision_brain/integration/sense_control/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+"""Credential-free Sense control-plane connector for Brain."""
+
+from .consumer import ApplyResult, SourceConfigConsumer, SourceConfigError
+from .replay import SQLiteReplayStore
+from .status import RuntimeStatusPublisher
+
+__all__ = ["ApplyResult", "SourceConfigConsumer", "SourceConfigError", "SQLiteReplayStore", "RuntimeStatusPublisher"]

Brain/src/yovision_brain/integration/sense_control/connector.py

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+"""Machine-authenticated adapters with bounded timeout/backoff and a kill switch."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import time
+import re
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Callable
+
+from yovision_brain.integration.machine_identity.token import Signer, Verifier, bearer_token
+
+from .consumer import ApplyResult, SourceConfigConsumer
+
+_REQUEST_ID = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{15,127}$")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ConnectorResponse:
+    status: int
+    body: bytes
+    correlation_id: str
+
+
+class SourceConfigEndpoint:
+    def __init__(self, consumer: SourceConfigConsumer, verifier: Verifier, *, enabled: bool = True, max_body_bytes: int = 10 * 1024 * 1024) -> None:
+        self._consumer, self._verifier, self._enabled, self._max = consumer, verifier, enabled, max_body_bytes
+
+    def receive(self, authorization: str, body: bytes, correlation_id: str) -> ApplyResult:
+        if not self._enabled: raise RuntimeError("CONNECTOR_DISABLED")
+        if not _REQUEST_ID.fullmatch(correlation_id): raise ValueError("INVALID_CORRELATION_ID")
+        if len(body) > self._max: raise ValueError("REQUEST_TOO_LARGE")
+        token=bearer_token(authorization)
+        self._verifier.verify(token,"yovision-brain","source-config:write","POST","/machine/v1/source-config",body)
+        return self._consumer.apply(body)
+
+
+class StatusSender:
+    def __init__(self, signer: Signer, send: Callable[[str, bytes, str, float], ConnectorResponse], *, enabled: bool = True, timeout_seconds: float = 5.0, max_attempts: int = 4, sleeper: Callable[[float], None] = time.sleep) -> None:
+        if timeout_seconds <= 0 or max_attempts < 1: raise ValueError("invalid connector retry policy")
+        self._signer,self._send,self._enabled,self._timeout,self._attempts,self._sleep=signer,send,enabled,timeout_seconds,max_attempts,sleeper
+
+    def publish(self, body: bytes, correlation_id: str) -> ConnectorResponse:
+        if not self._enabled: raise RuntimeError("CONNECTOR_DISABLED")
+        if not _REQUEST_ID.fullmatch(correlation_id): raise ValueError("INVALID_CORRELATION_ID")
+        last: Exception|None=None
+        for attempt in range(self._attempts):
+            try:
+                # A retry gets a fresh jti: the previous request may have been
+                # accepted even when its response was lost.
+                token=self._signer.mint("yovision-sense",("runtime-status:write",),"POST","/machine/v1/runtime-status",body)
+                response=self._send("Bearer "+token,body,correlation_id,self._timeout)
+                if 200<=response.status<300:return response
+                if response.status<500:raise RuntimeError(f"STATUS_REJECTED_{response.status}")
+                last=RuntimeError(f"STATUS_REMOTE_{response.status}")
+            except (TimeoutError,ConnectionError) as exc:last=exc
+            if attempt+1<self._attempts:self._sleep(min(2**attempt,30))
+        raise RuntimeError("STATUS_DELIVERY_EXHAUSTED") from last

Brain/src/yovision_brain/integration/sense_control/consumer.py

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+"""Strict source-config/v1 validation and atomic last-known-good application."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+import re
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+import time
+from contextlib import closing
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Callable, Mapping
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+from yovision_brain.rules.models import AreaDefinition, DirectionalLineDefinition, NormalizedPoint, RuleSet
+
+VERSION = "yovision.source-config/v1"
+_ID = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._~-]{0,127}$")
+_EXTENSION_NAMESPACE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9.-]{0,127}$")
+_SECRET = re.compile(r"password|secret|credential|cookie|jwt|username|stream_uri", re.I)
+
+
+class SourceConfigError(ValueError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AppliedConfig:
+    config_id: str
+    revision: int
+    logical_device_id: str
+    media_ref: str
+    profile_encoding: str
+    frame_rate: float
+    rule_state: str
+    rules: RuleSet | None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ApplyResult:
+    config_id: str
+    revision: int
+    state: str
+    config: AppliedConfig | None
+
+
+class SourceConfigConsumer:
+    """Persists validated snapshots before atomically changing the active pointer."""
+
+    def __init__(self, state_path: str | Path, *, clock: Callable[[], float] | None = None) -> None:
+        self._path = str(state_path)
+        self._clock = clock or time.time
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        with closing(self._connect()) as connection:
+            connection.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS source_snapshots (
+                    config_id TEXT NOT NULL, revision INTEGER NOT NULL, effective_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    state TEXT NOT NULL, payload TEXT NOT NULL, PRIMARY KEY(config_id, revision));
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS source_active (
+                    config_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    FOREIGN KEY(config_id, revision) REFERENCES source_snapshots(config_id, revision));
+                """
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self._path, timeout=5)
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        return connection
+
+    def apply(self, body: bytes) -> ApplyResult:
+        document = _parse_and_validate(body)
+        config_id, revision = document["config_id"], document["revision"]
+        mapped = _map(document)
+        effective_at = int(_timestamp(document["effective_at"]))
+        with self._lock, closing(self._connect()) as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            latest = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT revision, payload, state, effective_at FROM source_snapshots WHERE config_id=? ORDER BY revision DESC LIMIT 1",
+                (config_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if latest and revision < latest[0]:
+                connection.rollback()
+                raise SourceConfigError("STALE_REVISION")
+            canonical = body.decode("utf-8")
+            if latest and revision == latest[0]:
+                if json.loads(latest[1]) != document:
+                    connection.rollback()
+                    raise SourceConfigError("REVISION_CONFLICT")
+                connection.rollback()
+                return ApplyResult(config_id, revision, "idempotent", self.get_active(config_id))
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO source_snapshots(config_id, revision, effective_at, state, payload) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                (config_id, revision, effective_at, document["rule_set"]["state"], canonical),
+            )
+            if effective_at <= int(self._clock()):
+                connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO source_active(config_id, revision) VALUES (?, ?) ON CONFLICT(config_id) DO UPDATE SET revision=excluded.revision",
+                    (config_id, revision),
+                )
+                state = "applied"
+            else:
+                state = "scheduled"
+            connection.commit()
+        return ApplyResult(config_id, revision, state, mapped if state == "applied" else self.get_active(config_id))
+
+    def activate_due(self) -> tuple[AppliedConfig, ...]:
+        now = int(self._clock())
+        activated: list[AppliedConfig] = []
+        with self._lock, closing(self._connect()) as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            rows = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT s.payload FROM source_snapshots s JOIN (SELECT config_id, MAX(revision) revision FROM source_snapshots WHERE effective_at<=? GROUP BY config_id) d ON d.config_id=s.config_id AND d.revision=s.revision",
+                (now,),
+            ).fetchall()
+            for (payload,) in rows:
+                document = json.loads(payload)
+                connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO source_active(config_id, revision) VALUES (?, ?) ON CONFLICT(config_id) DO UPDATE SET revision=excluded.revision",
+                    (document["config_id"], document["revision"]),
+                )
+                activated.append(_map(document))
+            connection.commit()
+        return tuple(activated)
+
+    def get_active(self, config_id: str) -> AppliedConfig | None:
+        with closing(self._connect()) as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT s.payload FROM source_active a JOIN source_snapshots s ON s.config_id=a.config_id AND s.revision=a.revision WHERE a.config_id=?",
+                (config_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return _map(json.loads(row[0])) if row else None
+
+
+def _parse_and_validate(body: bytes) -> dict[str, object]:
+    try:
+        document = json.loads(body.decode("utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        raise SourceConfigError("CONFIG_INVALID") from None
+    if not isinstance(document, dict):
+        raise SourceConfigError("CONFIG_INVALID")
+    if document.get("schema_version") != VERSION:
+        raise SourceConfigError("UNSUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSION")
+    if _contains_secret(document):
+        raise SourceConfigError("CONFIG_INVALID")
+    required = {"schema_version", "config_id", "revision", "published_at", "effective_at", "site", "logical_device", "profile", "media", "rule_set", "integrity"}
+    if set(document) - (required | {"extensions"}) or not required <= set(document):
+        raise SourceConfigError("CONFIG_INVALID")
+    extensions = document.get("extensions", {})
+    if not isinstance(extensions, dict) or any(
+        not isinstance(namespace, str)
+        or not _EXTENSION_NAMESPACE.fullmatch(namespace)
+        or not isinstance(value, dict)
+        for namespace, value in extensions.items()
+    ):
+        raise SourceConfigError("CONFIG_INVALID")
+    integrity = document.get("integrity")
+    if not isinstance(integrity, dict) or set(integrity) != {"algorithm", "value"} or integrity.get("algorithm") != "sha256":
+        raise SourceConfigError("CONFIG_INVALID")
+    unsigned = dict(document); unsigned.pop("integrity")
+    digest = hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(unsigned, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True).encode()).hexdigest()
+    if not hmac.compare_digest(digest, str(integrity.get("value", ""))):
+        raise SourceConfigError("CONFIG_INVALID")
+    try:
+        if not _ID.fullmatch(document["config_id"]) or isinstance(document["revision"], bool) or document["revision"] < 1:
+            raise ValueError
+        published, effective = _timestamp(document["published_at"]), _timestamp(document["effective_at"])
+        if effective < published:
+            raise ValueError
+        for field in ("site", "logical_device"):
+            if not isinstance(document[field], dict) or set(document[field]) != {"id"} or not _ID.fullmatch(document[field]["id"]): raise ValueError
+        _validate_profile(document["profile"])
+        media = document["media"]
+        if not isinstance(media, dict) or set(media) != {"ref", "transport"} or media["transport"] != "rtsp" or not isinstance(media["ref"], str) or not media["ref"].startswith("media:") or any(marker in media["ref"] for marker in ("?", "#", "@", "\\", "://")): raise ValueError
+        _validate_rules(document["rule_set"], document["profile"])
+    except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError, AttributeError):
+        raise SourceConfigError("CONFIG_INVALID") from None
+    return document
+
+
+def _validate_profile(profile: object) -> None:
+    if not isinstance(profile, dict) or set(profile) != {"id", "width", "height", "encoding", "frame_rate"}: raise ValueError
+    if not _ID.fullmatch(profile["id"]) or profile["encoding"] not in {"H264", "H265", "MJPEG"}: raise ValueError
+    for field in ("width", "height"):
+        if isinstance(profile[field], bool) or not isinstance(profile[field], int) or profile[field] < 1: raise ValueError
+    if isinstance(profile["frame_rate"], bool) or not isinstance(profile["frame_rate"], (int, float)) or profile["frame_rate"] <= 0: raise ValueError
+
+
+def _validate_rules(rules: object, profile: Mapping[str, object]) -> None:
+    if not isinstance(rules, dict) or set(rules) != {"version", "state", "profile_binding", "areas", "directional_lines"}: raise ValueError
+    if not _ID.fullmatch(rules["version"]) or rules["state"] not in {"active", "disabled", "recalibration_required"}: raise ValueError
+    binding = rules["profile_binding"]
+    if binding != {"profile_id": profile["id"], "width": profile["width"], "height": profile["height"]}: raise ValueError
+    if not isinstance(rules["areas"], list) or not isinstance(rules["directional_lines"], list) or len(rules["areas"]) > 1024 or len(rules["directional_lines"]) > 1024: raise ValueError
+    identifiers: set[str] = set()
+    for area in rules["areas"]:
+        if not isinstance(area, dict) or set(area) != {"id", "version", "kind", "enabled", "points"} or area["kind"] != "danger_area" or not isinstance(area["enabled"], bool) or not 3 <= len(area["points"]) <= 256: raise ValueError
+        _rule_identity(area, identifiers); points = tuple(_point(value) for value in area["points"])
+        polygon = sum(a[0]*b[1]-b[0]*a[1] for a,b in zip(points, points[1:]+points[:1])) / 2
+        if abs(polygon) < 1e-9: raise ValueError
+    for line in rules["directional_lines"]:
+        if not isinstance(line, dict) or set(line) != {"id", "version", "kind", "enabled", "start", "end", "trigger_direction"} or line["kind"] != "directional_line" or not isinstance(line["enabled"], bool) or line["trigger_direction"] not in {"left_to_right", "right_to_left"}: raise ValueError
+        _rule_identity(line, identifiers)
+        if _point(line["start"]) == _point(line["end"]): raise ValueError
+
+
+def _rule_identity(rule: Mapping[str, object], identifiers: set[str]) -> None:
+    if not isinstance(rule["id"], str) or not _ID.fullmatch(rule["id"]) or rule["id"] in identifiers or isinstance(rule["version"], bool) or not isinstance(rule["version"], int) or rule["version"] < 1: raise ValueError
+    identifiers.add(rule["id"])
+
+
+def _point(value: object) -> tuple[float, float]:
+    if not isinstance(value, dict) or set(value) != {"x", "y"}: raise ValueError
+    x, y = value["x"], value["y"]
+    if isinstance(x, bool) or isinstance(y, bool) or not isinstance(x, (int,float)) or not isinstance(y,(int,float)) or not 0 <= x <= 1 or not 0 <= y <= 1: raise ValueError
+    return float(x), float(y)
+
+
+def _map(document: Mapping[str, object]) -> AppliedConfig:
+    profile, rules = document["profile"], document["rule_set"]
+    rule_set = None
+    if rules["state"] == "active":
+        rule_set = RuleSet(
+            version=rules["version"], profile_id=profile["id"], width=profile["width"], height=profile["height"],
+            areas=tuple(AreaDefinition(a["id"], tuple(NormalizedPoint(**p) for p in a["points"])) for a in rules["areas"] if a["enabled"]),
+            directional_lines=tuple(DirectionalLineDefinition(l["id"], NormalizedPoint(**l["start"]), NormalizedPoint(**l["end"]), l["trigger_direction"]) for l in rules["directional_lines"] if l["enabled"]),
+        )
+    return AppliedConfig(document["config_id"], document["revision"], document["logical_device"]["id"], document["media"]["ref"], profile["encoding"], float(profile["frame_rate"]), rules["state"], rule_set)
+
+
+def _timestamp(value: object) -> float:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.endswith("Z"): raise ValueError
+    return datetime.fromisoformat(value[:-1] + "+00:00").astimezone(timezone.utc).timestamp()
+
+
+def _contains_secret(value: object) -> bool:
+    if isinstance(value, dict): return any(_SECRET.search(str(k)) or _contains_secret(v) for k,v in value.items())
+    if isinstance(value, list): return any(_contains_secret(item) for item in value)
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        split=urlsplit(value)
+        return bool(split.username or split.password or value.startswith("file:") or re.match(r"^[A-Za-z]:[\\/]", value))
+    return False

Brain/src/yovision_brain/integration/sense_control/replay.py

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+"""Brain-owned durable replay storage; never shared with Sense or Bell."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+from contextlib import closing
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+class SQLiteReplayStore:
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self._path = str(path)
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+        with closing(self._connect()) as connection:
+            connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+            connection.execute(
+                "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS machine_replay (principal TEXT NOT NULL, token_id TEXT NOT NULL, expires_at INTEGER NOT NULL, PRIMARY KEY(principal, token_id))"
+            )
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self._path, timeout=5, isolation_level=None)
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=5000")
+        return connection
+
+    def consume(self, principal: str, token_id: str, expires_at: int, now: int) -> bool:
+        if not principal or not token_id or expires_at <= now:
+            return False
+        with self._lock, closing(self._connect()) as connection:
+            try:
+                connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+                connection.execute("DELETE FROM machine_replay WHERE expires_at <= ?", (now,))
+                connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO machine_replay(principal, token_id, expires_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?)",
+                    (principal, token_id, expires_at),
+                )
+                connection.execute("COMMIT")
+                return True
+            except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
+                connection.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                return False
+            except Exception:
+                connection.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                return False

Brain/src/yovision_brain/integration/sense_control/status.py

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+"""Persistent sequence allocation and safe runtime-status/v1 production."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import re
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+import uuid
+from contextlib import closing
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Mapping, Sequence
+
+_LOGICAL_REF = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$")
+_VERSION = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._+-]{0,63}$")
+_ERROR_CODE = re.compile(r"^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,63}$")
+_RUNTIME_STATES = {"unconfigured", "starting", "running", "degraded", "failed", "stopped"}
+
+
+class RuntimeStatusPublisher:
+    def __init__(self, state_path: str | Path, brain_instance_ref: str) -> None:
+        self._path, self._instance, self._lock = str(state_path), brain_instance_ref, threading.Lock()
+        with closing(self._connect()) as connection:
+            connection.execute("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS runtime_sequence(instance_ref TEXT PRIMARY KEY, sequence INTEGER NOT NULL)")
+            connection.commit()
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        return sqlite3.connect(self._path, timeout=5)
+
+    def build(self, *, runtime_state: str, runtime_version: str, started_at: datetime | None, model_ref: str, model_version: str, configurations: Sequence[Mapping[str, object]], health: Mapping[str, object], inputs: Sequence[Mapping[str, object]], observed_at: datetime | None = None) -> bytes:
+        _validate(runtime_state, runtime_version, self._instance, model_ref, model_version, configurations, health, inputs)
+        with self._lock, closing(self._connect()) as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            row=connection.execute("SELECT sequence FROM runtime_sequence WHERE instance_ref=?",(self._instance,)).fetchone();sequence=(row[0]+1) if row else 0
+            connection.execute("INSERT INTO runtime_sequence(instance_ref,sequence) VALUES(?,?) ON CONFLICT(instance_ref) DO UPDATE SET sequence=excluded.sequence",(self._instance,sequence));connection.commit()
+        observed=(observed_at or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+        document={"schema_version":"yovision.runtime-status/v1","status_id":str(uuid.uuid4()),"brain_instance_ref":self._instance,"sequence":sequence,"observed_at":_utc(observed),"runtime":{"state":runtime_state,"version":runtime_version,"started_at":_utc(started_at) if started_at else None},"model":{"model_ref":model_ref,"version":model_version},"configurations":list(configurations),"health":dict(health),"inputs":list(inputs)}
+        raw=json.dumps(document,separators=(",",":"),sort_keys=True).encode()
+        lowered=raw.lower();
+        for marker in (b"password",b"credential",b"stream_uri",b"cookie",b"jwt",b"file://"):
+            if marker in lowered: raise ValueError("runtime status contains sensitive field")
+        return raw
+
+
+def _utc(value: datetime) -> str:
+    if value.tzinfo is None: raise ValueError("runtime timestamp must be timezone-aware")
+    return value.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat(timespec="seconds").replace("+00:00","Z")
+
+
+def _validate(runtime_state: str, runtime_version: str, instance: str, model_ref: str, model_version: str, configurations: Sequence[Mapping[str, object]], health: Mapping[str, object], inputs: Sequence[Mapping[str, object]]) -> None:
+    if runtime_state not in _RUNTIME_STATES or not _VERSION.fullmatch(runtime_version) or not _LOGICAL_REF.fullmatch(instance) or not _LOGICAL_REF.fullmatch(model_ref) or not _VERSION.fullmatch(model_version):
+        raise ValueError("invalid runtime identity or version")
+    if len(configurations) > 4096 or len(inputs) > 4096:
+        raise ValueError("runtime status collection too large")
+    seen: set[str] = set()
+    for item in configurations:
+        if set(item) != {"config_id", "apply_state", "applied_revision", "error_code"} or not isinstance(item["config_id"], str) or not _LOGICAL_REF.fullmatch(item["config_id"]) or item["config_id"] in seen:
+            raise ValueError("invalid configuration status")
+        seen.add(item["config_id"]); state=item["apply_state"]; revision=item["applied_revision"]; error=item["error_code"]
+        if state not in {"not_configured","applying","applied","rejected"} or (state=="not_configured" and revision is not None) or (state=="applied" and (isinstance(revision,bool) or not isinstance(revision,int) or revision<1)) or (state=="rejected" and (not isinstance(error,str) or not _ERROR_CODE.fullmatch(error))):
+            raise ValueError("invalid configuration status")
+    if set(health) != {"overall","error_codes","metrics"} or health["overall"] not in {"healthy","degraded","unhealthy"} or not _codes(health["error_codes"],32) or not _metrics(health["metrics"]):
+        raise ValueError("invalid health status")
+    for item in inputs:
+        if set(item) != {"input_ref","state","error_codes","metrics"} or not isinstance(item["input_ref"],str) or not _LOGICAL_REF.fullmatch(item["input_ref"]) or item["state"] not in _RUNTIME_STATES or not _codes(item["error_codes"],16) or not _metrics(item["metrics"]):
+            raise ValueError("invalid input status")
+
+
+def _codes(value: object, limit: int) -> bool:
+    return isinstance(value,list) and len(value)<=limit and len(set(value))==len(value) and all(isinstance(code,str) and _ERROR_CODE.fullmatch(code) for code in value)
+
+
+def _metrics(value: object) -> bool:
+    if not isinstance(value,Mapping) or set(value)!={"load_percent","queue_depth","latency_ms"}: return False
+    load,queue,latency=value["load_percent"],value["queue_depth"],value["latency_ms"]
+    return not isinstance(load,bool) and isinstance(load,(int,float)) and 0<=load<=100 and not isinstance(queue,bool) and isinstance(queue,int) and queue>=0 and not isinstance(latency,bool) and isinstance(latency,(int,float)) and latency>=0

Brain/tests/integration/sense_control/test_connector.py

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import threading
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+
+import pytest
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
+
+from yovision_brain.integration.machine_identity.token import KeyRecord, Registry, Signer, Verifier
+from yovision_brain.integration.sense_control.connector import ConnectorResponse, SourceConfigEndpoint, StatusSender
+from yovision_brain.integration.sense_control.consumer import SourceConfigConsumer, SourceConfigError
+from yovision_brain.integration.sense_control.replay import SQLiteReplayStore
+from yovision_brain.integration.sense_control.status import RuntimeStatusPublisher
+
+
+def source_document(revision: int = 1, *, state: str = "active", effective: int = 0) -> bytes:
+    now=datetime(2026,8,31,tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+    document={"schema_version":"yovision.source-config/v1","config_id":"gate-primary","revision":revision,"published_at":now.isoformat().replace("+00:00","Z"),"effective_at":(now+timedelta(seconds=effective)).isoformat().replace("+00:00","Z"),"site":{"id":"site-east"},"logical_device":{"id":"camera-1"},"profile":{"id":"main","width":1920,"height":1080,"encoding":"H264","frame_rate":25},"media":{"ref":"media:site-east/camera-1/main","transport":"rtsp"},"rule_set":{"version":f"rules-{revision}","state":state,"profile_binding":{"profile_id":"main","width":1920,"height":1080},"areas":[{"id":"danger","version":1,"kind":"danger_area","enabled":True,"points":[{"x":.1,"y":.1},{"x":.8,"y":.1},{"x":.5,"y":.8}]}],"directional_lines":[]}}
+    digest=hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(document,separators=(",",":"),sort_keys=True).encode()).hexdigest();document["integrity"]={"algorithm":"sha256","value":digest}
+    return json.dumps(document,separators=(",",":"),sort_keys=True).encode()
+
+
+def with_extension(body: bytes, extensions: object) -> bytes:
+    document=json.loads(body);document["extensions"]=extensions;unsigned=dict(document);unsigned.pop("integrity");document["integrity"]["value"]=hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(unsigned,separators=(",",":"),sort_keys=True).encode()).hexdigest();return json.dumps(document,separators=(",",":"),sort_keys=True).encode()
+
+
+def identity(tmp_path, now: int):
+    private=Ed25519PrivateKey.generate();signer=Signer("yv:sense:east","sense-key-01",private,clock=lambda:now)
+    registry=Registry([KeyRecord("yv:sense:east","sense-key-01",private.public_key(),"yovision-brain",frozenset({"source-config:write"}))])
+    replay=SQLiteReplayStore(tmp_path/"replay.sqlite")
+    return signer,Verifier(registry,replay,clock=lambda:now)
+
+
+def test_authenticated_apply_is_idempotent_and_replay_survives_restart(tmp_path):
+    now=int(datetime(2026,8,31,tzinfo=timezone.utc).timestamp());signer,verifier=identity(tmp_path,now);body=source_document();consumer=SourceConfigConsumer(tmp_path/"state.sqlite",clock=lambda:now);endpoint=SourceConfigEndpoint(consumer,verifier)
+    token=signer.mint("yovision-brain",("source-config:write",),"POST","/machine/v1/source-config",body)
+    result=endpoint.receive("Bearer "+token,body,"corr-request-0001");assert result.state=="applied" and result.config.rules is not None
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError,match="machine_token_replayed"):endpoint.receive("Bearer "+token,body,"corr-request-0001")
+    restarted=SourceConfigEndpoint(SourceConfigConsumer(tmp_path/"state.sqlite",clock=lambda:now),Verifier(verifier._registry,SQLiteReplayStore(tmp_path/"replay.sqlite"),clock=lambda:now))
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError,match="machine_token_replayed"):restarted.receive("Bearer "+token,body,"corr-request-0002")
+    new_token=signer.mint("yovision-brain",("source-config:write",),"POST","/machine/v1/source-config",body);assert restarted.receive("Bearer "+new_token,body,"corr-request-0003").state=="idempotent"
+
+
+def test_atomic_replay_accepts_once_under_concurrency(tmp_path):
+    store=SQLiteReplayStore(tmp_path/"atomic.sqlite");results=[]
+    threads=[threading.Thread(target=lambda:results.append(store.consume("yv:sense:east","token-id",200,100))) for _ in range(12)]
+    for thread in threads:thread.start()
+    for thread in threads:thread.join()
+    assert results.count(True)==1
+
+
+def test_stale_unknown_profile_and_recalibration_are_safe(tmp_path):
+    now=int(datetime(2026,8,31,tzinfo=timezone.utc).timestamp());consumer=SourceConfigConsumer(tmp_path/"state.sqlite",clock=lambda:now)
+    assert consumer.apply(source_document(2)).config.rules is not None
+    with pytest.raises(SourceConfigError,match="STALE_REVISION"):consumer.apply(source_document(1))
+    invalid=json.loads(source_document(3));invalid["profile"]["width"]=1280;invalid["integrity"]["value"]="0"*64
+    with pytest.raises(SourceConfigError,match="CONFIG_INVALID"):consumer.apply(json.dumps(invalid).encode())
+    unknown=json.loads(source_document(3));unknown["schema_version"]="yovision.source-config/v2"
+    with pytest.raises(SourceConfigError,match="UNSUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSION"):consumer.apply(json.dumps(unknown).encode())
+    safe=consumer.apply(source_document(3,state="recalibration_required"));assert safe.config.rule_state=="recalibration_required" and safe.config.rules is None
+
+
+def test_future_effective_snapshot_activates_atomically_after_restart(tmp_path):
+    base=int(datetime(2026,8,31,tzinfo=timezone.utc).timestamp());current=[base];path=tmp_path/"state.sqlite";consumer=SourceConfigConsumer(path,clock=lambda:current[0])
+    assert consumer.apply(source_document(1)).state=="applied";scheduled=consumer.apply(source_document(2,effective=60));assert scheduled.state=="scheduled" and scheduled.config.revision==1
+    current[0]+=61;restarted=SourceConfigConsumer(path,clock=lambda:current[0]);activated=restarted.activate_due();assert activated[0].revision==2 and restarted.get_active("gate-primary").revision==2
+
+
+def test_unknown_valid_extension_namespace_is_ignored(tmp_path):
+    now=int(datetime(2026,8,31,tzinfo=timezone.utc).timestamp());consumer=SourceConfigConsumer(tmp_path/"state.sqlite",clock=lambda:now)
+    result=consumer.apply(with_extension(source_document(),{"vendor.example":{"feature":"safe"}}));assert result.state=="applied" and result.config.revision==1
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("extensions", [[], {"1invalid":{}}, {"vendor_ok":{}}, {"vendor.example":"not-an-object"}])
+def test_invalid_extensions_are_rejected(tmp_path, extensions):
+    now=int(datetime(2026,8,31,tzinfo=timezone.utc).timestamp());consumer=SourceConfigConsumer(tmp_path/"state.sqlite",clock=lambda:now)
+    with pytest.raises(SourceConfigError,match="CONFIG_INVALID"):consumer.apply(with_extension(source_document(),extensions))
+
+
+def test_status_sequence_restart_retry_timeout_and_disable(tmp_path):
+    path=tmp_path/"status.sqlite";publisher=RuntimeStatusPublisher(path,"brain-east-01");health={"overall":"healthy","error_codes":[],"metrics":{"load_percent":1.0,"queue_depth":0,"latency_ms":2.0}}
+    one=json.loads(publisher.build(runtime_state="running",runtime_version="1.0.0",started_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc),model_ref="people-detection",model_version="1",configurations=[],health=health,inputs=[]));two=json.loads(RuntimeStatusPublisher(path,"brain-east-01").build(runtime_state="running",runtime_version="1.0.0",started_at=None,model_ref="people-detection",model_version="1",configurations=[],health=health,inputs=[]));assert (one["sequence"],two["sequence"])==(0,1)
+    private=Ed25519PrivateKey.generate();signer=Signer("yv:brain:east","brain-key-01",private,clock=lambda:1_787_000_000);attempts=[]
+    def send(_auth,_body,_corr,timeout):attempts.append(timeout);raise TimeoutError
+    sender=StatusSender(signer,send,max_attempts=3,sleeper=lambda _:None)
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError,match="STATUS_DELIVERY_EXHAUSTED"):sender.publish(b"{}","corr-request-0001")
+    assert attempts==[5.0,5.0,5.0]
+    disabled=StatusSender(signer,lambda *_:ConnectorResponse(204,b"","corr-request-0001"),enabled=False)
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError,match="CONNECTOR_DISABLED"):disabled.publish(b"{}","corr-request-0001")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("request_id", ["short", "0123456789abcde\n", "0123456789abcde!", "a"*129])
+def test_connector_rejects_unsafe_request_ids(tmp_path, request_id):
+    now=int(datetime(2026,8,31,tzinfo=timezone.utc).timestamp());signer,verifier=identity(tmp_path,now);body=source_document();endpoint=SourceConfigEndpoint(SourceConfigConsumer(tmp_path/"state.sqlite",clock=lambda:now),verifier)
+    token=signer.mint("yovision-brain",("source-config:write",),"POST","/machine/v1/source-config",body)
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError,match="INVALID_CORRELATION_ID"):endpoint.receive("Bearer "+token,body,request_id)
+    status_signer=Signer("yv:brain:east","brain-key-01",Ed25519PrivateKey.generate(),clock=lambda:now)
+    sender=StatusSender(status_signer,lambda *_:ConnectorResponse(204,b"",request_id))
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError,match="INVALID_CORRELATION_ID"):sender.publish(b"{}",request_id)

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/brain_control/connector.go

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+package brain_control
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"regexp"
+	"time"
+
+	mi "git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/Sense/server/app/sense/integration/machine_identity"
+)
+
+const (
+	sourceConfigPath  = "/machine/v1/source-config"
+	runtimeStatusPath = "/machine/v1/runtime-status"
+)
+
+var requestIDPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{15,127}$`)
+
+type SendResponse struct {
+	StatusCode    int
+	Body          []byte
+	CorrelationID string
+}
+type SendFunc func(authorization string, body []byte, correlationID string, timeout time.Duration) (SendResponse, error)
+
+type ConfigSender struct {
+	Signer      mi.Signer
+	Send        SendFunc
+	Enabled     bool
+	Timeout     time.Duration
+	MaxAttempts int
+	Sleep       func(time.Duration)
+}
+
+func (s ConfigSender) Publish(config SourceConfig, correlationID string) (SendResponse, error) {
+	if !s.Enabled {
+		return SendResponse{}, errors.New("CONNECTOR_DISABLED")
+	}
+	if s.Send == nil || !requestIDPattern.MatchString(correlationID) {
+		return SendResponse{}, errors.New("invalid connector configuration")
+	}
+	if s.Timeout <= 0 {
+		s.Timeout = 5 * time.Second
+	}
+	if s.MaxAttempts == 0 {
+		s.MaxAttempts = 4
+	}
+	if s.MaxAttempts < 1 {
+		return SendResponse{}, errors.New("invalid connector retry policy")
+	}
+	if s.Sleep == nil {
+		s.Sleep = time.Sleep
+	}
+	if err := ValidateSourceConfig(config); err != nil {
+		return SendResponse{}, err
+	}
+	body, err := MarshalSourceConfig(config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return SendResponse{}, err
+	}
+	var last error
+	for attempt := 0; attempt < s.MaxAttempts; attempt++ {
+		token, mintErr := s.Signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", sourceConfigPath, body)
+		if mintErr != nil {
+			return SendResponse{}, mintErr
+		}
+		response, sendErr := s.Send("Bearer "+token, body, correlationID, s.Timeout)
+		if sendErr == nil && response.StatusCode >= 200 && response.StatusCode < 300 {
+			return response, nil
+		}
+		if sendErr == nil && response.StatusCode < 500 {
+			return SendResponse{}, fmt.Errorf("source config rejected: %d", response.StatusCode)
+		}
+		if sendErr != nil {
+			last = sendErr
+		} else {
+			last = fmt.Errorf("source config remote status: %d", response.StatusCode)
+		}
+		if attempt+1 < s.MaxAttempts {
+			delay := time.Second << attempt
+			if delay > 30*time.Second {
+				delay = 30 * time.Second
+			}
+			s.Sleep(delay)
+		}
+	}
+	return SendResponse{}, fmt.Errorf("source config delivery exhausted: %w", last)
+}
+
+type RuntimeStatusEndpoint struct {
+	Verifier     mi.Verifier
+	Store        ProjectionStore
+	Enabled      bool
+	MaxBodyBytes int
+}
+
+func (e RuntimeStatusEndpoint) Receive(authorization string, body []byte, correlationID string, expected map[string]int64) (ProjectionView, error) {
+	if !e.Enabled {
+		return ProjectionView{}, errors.New("CONNECTOR_DISABLED")
+	}
+	if !requestIDPattern.MatchString(correlationID) {
+		return ProjectionView{}, errors.New("INVALID_CORRELATION_ID")
+	}
+	if e.MaxBodyBytes == 0 {
+		e.MaxBodyBytes = 10 * 1024 * 1024
+	}
+	if len(body) > e.MaxBodyBytes {
+		return ProjectionView{}, errors.New("REQUEST_TOO_LARGE")
+	}
+	token, err := mi.BearerToken(authorization)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ProjectionView{}, err
+	}
+	if _, err = e.Verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", runtimeStatusPath, body); err != nil {
+		return ProjectionView{}, err
+	}
+	return e.Store.Ingest(body, expected)
+}

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/brain_control/connector_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+package brain_control
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	mi "git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/Sense/server/app/sense/integration/machine_identity"
+	"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+)
+
+func memoryDB(t *testing.T, name string) *gorm.DB {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open("file:"+name+"?mode=memory&cache=shared"), &gorm.Config{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err = db.AutoMigrate(&ReplayToken{}, &RuntimeProjection{}, &SourceRevision{}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return db
+}
+
+func TestSourceMapperAndRecalibration(t *testing.T) {
+	now := time.Date(2026, 8, 31, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	facts := SourceFacts{ConfigID: "gate-primary", SiteID: "site-east", LogicalDeviceID: "camera-1", MediaPath: "site/camera/main", Revision: 1, PublishedAt: now, EffectiveAt: now, Profile: Profile{ID: "main", Width: 1920, Height: 1080, Encoding: "h264", FrameRate: 25}, RuleSetVersion: "rules-1", Areas: []AreaRule{{ID: "danger", Version: 1, Kind: "danger_area", Enabled: true, Points: []Point{{.1, .1}, {.8, .1}, {.5, .8}}}}}
+	config, err := MapSourceConfig(facts)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err = ValidateSourceConfig(config); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	facts.Revision = 2
+	facts.NeedsRecalibration = true
+	config, err = MapSourceConfig(facts)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if config.RuleSet.State != "recalibration_required" || config.RuleSet.Areas[0].Enabled {
+		t.Fatal("recalibration did not disable rules")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestReplayAtomicAndRestart(t *testing.T) {
+	db := memoryDB(t, "replay-package")
+	pub, priv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	now := time.Date(2026, 8, 31, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	registry, _ := mi.NewRegistry(mi.KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:east", KeyID: "brain-key-01", PublicKey: pub, Audience: "yovision-sense", Scopes: []string{"runtime-status:write"}, Enabled: true})
+	signer := mi.Signer{Principal: "yv:brain:east", KeyID: "brain-key-01", PrivateKey: priv, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	body := []byte("{}")
+	token, _ := signer.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	accepted := 0
+	var mu sync.Mutex
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for range 8 {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			v := mi.Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: GORMReplayStore{DB: db}, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+			if _, err := v.Verify(token, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); err == nil {
+				mu.Lock()
+				accepted++
+				mu.Unlock()
+			}
+		}()
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+	if accepted != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("accepted %d", accepted)
+	}
+	v := mi.Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: GORMReplayStore{DB: db}, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	if _, err := v.Verify(token, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("restart replay accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProjectionStaleRecoveryAndMismatch(t *testing.T) {
+	db := memoryDB(t, "projection-package")
+	now := time.Date(2026, 8, 31, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	store := ProjectionStore{DB: db, Clock: func() time.Time { return now }, StaleAfter: 90 * time.Second}
+	raw := runtimeFixture("018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d101", 1, now, 2)
+	view, err := store.Ingest(raw, map[string]int64{"gate": 3})
+	if err != nil || !view.RevisionMismatch {
+		t.Fatalf("view %+v err %v", view, err)
+	}
+	now = now.Add(91 * time.Second)
+	view, _ = store.View("brain-east-01")
+	if !view.Offline {
+		t.Fatal("not offline")
+	}
+	raw = runtimeFixture("018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d102", 2, now, 3)
+	view, err = store.Ingest(raw, map[string]int64{"gate": 3})
+	if err != nil || !view.Recovered {
+		t.Fatalf("recovery %+v err %v", view, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConnectorRejectsUnsafeRequestIDs(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, value := range []string{"short", "0123456789abcde\n", "0123456789abcde!", strings.Repeat("a", 129)} {
+		sender := ConfigSender{Enabled: true, Send: func(string, []byte, string, time.Duration) (SendResponse, error) {
+			t.Fatal("unsafe request id reached transport")
+			return SendResponse{}, nil
+		}}
+		if _, err := sender.Publish(SourceConfig{}, value); err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("sender accepted request id %q", value)
+		}
+		endpoint := RuntimeStatusEndpoint{Enabled: true}
+		if _, err := endpoint.Receive("Bearer ignored", nil, value, nil); err == nil || err.Error() != "INVALID_CORRELATION_ID" {
+			t.Fatalf("endpoint accepted request id %q: %v", value, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func runtimeFixture(id string, seq int64, observed time.Time, revision int64) []byte {
+	value := map[string]any{"schema_version": RuntimeStatusVersion, "status_id": id, "brain_instance_ref": "brain-east-01", "sequence": seq, "observed_at": observed.Format(time.RFC3339), "runtime": map[string]any{"state": "running", "version": "1.0.0", "started_at": observed.Format(time.RFC3339)}, "model": map[string]any{"model_ref": "people", "version": "1"}, "configurations": []any{map[string]any{"config_id": "gate", "apply_state": "applied", "applied_revision": revision, "error_code": nil}}, "health": map[string]any{"overall": "healthy", "error_codes": []any{}, "metrics": map[string]any{"load_percent": 1.0, "queue_depth": 0, "latency_ms": 1.0}}, "inputs": []any{}}
+	raw, _ := json.Marshal(value)
+	return raw
+}

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/brain_control/mapper.go

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+package brain_control
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+var stableID = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._~-]{0,127}$`)
+
+func MapSourceConfig(f SourceFacts) (SourceConfig, error) {
+	if !stableID.MatchString(f.ConfigID) || !stableID.MatchString(f.SiteID) || !stableID.MatchString(f.LogicalDeviceID) || !stableID.MatchString(f.Profile.ID) || f.Revision < 1 || f.Profile.Width < 1 || f.Profile.Height < 1 || f.Profile.FrameRate <= 0 {
+		return SourceConfig{}, errors.New("invalid source configuration facts")
+	}
+	encoding := strings.ToUpper(f.Profile.Encoding)
+	if encoding != "H264" && encoding != "H265" && encoding != "MJPEG" {
+		return SourceConfig{}, errors.New("unsupported profile encoding")
+	}
+	if f.PublishedAt.IsZero() || f.EffectiveAt.Before(f.PublishedAt) {
+		return SourceConfig{}, errors.New("invalid source configuration time")
+	}
+	if !stableID.MatchString(f.RuleSetVersion) {
+		return SourceConfig{}, errors.New("invalid rule set version")
+	}
+	if strings.ContainsAny(f.MediaPath, "?#@\\") || strings.Contains(f.MediaPath, "://") || f.MediaPath == "" {
+		return SourceConfig{}, errors.New("media path must be opaque and credential-free")
+	}
+	if len(f.Areas) > 1024 || len(f.DirectionalLines) > 1024 {
+		return SourceConfig{}, errors.New("too many rules")
+	}
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, a := range f.Areas {
+		if !stableID.MatchString(a.ID) || seen[a.ID] || a.Version < 1 || a.Kind != "danger_area" || len(a.Points) < 3 || len(a.Points) > 256 || !validPoints(a.Points) || polygonArea(a.Points) == 0 {
+			return SourceConfig{}, errors.New("invalid area rule")
+		}
+		seen[a.ID] = true
+	}
+	for _, l := range f.DirectionalLines {
+		if !stableID.MatchString(l.ID) || seen[l.ID] || l.Version < 1 || l.Kind != "directional_line" || (l.TriggerDirection != "left_to_right" && l.TriggerDirection != "right_to_left") || !validPoints([]Point{l.Start, l.End}) || l.Start == l.End {
+			return SourceConfig{}, errors.New("invalid directional line rule")
+		}
+		seen[l.ID] = true
+	}
+	var out SourceConfig
+	out.SchemaVersion, out.ConfigID, out.Revision = SourceConfigVersion, f.ConfigID, f.Revision
+	out.PublishedAt, out.EffectiveAt = f.PublishedAt.UTC(), f.EffectiveAt.UTC()
+	out.Site.ID, out.LogicalDevice.ID = f.SiteID, f.LogicalDeviceID
+	out.Profile = f.Profile
+	out.Profile.Encoding = encoding
+	out.Media.Ref, out.Media.Transport = "media:"+strings.TrimPrefix(f.MediaPath, "/"), "rtsp"
+	out.RuleSet.Version = f.RuleSetVersion
+	out.RuleSet.State = "active"
+	if f.Disabled {
+		out.RuleSet.State = "disabled"
+	}
+	if f.NeedsRecalibration {
+		out.RuleSet.State = "recalibration_required"
+	}
+	out.RuleSet.ProfileBinding.ProfileID, out.RuleSet.ProfileBinding.Width, out.RuleSet.ProfileBinding.Height = f.Profile.ID, f.Profile.Width, f.Profile.Height
+	out.RuleSet.Areas = append([]AreaRule(nil), f.Areas...)
+	out.RuleSet.DirectionalLines = append([]DirectionalLineRule(nil), f.DirectionalLines...)
+	if out.RuleSet.State != "active" {
+		for i := range out.RuleSet.Areas {
+			out.RuleSet.Areas[i].Enabled = false
+		}
+		for i := range out.RuleSet.DirectionalLines {
+			out.RuleSet.DirectionalLines[i].Enabled = false
+		}
+	}
+	digest, err := sourceDigest(out)
+	if err != nil {
+		return SourceConfig{}, err
+	}
+	out.Integrity.Algorithm, out.Integrity.Value = "sha256", digest
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func MarshalSourceConfig(config SourceConfig) ([]byte, error) { return json.Marshal(config) }
+
+func sourceDigest(config SourceConfig) (string, error) {
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	var value map[string]any
+	if err = json.Unmarshal(raw, &value); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	delete(value, "integrity")
+	canonical, err := json.Marshal(value)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	sum := sha256.Sum256(canonical)
+	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]), nil
+}
+
+func validPoints(points []Point) bool {
+	for _, p := range points {
+		if p.X < 0 || p.X > 1 || p.Y < 0 || p.Y > 1 {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+func polygonArea(p []Point) float64 {
+	var a float64
+	for i := range p {
+		n := p[(i+1)%len(p)]
+		a += p[i].X*n.Y - n.X*p[i].Y
+	}
+	if a < 0 {
+		a = -a
+	}
+	return a / 2
+}
+
+func ValidateSourceConfig(config SourceConfig) error {
+	if config.SchemaVersion != SourceConfigVersion {
+		return fmt.Errorf("unsupported source config version")
+	}
+	digest, err := sourceDigest(config)
+	if err != nil || config.Integrity.Algorithm != "sha256" || digest != config.Integrity.Value {
+		return errors.New("source config integrity mismatch")
+	}
+	_, err = MapSourceConfig(SourceFacts{ConfigID: config.ConfigID, SiteID: config.Site.ID, LogicalDeviceID: config.LogicalDevice.ID, MediaPath: strings.TrimPrefix(config.Media.Ref, "media:"), Revision: config.Revision, PublishedAt: config.PublishedAt, EffectiveAt: config.EffectiveAt, Profile: config.Profile, RuleSetVersion: config.RuleSet.Version, Disabled: config.RuleSet.State == "disabled", NeedsRecalibration: config.RuleSet.State == "recalibration_required", Areas: config.RuleSet.Areas, DirectionalLines: config.RuleSet.DirectionalLines})
+	return err
+}
+
+func UTCNow() time.Time { return time.Now().UTC() }

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/brain_control/models.go

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+package brain_control
+
+import "time"
+
+const (
+	SourceConfigVersion  = "yovision.source-config/v1"
+	RuntimeStatusVersion = "yovision.runtime-status/v1"
+)
+
+type Point struct {
+	X float64 `json:"x"`
+	Y float64 `json:"y"`
+}
+type Profile struct {
+	ID        string  `json:"id"`
+	Width     int     `json:"width"`
+	Height    int     `json:"height"`
+	Encoding  string  `json:"encoding"`
+	FrameRate float64 `json:"frame_rate"`
+}
+type AreaRule struct {
+	ID      string  `json:"id"`
+	Version int64   `json:"version"`
+	Kind    string  `json:"kind"`
+	Enabled bool    `json:"enabled"`
+	Points  []Point `json:"points"`
+}
+type DirectionalLineRule struct {
+	ID               string `json:"id"`
+	Version          int64  `json:"version"`
+	Kind             string `json:"kind"`
+	Enabled          bool   `json:"enabled"`
+	Start            Point  `json:"start"`
+	End              Point  `json:"end"`
+	TriggerDirection string `json:"trigger_direction"`
+}
+
+type SourceConfig struct {
+	SchemaVersion string    `json:"schema_version"`
+	ConfigID      string    `json:"config_id"`
+	Revision      int64     `json:"revision"`
+	PublishedAt   time.Time `json:"published_at"`
+	EffectiveAt   time.Time `json:"effective_at"`
+	Site          struct {
+		ID string `json:"id"`
+	} `json:"site"`
+	LogicalDevice struct {
+		ID string `json:"id"`
+	} `json:"logical_device"`
+	Profile Profile `json:"profile"`
+	Media   struct {
+		Ref       string `json:"ref"`
+		Transport string `json:"transport"`
+	} `json:"media"`
+	RuleSet struct {
+		Version        string `json:"version"`
+		State          string `json:"state"`
+		ProfileBinding struct {
+			ProfileID string `json:"profile_id"`
+			Width     int    `json:"width"`
+			Height    int    `json:"height"`
+		} `json:"profile_binding"`
+		Areas            []AreaRule            `json:"areas"`
+		DirectionalLines []DirectionalLineRule `json:"directional_lines"`
+	} `json:"rule_set"`
+	Integrity struct {
+		Algorithm string `json:"algorithm"`
+		Value     string `json:"value"`
+	} `json:"integrity"`
+}
+
+// SourceFacts is an explicit, credential-free boundary DTO. Callers map their
+// GORM entities into it; database models are never serialized as a contract.
+type SourceFacts struct {
+	ConfigID, SiteID, LogicalDeviceID, MediaRouteID, MediaPath string
+	Revision                                                   int64
+	PublishedAt, EffectiveAt                                   time.Time
+	Profile                                                    Profile
+	RuleSetVersion                                             string
+	Disabled, NeedsRecalibration                               bool
+	Areas                                                      []AreaRule
+	DirectionalLines                                           []DirectionalLineRule
+}
+
+type ReplayToken struct {
+	Principal string    `gorm:"size:128;primaryKey"`
+	TokenID   string    `gorm:"size:96;primaryKey"`
+	ExpiresAt time.Time `gorm:"not null;index"`
+	CreatedAt time.Time `gorm:"not null"`
+}
+
+func (ReplayToken) TableName() string { return "sense_brain_runtime_replay_tokens" }
+
+type RuntimeProjection struct {
+	BrainInstanceRef      string    `gorm:"size:128;primaryKey"`
+	StatusID              string    `gorm:"size:36;not null;uniqueIndex"`
+	Sequence              int64     `gorm:"not null"`
+	ObservedAt            time.Time `gorm:"not null;index"`
+	ReceivedAt            time.Time `gorm:"not null"`
+	RuntimeState          string    `gorm:"size:32;not null"`
+	RuntimeVersion        string    `gorm:"size:64;not null"`
+	ModelRef              string    `gorm:"size:128;not null"`
+	ModelVersion          string    `gorm:"size:64;not null"`
+	HealthOverall         string    `gorm:"size:32;not null"`
+	ExpectedRevisionsJSON string    `gorm:"type:jsonb;not null"`
+	ConfigurationsJSON    string    `gorm:"type:jsonb;not null"`
+	HealthJSON            string    `gorm:"type:jsonb;not null"`
+	InputsJSON            string    `gorm:"type:jsonb;not null"`
+	WasOffline            bool      `gorm:"not null;default:false"`
+	CreatedAt             time.Time
+	UpdatedAt             time.Time
+}
+
+func (RuntimeProjection) TableName() string { return "sense_brain_runtime_projections" }
+
+type SourceRevision struct {
+	ConfigID  string `gorm:"size:128;primaryKey"`
+	Revision  int64  `gorm:"not null"`
+	UpdatedAt time.Time
+}
+
+func (SourceRevision) TableName() string { return "sense_brain_source_revisions" }

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/brain_control/runtime.go

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+package brain_control
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"regexp"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type runtimeStatus struct {
+	SchemaVersion    string    `json:"schema_version"`
+	StatusID         string    `json:"status_id"`
+	BrainInstanceRef string    `json:"brain_instance_ref"`
+	Sequence         int64     `json:"sequence"`
+	ObservedAt       time.Time `json:"observed_at"`
+	Runtime          struct {
+		State     string     `json:"state"`
+		Version   string     `json:"version"`
+		StartedAt *time.Time `json:"started_at"`
+	} `json:"runtime"`
+	Model struct {
+		ModelRef string `json:"model_ref"`
+		Version  string `json:"version"`
+	} `json:"model"`
+	Configurations []configurationStatus `json:"configurations"`
+	Health         healthStatus          `json:"health"`
+	Inputs         []inputStatus         `json:"inputs"`
+}
+type configurationStatus struct {
+	ConfigID        string  `json:"config_id"`
+	ApplyState      string  `json:"apply_state"`
+	AppliedRevision *int64  `json:"applied_revision"`
+	ErrorCode       *string `json:"error_code"`
+}
+type metrics struct {
+	LoadPercent float64 `json:"load_percent"`
+	QueueDepth  int64   `json:"queue_depth"`
+	LatencyMS   float64 `json:"latency_ms"`
+}
+type healthStatus struct {
+	Overall    string   `json:"overall"`
+	ErrorCodes []string `json:"error_codes"`
+	Metrics    metrics  `json:"metrics"`
+}
+type inputStatus struct {
+	InputRef   string   `json:"input_ref"`
+	State      string   `json:"state"`
+	ErrorCodes []string `json:"error_codes"`
+	Metrics    metrics  `json:"metrics"`
+}
+
+var uuid4 = regexp.MustCompile(`^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-4[0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$`)
+var errCode = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,63}$`)
+
+func parseRuntimeStatus(raw []byte) (runtimeStatus, error) {
+	var s runtimeStatus
+	d := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	d.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	if err := d.Decode(&s); err != nil {
+		return s, errors.New("CONFIG_INVALID")
+	}
+	if err := d.Decode(&struct{}{}); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		return s, errors.New("CONFIG_INVALID")
+	}
+	if s.SchemaVersion != RuntimeStatusVersion {
+		return s, errors.New("UNSUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSION")
+	}
+	if !uuid4.MatchString(s.StatusID) || !stableID.MatchString(s.BrainInstanceRef) || s.Sequence < 0 || s.ObservedAt.IsZero() || !validState(s.Runtime.State) || s.Runtime.Version == "" || !stableID.MatchString(s.Model.ModelRef) || s.Model.Version == "" || len(s.Configurations) > 4096 || len(s.Inputs) > 4096 || !validHealth(s.Health) {
+		return s, errors.New("CONFIG_INVALID")
+	}
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, c := range s.Configurations {
+		if !stableID.MatchString(c.ConfigID) || seen[c.ConfigID] || !validApply(c) {
+			return s, errors.New("CONFIG_INVALID")
+		}
+		seen[c.ConfigID] = true
+	}
+	for _, i := range s.Inputs {
+		if !stableID.MatchString(i.InputRef) || !validState(i.State) || !validMetrics(i.Metrics) || !validCodes(i.ErrorCodes, 16) {
+			return s, errors.New("CONFIG_INVALID")
+		}
+	}
+	return s, nil
+}
+func validState(v string) bool {
+	switch v {
+	case "unconfigured", "starting", "running", "degraded", "failed", "stopped":
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+func validApply(c configurationStatus) bool {
+	switch c.ApplyState {
+	case "not_configured":
+		return c.AppliedRevision == nil
+	case "applying":
+		return true
+	case "applied":
+		return c.AppliedRevision != nil && *c.AppliedRevision >= 1
+	case "rejected":
+		return c.ErrorCode != nil && errCode.MatchString(*c.ErrorCode)
+	}
+	return false
+}
+func validMetrics(m metrics) bool {
+	return m.LoadPercent >= 0 && m.LoadPercent <= 100 && m.QueueDepth >= 0 && m.LatencyMS >= 0
+}
+func validCodes(v []string, n int) bool {
+	if len(v) > n {
+		return false
+	}
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, x := range v {
+		if seen[x] || !errCode.MatchString(x) {
+			return false
+		}
+		seen[x] = true
+	}
+	return true
+}
+func validHealth(h healthStatus) bool {
+	return (h.Overall == "healthy" || h.Overall == "degraded" || h.Overall == "unhealthy") && validCodes(h.ErrorCodes, 32) && validMetrics(h.Metrics)
+}
+func validRuntimeTransition(from, to string) bool {
+	if from == to {
+		return true
+	}
+	switch from {
+	case "unconfigured":
+		return to == "starting" || to == "stopped"
+	case "starting":
+		return to == "running" || to == "degraded" || to == "failed" || to == "stopped"
+	case "running":
+		return to == "degraded" || to == "failed" || to == "stopped"
+	case "degraded":
+		return to == "running" || to == "failed" || to == "stopped"
+	case "failed":
+		return to == "starting" || to == "stopped"
+	case "stopped":
+		return to == "starting"
+	}
+	return false
+}

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/brain_control/store.go

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+package brain_control
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"time"
+
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+	"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
+)
+
+type GORMReplayStore struct{ DB *gorm.DB }
+
+func (s GORMReplayStore) Consume(principal, tokenID string, expiresAt, now time.Time) bool {
+	if s.DB == nil || principal == "" || tokenID == "" || !expiresAt.After(now) {
+		return false
+	}
+	return s.DB.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
+		if err := tx.Where("expires_at <= ?", now).Delete(&ReplayToken{}).Error; err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		result := tx.Clauses(clause.OnConflict{DoNothing: true}).Create(&ReplayToken{Principal: principal, TokenID: tokenID, ExpiresAt: expiresAt, CreatedAt: now})
+		if result.Error != nil {
+			return result.Error
+		}
+		if result.RowsAffected != 1 {
+			return errors.New("replayed")
+		}
+		return nil
+	}) == nil
+}
+
+type RevisionStore struct{ DB *gorm.DB }
+
+func (s RevisionStore) Next(configID string) (int64, error) {
+	if s.DB == nil || !stableID.MatchString(configID) {
+		return 0, errors.New("invalid revision store")
+	}
+	var next int64
+	err := s.DB.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
+		var row SourceRevision
+		err := tx.Clauses(clause.Locking{Strength: "UPDATE"}).Where("config_id = ?", configID).First(&row).Error
+		if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
+			row = SourceRevision{ConfigID: configID, Revision: 1}
+			if err = tx.Create(&row).Error; err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			next = 1
+			return nil
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		row.Revision++
+		next = row.Revision
+		return tx.Save(&row).Error
+	})
+	return next, err
+}
+
+type ProjectionStore struct {
+	DB         *gorm.DB
+	Clock      func() time.Time
+	StaleAfter time.Duration
+	FutureSkew time.Duration
+}
+type ProjectionView struct {
+	Projection                                  RuntimeProjection
+	Offline, Stale, Recovered, RevisionMismatch bool
+}
+
+func (s ProjectionStore) Ingest(raw []byte, expected map[string]int64) (ProjectionView, error) {
+	if s.DB == nil {
+		return ProjectionView{}, errors.New("projection database required")
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	if s.Clock != nil {
+		now = s.Clock().UTC()
+	}
+	if s.StaleAfter == 0 {
+		s.StaleAfter = 90 * time.Second
+	}
+	if s.FutureSkew == 0 {
+		s.FutureSkew = 30 * time.Second
+	}
+	status, err := parseRuntimeStatus(raw)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ProjectionView{}, err
+	}
+	if status.ObservedAt.After(now.Add(s.FutureSkew)) {
+		return ProjectionView{}, errors.New("FUTURE_OBSERVATION")
+	}
+	var view ProjectionView
+	err = s.DB.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
+		var old RuntimeProjection
+		find := tx.Where("brain_instance_ref = ?", status.BrainInstanceRef).First(&old).Error
+		if find == nil {
+			if old.StatusID == status.StatusID {
+				view.Projection = old
+				return nil
+			}
+			if status.Sequence <= old.Sequence {
+				return errors.New("OUT_OF_ORDER_STATUS")
+			}
+			if !validRuntimeTransition(old.RuntimeState, status.Runtime.State) {
+				return errors.New("INVALID_STATUS_TRANSITION")
+			}
+		}
+		if find != nil && !errors.Is(find, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
+			return find
+		}
+		expectedJSON, _ := json.Marshal(expected)
+		configs, _ := json.Marshal(status.Configurations)
+		health, _ := json.Marshal(status.Health)
+		inputs, _ := json.Marshal(status.Inputs)
+		p := RuntimeProjection{BrainInstanceRef: status.BrainInstanceRef, StatusID: status.StatusID, Sequence: status.Sequence, ObservedAt: status.ObservedAt, ReceivedAt: now, RuntimeState: status.Runtime.State, RuntimeVersion: status.Runtime.Version, ModelRef: status.Model.ModelRef, ModelVersion: status.Model.Version, HealthOverall: status.Health.Overall, ExpectedRevisionsJSON: string(expectedJSON), ConfigurationsJSON: string(configs), HealthJSON: string(health), InputsJSON: string(inputs), WasOffline: find == nil && now.Sub(old.ObservedAt) > s.StaleAfter}
+		if find == nil {
+			p.CreatedAt = old.CreatedAt
+			view.Recovered = p.WasOffline
+		}
+		if err := tx.Save(&p).Error; err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		view.Projection = p
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return ProjectionView{}, err
+	}
+	view.Stale = now.Sub(view.Projection.ObservedAt) > s.StaleAfter
+	view.Offline = view.Stale
+	applied := make(map[string]*int64, len(status.Configurations))
+	for _, c := range status.Configurations {
+		applied[c.ConfigID] = c.AppliedRevision
+	}
+	for configID, want := range expected {
+		got, ok := applied[configID]
+		if !ok || got == nil || *got != want {
+			view.RevisionMismatch = true
+		}
+	}
+	return view, nil
+}
+
+func (s ProjectionStore) View(instance string) (ProjectionView, error) {
+	var p RuntimeProjection
+	if err := s.DB.First(&p, "brain_instance_ref = ?", instance).Error; err != nil {
+		return ProjectionView{}, err
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	if s.Clock != nil {
+		now = s.Clock().UTC()
+	}
+	stale := s.StaleAfter
+	if stale == 0 {
+		stale = 90 * time.Second
+	}
+	return ProjectionView{Projection: p, Offline: now.Sub(p.ObservedAt) > stale, Stale: now.Sub(p.ObservedAt) > stale}, nil
+}

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/machine_identity/registry.go

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+type registryDocument struct {
+	Version    string              `json:"version"`
+	Audience   string              `json:"audience"`
+	Principals []registryPrincipal `json:"principals"`
+}
+
+type registryPrincipal struct {
+	PrincipalID string        `json:"principal_id"`
+	Enabled     bool          `json:"enabled"`
+	Keys        []registryKey `json:"keys"`
+}
+
+type registryKey struct {
+	KeyID     string   `json:"kid"`
+	PublicKey string   `json:"public_key_base64url"`
+	Status    string   `json:"status"`
+	Scopes    []string `json:"scopes"`
+}
+
+func LoadRegistry(filePath, expectedAudience string) (*Registry, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(filePath) == "" || !validAudiences[expectedAudience] {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine principal registry path and audience are required")
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filePath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("read machine principal registry")
+	}
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	var document registryDocument
+	if err = decoder.Decode(&document); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	if err = decoder.Decode(&struct{}{}); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	if document.Version != "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1" || document.Audience != expectedAudience || len(document.Principals) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	records := make([]KeyRecord, 0)
+	for _, principal := range document.Principals {
+		if len(principal.Keys) == 0 {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+		}
+		for _, key := range principal.Keys {
+			publicKey, decodeErr := base64.RawURLEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(key.PublicKey)
+			if decodeErr != nil || len(publicKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize || (key.Status != "active" && key.Status != "revoked") {
+				return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+			}
+			records = append(records, KeyRecord{Principal: principal.PrincipalID, KeyID: key.KeyID, PublicKey: ed25519.PublicKey(publicKey), Audience: document.Audience,
+				Scopes: key.Scopes, Enabled: principal.Enabled, Revoked: key.Status == "revoked"})
+		}
+	}
+	return NewRegistry(records...)
+}

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/machine_identity/token.go

@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"path"
+	"regexp"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+)
+
+var (
+	principalPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$`)
+	keyIDPattern     = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$`)
+	tokenIDPattern   = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,64}$`)
+	validAudiences   = map[string]bool{"yovision-sense": true, "yovision-brain": true, "yovision-bell": true}
+	validScopes      = map[string]bool{"source-config:write": true, "runtime-status:write": true, "events:ingest": true, "evidence:read": true}
+)
+
+const (
+	Version       = "yovision.machine-identity/v1"
+	TokenType     = "YOVISION-MACHINE+JWT"
+	MaxLifetime   = 5 * time.Minute
+	AllowedSkew   = 30 * time.Second
+	MaxKeyOverlap = 24 * time.Hour
+)
+
+type Error struct{ Code string }
+
+func (e *Error) Error() string { return e.Code }
+
+func codeError(code string) error { return &Error{Code: code} }
+
+// BearerToken deliberately has no cookie or query fallback.
+func BearerToken(authorization string) (string, error) {
+	parts := strings.Split(authorization, " ")
+	if len(parts) != 2 || !strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "Bearer") || parts[1] == "" || strings.ContainsAny(parts[1], " \t\r\n,") {
+		return "", codeError("machine_token_missing")
+	}
+	return parts[1], nil
+}
+
+type Claims struct {
+	Version    string   `json:"ver"`
+	Issuer     string   `json:"iss"`
+	Subject    string   `json:"sub"`
+	Audience   string   `json:"aud"`
+	Scopes     []string `json:"scope"`
+	IssuedAt   int64    `json:"iat"`
+	NotBefore  int64    `json:"nbf"`
+	ExpiresAt  int64    `json:"exp"`
+	TokenID    string   `json:"jti"`
+	Method     string   `json:"htm"`
+	Path       string   `json:"htu"`
+	BodySHA256 string   `json:"body_sha256"`
+}
+
+type protectedHeader struct {
+	Algorithm string `json:"alg"`
+	Type      string `json:"typ"`
+	KeyID     string `json:"kid"`
+	Version   string `json:"ver"`
+}
+
+type KeyRecord struct {
+	Principal string
+	KeyID     string
+	PublicKey ed25519.PublicKey
+	Audience  string
+	Scopes    []string
+	Enabled   bool
+	Revoked   bool
+}
+
+type Registry struct {
+	mu   sync.RWMutex
+	keys map[string]KeyRecord
+}
+
+func NewRegistry(records ...KeyRecord) (*Registry, error) {
+	r := &Registry{keys: make(map[string]KeyRecord, len(records))}
+	for _, record := range records {
+		if !keyIDPattern.MatchString(record.KeyID) || !principalPattern.MatchString(record.Principal) || !validAudiences[record.Audience] || len(record.PublicKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize || !validScopeList(record.Scopes) {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid machine key record")
+		}
+		if _, exists := r.keys[record.KeyID]; exists {
+			return nil, errors.New("duplicate machine key id")
+		}
+		record.PublicKey = slices.Clone(record.PublicKey)
+		record.Scopes = slices.Clone(record.Scopes)
+		r.keys[record.KeyID] = record
+	}
+	return r, nil
+}
+
+func (r *Registry) Lookup(keyID string) (KeyRecord, bool) {
+	r.mu.RLock()
+	defer r.mu.RUnlock()
+	record, ok := r.keys[keyID]
+	record.PublicKey = slices.Clone(record.PublicKey)
+	record.Scopes = slices.Clone(record.Scopes)
+	return record, ok
+}
+
+func (r *Registry) Revoke(keyID string) bool {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	record, ok := r.keys[keyID]
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	record.Revoked = true
+	r.keys[keyID] = record
+	return true
+}
+
+type ReplayStore struct {
+	mu   sync.Mutex
+	used map[string]time.Time
+}
+
+// ReplayCache must atomically persist accepted (principal, jti) pairs until
+// expiry. ReplayStore is process-local and intended for tests or a single
+// uninterrupted process; connector implementations inject a durable store.
+type ReplayCache interface {
+	Consume(principal, tokenID string, expiresAt, now time.Time) bool
+}
+
+func NewReplayStore() *ReplayStore { return &ReplayStore{used: map[string]time.Time{}} }
+
+func (s *ReplayStore) Consume(principal, tokenID string, expiresAt, now time.Time) bool {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	for key, expiry := range s.used {
+		if !expiry.After(now) {
+			delete(s.used, key)
+		}
+	}
+	key := principal + "\x00" + tokenID
+	if _, exists := s.used[key]; exists {
+		return false
+	}
+	s.used[key] = expiresAt
+	return true
+}
+
+type Signer struct {
+	Principal  string
+	KeyID      string
+	PrivateKey ed25519.PrivateKey
+	Now        func() time.Time
+}
+
+func LoadPrivateKey(path string) (ed25519.PrivateKey, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(path) == "" {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key path is required")
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("read machine private key")
+	}
+	block, rest := pem.Decode(raw)
+	if block == nil || len(bytes.TrimSpace(rest)) != 0 || block.Type != "PRIVATE KEY" {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key must be one PKCS#8 PEM block")
+	}
+	parsed, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("parse machine private key")
+	}
+	key, ok := parsed.(ed25519.PrivateKey)
+	if !ok || len(key) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key is not Ed25519")
+	}
+	return slices.Clone(key), nil
+}
+
+func (s Signer) Mint(audience string, scopes []string, method, requestPath string, body []byte) (string, error) {
+	if !principalPattern.MatchString(s.Principal) || !keyIDPattern.MatchString(s.KeyID) || len(s.PrivateKey) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize || !validAudiences[audience] || !validScopeList(scopes) {
+		return "", errors.New("incomplete machine signer configuration")
+	}
+	normalizedPath, err := normalizePath(requestPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	method = strings.ToUpper(method)
+	if !allowedMethod(method) {
+		return "", errors.New("unsupported machine request method")
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	if s.Now != nil {
+		now = s.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	tokenID, err := randomTokenID()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	claims := Claims{Version: Version, Issuer: s.Principal, Subject: s.Principal, Audience: audience,
+		Scopes: slices.Clone(scopes), IssuedAt: now.Unix(), NotBefore: now.Unix(), ExpiresAt: now.Add(MaxLifetime).Unix(),
+		TokenID: tokenID, Method: method, Path: normalizedPath, BodySHA256: hex.EncodeToString(digest[:])}
+	header := protectedHeader{Algorithm: "EdDSA", Type: TokenType, KeyID: s.KeyID, Version: Version}
+	headerJSON, _ := json.Marshal(header)
+	claimsJSON, _ := json.Marshal(claims)
+	signingInput := rawBase64(headerJSON) + "." + rawBase64(claimsJSON)
+	signature := ed25519.Sign(s.PrivateKey, []byte(signingInput))
+	return signingInput + "." + rawBase64(signature), nil
+}
+
+type Verifier struct {
+	Registry *Registry
+	Replay   ReplayCache
+	Now      func() time.Time
+}
+
+func (v Verifier) Verify(token, audience, requiredScope, method, requestPath string, body []byte) (Claims, error) {
+	if v.Registry == nil || v.Replay == nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
+	if len(parts) != 3 || strings.Contains(token, "=") {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	headerBytes, err := decodeRaw(parts[0])
+	if err != nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	var header protectedHeader
+	if err = decodeClosed(headerBytes, &header); err != nil || header.Algorithm != "EdDSA" || header.Type != TokenType || header.Version != Version || !keyIDPattern.MatchString(header.KeyID) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	record, ok := v.Registry.Lookup(header.KeyID)
+	if !ok {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	signature, err := decodeRaw(parts[2])
+	if err != nil || len(signature) != ed25519.SignatureSize || !ed25519.Verify(record.PublicKey, []byte(parts[0]+"."+parts[1]), signature) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if !record.Enabled || record.Revoked {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_identity_revoked")
+	}
+	claimsBytes, err := decodeRaw(parts[1])
+	if err != nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	var claims Claims
+	if err = decodeClosed(claimsBytes, &claims); err != nil || !validClaimsShape(claims) || claims.Issuer != record.Principal || claims.Subject != record.Principal {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	if v.Now != nil {
+		now = v.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	nowUnix := now.Unix()
+	if claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt <= 0 || claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt > int64(MaxLifetime/time.Second) ||
+		claims.NotBefore < claims.IssuedAt || claims.NotBefore > claims.ExpiresAt || claims.IssuedAt > nowUnix+int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if claims.NotBefore > nowUnix+int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) || claims.ExpiresAt < nowUnix-int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_expired")
+	}
+	if claims.Audience != audience || record.Audience != audience {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_audience_denied")
+	}
+	if !slices.Contains(claims.Scopes, requiredScope) || !slices.Contains(record.Scopes, requiredScope) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_scope_denied")
+	}
+	normalizedPath, err := normalizePath(requestPath)
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	if err != nil || claims.Method != strings.ToUpper(method) || claims.Path != normalizedPath || claims.BodySHA256 != hex.EncodeToString(digest[:]) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if !v.Replay.Consume(claims.Issuer, claims.TokenID, time.Unix(claims.ExpiresAt, 0).Add(AllowedSkew), now) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_replayed")
+	}
+	return claims, nil
+}
+
+func decodeClosed(raw []byte, target any) error {
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	if err := decoder.Decode(target); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := decoder.Decode(&struct{}{}); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		if err == nil {
+			return errors.New("trailing JSON value")
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func validClaimsShape(claims Claims) bool {
+	if claims.Version != Version || !principalPattern.MatchString(claims.Issuer) || claims.Subject != claims.Issuer || !validAudiences[claims.Audience] || !tokenIDPattern.MatchString(claims.TokenID) ||
+		len(claims.Scopes) == 0 || len(claims.Scopes) > 4 || !allowedMethod(claims.Method) || claims.Path == "" || len(claims.BodySHA256) != 64 {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !validScopeList(claims.Scopes) {
+		return false
+	}
+	_, err := hex.DecodeString(claims.BodySHA256)
+	return err == nil
+}
+
+func validScopeList(scopes []string) bool {
+	if len(scopes) == 0 || len(scopes) > 4 {
+		return false
+	}
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, scope := range scopes {
+		if !validScopes[scope] || seen[scope] {
+			return false
+		}
+		seen[scope] = true
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func normalizePath(value string) (string, error) {
+	parsed, err := url.ParseRequestURI(value)
+	if err != nil || parsed.IsAbs() || parsed.Host != "" || parsed.RawQuery != "" || parsed.Fragment != "" || parsed.Path == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(parsed.Path, "/") || strings.Contains(parsed.Path, "\\") || strings.Contains(parsed.Path, "//") || path.Clean(parsed.Path) != parsed.Path {
+		return "", errors.New("machine request path must be a normalized absolute path without query or fragment")
+	}
+	return parsed.EscapedPath(), nil
+}
+
+func allowedMethod(method string) bool {
+	switch method {
+	case "GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE":
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
+func randomTokenID() (string, error) {
+	raw := make([]byte, 16)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("generate machine token id: %w", err)
+	}
+	return rawBase64(raw), nil
+}
+
+func rawBase64(value []byte) string { return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(value) }
+
+func decodeRaw(value string) ([]byte, error) {
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(value)
+}

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/machine_identity/token_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type crossLanguageVector struct {
+	PublicKey string `json:"public_key_base64url"`
+	Token     string `json:"token"`
+	Now       int64  `json:"now"`
+	Audience  string `json:"audience"`
+	Scope     string `json:"required_scope"`
+	Method    string `json:"method"`
+	Path      string `json:"path"`
+	Body      string `json:"body_base64"`
+}
+
+func testIdentity(t *testing.T) (Signer, *Registry, time.Time) {
+	t.Helper()
+	publicKey, privateKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	now := time.Unix(1_800_000_000, 0).UTC()
+	registry, err := NewRegistry(KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:sense:site-a", KeyID: "sense-key-0001", PublicKey: publicKey,
+		Audience: "yovision-brain", Scopes: []string{"source-config:write"}, Enabled: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return Signer{Principal: "yv:sense:site-a", KeyID: "sense-key-0001", PrivateKey: privateKey, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}, registry, now
+}
+
+func errorCode(t *testing.T, err error) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	var coded *Error
+	if !errors.As(err, &coded) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected coded error, got %v", err)
+	}
+	return coded.Code
+}
+
+func TestMintAndVerifyRequestBoundToken(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte(`{"revision":7}`)
+	token, err := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	claims, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if claims.Issuer != signer.Principal || claims.Subject != signer.Principal || claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt != 300 {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected claims: %+v", claims)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBearerTokenHasNoCookieOrQueryFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	if token, err := BearerToken("Bearer compact.token.value"); err != nil || token != "compact.token.value" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, value := range []string{"", "compact.token.value", "Bearer", "Bearer one two", "Cookie compact.token.value"} {
+		if _, err := BearerToken(value); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_missing" {
+			t.Fatalf("accepted %q", value)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRejectsReplayWrongAudienceScopeAndRequest(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte(`{"revision":7}`)
+	mint := func() string {
+		token, err := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		return token
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	token := mint()
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_replayed" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-bell", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_audience_denied" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-brain", "events:ingest", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_scope_denied" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", []byte("changed")); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_invalid" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExpiryRevocationAndRotation(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte("{}")
+	token, _ := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	expired := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now.Add(6 * time.Minute) }}
+	if _, err := expired.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_expired" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	oldPublic, oldPrivate, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	newPublic, newPrivate, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	rotation, err := NewRegistry(
+		KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-old-0001", PublicKey: oldPublic, Audience: "yovision-sense", Scopes: []string{"runtime-status:write"}, Enabled: true},
+		KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-new-0002", PublicKey: newPublic, Audience: "yovision-sense", Scopes: []string{"runtime-status:write"}, Enabled: true},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	oldSigner := Signer{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-old-0001", PrivateKey: oldPrivate, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	newSigner := Signer{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-new-0002", PrivateKey: newPrivate, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	oldToken, _ := oldSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	newToken, _ := newSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	verify := Verifier{Registry: rotation, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(oldToken, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(newToken, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !rotation.Revoke("brain-old-0001") {
+		t.Fatal("old key was not revoked")
+	}
+	oldAfterRevoke, _ := oldSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(oldAfterRevoke, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_identity_revoked" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTransportPolicyRejectsUnsafeTLS(t *testing.T) {
+	safe := TransportPolicy{TLSMinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12, VerifyCertificate: true, VerifyHostname: true,
+		ConnectTimeout: time.Second, ResponseHeaderTimeout: time.Second, RequestTimeout: 2 * time.Second, MaxRequestBytes: 1024}
+	if err := safe.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	unsafe := safe
+	unsafe.VerifyHostname = false
+	if err := unsafe.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unsafe hostname policy accepted")
+	}
+	unsafe = safe
+	unsafe.TLSMinVersion = tls.VersionTLS11
+	if err := unsafe.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("TLS 1.1 accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifiesCrossLanguageVector(t *testing.T) {
+	vectorPath := filepath.Join("..", "..", "..", "..", "..", "..", "contracts", "tests", "machine-identity-v1", "cross-language-vector.json")
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(vectorPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var vector crossLanguageVector
+	if err = json.Unmarshal(raw, &vector); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	publicKey, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(vector.PublicKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	body, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(vector.Body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	registry, err := NewRegistry(KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:vector", KeyID: "brain-vector-0001", PublicKey: ed25519.PublicKey(publicKey), Audience: vector.Audience, Scopes: []string{vector.Scope}, Enabled: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return time.Unix(vector.Now, 0) }}
+	claims, err := verifier.Verify(vector.Token, vector.Audience, vector.Scope, vector.Method, vector.Path, body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if claims.Issuer != "yv:brain:vector" {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected issuer: %s", claims.Issuer)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadsExternalPublicRegistryAndRejectsWrongAudience(t *testing.T) {
+	publicKey, _, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	document := map[string]any{
+		"version": "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1", "audience": "yovision-bell",
+		"principals": []any{map[string]any{"principal_id": "yv:sense:site-a", "enabled": true, "keys": []any{map[string]any{
+			"kid": "sense-key-0001", "public_key_base64url": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(publicKey), "status": "active", "scopes": []string{"events:ingest"},
+		}}}},
+	}
+	raw, _ := json.Marshal(document)
+	file := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "principals.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(file, raw, 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	registry, err := LoadRegistry(file, "yovision-bell")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if record, ok := registry.Lookup("sense-key-0001"); !ok || record.Principal != "yv:sense:site-a" {
+		t.Fatal("registry record missing")
+	}
+	if _, err = LoadRegistry(file, "yovision-sense"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("wrong registry audience accepted")
+	}
+}

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/machine_identity/transport.go

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type TransportPolicy struct {
+	TLSMinVersion         uint16
+	VerifyCertificate     bool
+	VerifyHostname        bool
+	ConnectTimeout        time.Duration
+	ResponseHeaderTimeout time.Duration
+	RequestTimeout        time.Duration
+	MaxRequestBytes       int64
+}
+
+func (p TransportPolicy) Validate() error {
+	if p.TLSMinVersion < tls.VersionTLS12 || !p.VerifyCertificate || !p.VerifyHostname || p.ConnectTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.ConnectTimeout > 30*time.Second ||
+		p.ResponseHeaderTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.ResponseHeaderTimeout > 30*time.Second || p.RequestTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.RequestTimeout > 60*time.Second ||
+		p.MaxRequestBytes < 1 || p.MaxRequestBytes > 10*1024*1024 {
+		return errors.New("machine transport policy is unsafe")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (p TransportPolicy) HTTPClient() (*http.Client, error) {
+	if err := p.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	transport := &http.Transport{
+		TLSClientConfig:       &tls.Config{MinVersion: p.TLSMinVersion},
+		TLSHandshakeTimeout:   p.ConnectTimeout,
+		ResponseHeaderTimeout: p.ResponseHeaderTimeout,
+	}
+	return &http.Client{Transport: transport, Timeout: p.RequestTimeout}, nil
+}

Sense/server/cmd/migrate/migration/version/2026083112000_brain_runtime.go

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+package version
+
+import (
+	"runtime"
+
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+
+	"git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/Sense/server/app/sense/integration/brain_control"
+	"git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/Sense/server/cmd/migrate/migration"
+	common "git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/Sense/server/common/models"
+)
+
+func init() {
+	_, fileName, _, _ := runtime.Caller(0)
+	migration.Migrate.SetVersion(migration.GetFilename(fileName), migrateBrainRuntime)
+}
+
+func migrateBrainRuntime(db *gorm.DB, version string) error {
+	return db.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
+		if err := tx.AutoMigrate(&brain_control.ReplayToken{}, &brain_control.RuntimeProjection{}, &brain_control.SourceRevision{}); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		return tx.Create(&common.Migration{Version: version}).Error
+	})
+}

Sense/server/cmd/migrate/migration/version/2026083112000_brain_runtime_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+package version
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/Sense/server/app/sense/integration/brain_control"
+	common "git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/Sense/server/common/models"
+	"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+)
+
+func TestMigrateBrainRuntime(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open("file:brain-runtime-migration?mode=memory&cache=shared"), &gorm.Config{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err = db.AutoMigrate(&common.Migration{}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err = migrateBrainRuntime(db, "2026083112000"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, model := range []any{&brain_control.ReplayToken{}, &brain_control.RuntimeProjection{}, &brain_control.SourceRevision{}} {
+		if !db.Migrator().HasTable(model) {
+			t.Fatalf("missing table for %T", model)
+		}
+	}
+}

Sense/tests/integration/brain_control/connector_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+package brain_control_test
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	bc "git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/Sense/server/app/sense/integration/brain_control"
+	mi "git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/Sense/server/app/sense/integration/machine_identity"
+	"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+)
+
+func testDB(t *testing.T, name string) *gorm.DB {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open("file:"+name+"?mode=memory&cache=shared"), &gorm.Config{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err = db.AutoMigrate(&bc.ReplayToken{}, &bc.RuntimeProjection{}, &bc.SourceRevision{}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return db
+}
+
+func TestMapperProducesCredentialFreeFrozenContract(t *testing.T) {
+	now := time.Date(2026, 8, 31, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	c, err := bc.MapSourceConfig(bc.SourceFacts{ConfigID: "gate-primary", SiteID: "site-east", LogicalDeviceID: "camera-1", MediaPath: "site-east/camera-1/main", Revision: 1, PublishedAt: now, EffectiveAt: now, Profile: bc.Profile{ID: "main", Width: 1920, Height: 1080, Encoding: "h264", FrameRate: 25}, RuleSetVersion: "rules-1", Areas: []bc.AreaRule{{ID: "danger", Version: 1, Kind: "danger_area", Enabled: true, Points: []bc.Point{{X: .1, Y: .1}, {X: .8, Y: .1}, {X: .5, Y: .8}}}}})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err = bc.ValidateSourceConfig(c); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	raw, _ := json.Marshal(c)
+	text := strings.ToLower(string(raw))
+	for _, secret := range []string{"password", "username", "rtsp://", "stream_uri", "credential"} {
+		if strings.Contains(text, secret) {
+			t.Fatalf("leaked %q", secret)
+		}
+	}
+	c2, err := bc.MapSourceConfig(bc.SourceFacts{ConfigID: "gate-primary", SiteID: "site-east", LogicalDeviceID: "camera-1", MediaPath: "site-east/camera-1/main", Revision: 2, PublishedAt: now, EffectiveAt: now, Profile: bc.Profile{ID: "main-v2", Width: 1280, Height: 720, Encoding: "H265", FrameRate: 20}, RuleSetVersion: "rules-2", NeedsRecalibration: true, Areas: []bc.AreaRule{{ID: "danger", Version: 2, Kind: "danger_area", Enabled: true, Points: []bc.Point{{X: .1, Y: .1}, {X: .8, Y: .1}, {X: .5, Y: .8}}}}})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if c2.RuleSet.State != "recalibration_required" || c2.RuleSet.Areas[0].Enabled {
+		t.Fatal("recalibration must disable rules")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDurableReplayIsAtomicAndSurvivesVerifierRestart(t *testing.T) {
+	db := testDB(t, "sense-replay")
+	pub, priv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	now := time.Date(2026, 8, 31, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	registry, _ := mi.NewRegistry(mi.KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:east", KeyID: "brain-key-01", PublicKey: pub, Audience: "yovision-sense", Scopes: []string{"runtime-status:write"}, Enabled: true})
+	signer := mi.Signer{Principal: "yv:brain:east", KeyID: "brain-key-01", PrivateKey: priv, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	body := []byte(`{"ok":true}`)
+	token, _ := signer.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	results := make(chan bool, 8)
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			v := mi.Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: bc.GORMReplayStore{DB: db}, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+			_, err := v.Verify(token, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+			results <- err == nil
+		}()
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+	close(results)
+	accepted := 0
+	for ok := range results {
+		if ok {
+			accepted++
+		}
+	}
+	if accepted != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("accepted=%d", accepted)
+	}
+	v2 := mi.Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: bc.GORMReplayStore{DB: db}, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	if _, err := v2.Verify(token, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("replay accepted after verifier restart")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRevisionStoreConcurrentAndRestart(t *testing.T) {
+	db := testDB(t, "sense-revisions")
+	store := bc.RevisionStore{DB: db}
+	for want := int64(1); want <= 3; want++ {
+		got, err := store.Next("gate-primary")
+		if err != nil || got != want {
+			t.Fatalf("got %d err %v", got, err)
+		}
+	}
+	restarted := bc.RevisionStore{DB: db}
+	got, err := restarted.Next("gate-primary")
+	if err != nil || got != 4 {
+		t.Fatalf("restart got %d err %v", got, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRuntimeProjectionStaleRecoveryMismatchAndOrdering(t *testing.T) {
+	db := testDB(t, "sense-projection")
+	now := time.Date(2026, 8, 31, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	store := bc.ProjectionStore{DB: db, Clock: func() time.Time { return now }, StaleAfter: 90 * time.Second}
+	raw := statusJSON("018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d101", 41, now, "running", 20)
+	view, err := store.Ingest(raw, map[string]int64{"gate-primary": 21})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !view.RevisionMismatch || view.Stale {
+		t.Fatalf("bad initial view %+v", view)
+	}
+	now = now.Add(91 * time.Second)
+	view, err = store.View("brain-east-01")
+	if err != nil || !view.Offline || !view.Stale {
+		t.Fatalf("offline %+v %v", view, err)
+	}
+	raw = statusJSON("018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d102", 42, now, "running", 21)
+	view, err = store.Ingest(raw, map[string]int64{"gate-primary": 21})
+	if err != nil || !view.Recovered || view.RevisionMismatch {
+		t.Fatalf("recovery %+v %v", view, err)
+	}
+	if _, err = store.Ingest(statusJSON("018f4d6a-8d1b-4a25-8b37-9085f9c0d103", 41, now, "running", 21), nil); err == nil || err.Error() != "OUT_OF_ORDER_STATUS" {
+		t.Fatalf("expected ordering rejection: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func statusJSON(id string, seq int64, observed time.Time, state string, revision int64) []byte {
+	v := map[string]any{"schema_version": bc.RuntimeStatusVersion, "status_id": id, "brain_instance_ref": "brain-east-01", "sequence": seq, "observed_at": observed.Format(time.RFC3339), "runtime": map[string]any{"state": state, "version": "1.0.0", "started_at": observed.Add(-time.Minute).Format(time.RFC3339)}, "model": map[string]any{"model_ref": "people-detection", "version": "2026.08.1"}, "configurations": []any{map[string]any{"config_id": "gate-primary", "apply_state": "applied", "applied_revision": revision, "error_code": nil}}, "health": map[string]any{"overall": "healthy", "error_codes": []any{}, "metrics": map[string]any{"load_percent": 1.0, "queue_depth": 0, "latency_ms": 2.0}}, "inputs": []any{}}
+	raw, _ := json.Marshal(v)
+	return raw
+}

Sense/tests/integration/brain_control/go.mod

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+module git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/Sense/tests/integration/brain_control
+
+go 1.26.5
+
+require (
+	git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/Sense/server v0.0.0
+	gorm.io/driver/sqlite v1.6.0
+	gorm.io/gorm v1.31.2
+)
+
+require (
+	github.com/jinzhu/inflection v1.0.0 // indirect
+	github.com/jinzhu/now v1.1.5 // indirect
+	github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3 v1.14.49 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/text v0.40.0 // indirect
+)
+
+replace git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/Sense/server => ../../../server

Sense/tests/integration/brain_control/go.sum

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+github.com/jinzhu/inflection v1.0.0 h1:K317FqzuhWc8YvSVlFMCCUb36O/S9MCKRDI7QkRKD/E=
+github.com/jinzhu/inflection v1.0.0/go.mod h1:h+uFLlag+Qp1Va5pdKtLDYj+kHp5pxUVkryuEj+Srlc=
+github.com/jinzhu/now v1.1.5 h1:/o9tlHleP7gOFmsnYNz3RGnqzefHA47wQpKrrdTIwXQ=
+github.com/jinzhu/now v1.1.5/go.mod h1:d3SSVoowX0Lcu0IBviAWJpolVfI5UJVZZ7cO71lE/z8=
+github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3 v1.14.49 h1:B8jBHC3xhxZgxztrgruTuLucebnULQnx4W7cF7SAE9w=
+github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3 v1.14.49/go.mod h1:6JTjA44L93a0QCyJef5YvlPoKXntQPjzWv5gtm9sB6w=
+golang.org/x/text v0.40.0 h1:Ub2Z6/xjgF1WrYQz2nuITOEegKFtiIy+rieRJ5lHZKs=
+golang.org/x/text v0.40.0/go.mod h1:hpnzDAfGV753zIKo+wk3u1bVKCGPbrnF7+7LBF/UHVY=
+gorm.io/driver/sqlite v1.6.0 h1:WHRRrIiulaPiPFmDcod6prc4l2VGVWHz80KspNsxSfQ=
+gorm.io/driver/sqlite v1.6.0/go.mod h1:AO9V1qIQddBESngQUKWL9yoH93HIeA1X6V633rBwyT8=
+gorm.io/gorm v1.31.2 h1:3o8FXNo9v9S858gil+3LlZA1LkCOzgb4g5BL64FgaCo=
+gorm.io/gorm v1.31.2/go.mod h1:XyQVbO2k6YkOis7C2437jSit3SsDK72s7n7rsSHd+Gs=

contracts/machine-identity/v1/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# Machine identity contract v1
+
+`yovision.machine-identity/v1` defines service-to-service identity for YoVision connectors. It is deliberately separate from Sense and Bell users, GoAdmin JWT/Cookie state, database roles and operating-system accounts.
+
+## Authentication mechanism
+
+Every request uses HTTPS and one compact Ed25519 JWS in `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. The protected header is closed and contains `alg=EdDSA`, `typ=YOVISION-MACHINE+JWT`, `kid` and `ver=yovision.machine-identity/v1`. The closed claims object contains:
+
+mTLS is not the primary v1 identity mechanism. A customer PKI may add mTLS later as transport hardening, but it cannot replace or weaken the v1 principal, audience, scope, request binding, replay and revocation checks.
+
+- one instance-specific `iss`/`sub` principal;
+- one exact service `aud`;
+- the minimum required `scope` values;
+- `iat`, `nbf`, `exp` and a single-use random `jti`;
+- uppercase HTTP method `htm`, normalized absolute-path reference `htu`, and lowercase SHA-256 `body_sha256`.
+
+Tokens live for at most 300 seconds. Consumers allow at most 30 seconds of clock skew, verify the signature and active key/principal before authorization, then atomically consume `jti` until `exp + skew`. Retrying transport creates a new token and `jti`; business idempotency keys remain unchanged.
+
+Production consumers persist the replay key `(principal, jti)` in their own durable store so a process restart cannot reopen the replay window. The checked-in process-local replay stores are adapter test/default primitives only; connector tasks must inject an atomic durable implementation and test restart behavior without sharing a database across products.
+
+The v1 scopes are:
+
+| Caller | Audience | Scope |
+|---|---|---|
+| Sense | `yovision-brain` | `source-config:write` |
+| Brain | `yovision-sense` | `runtime-status:write` |
+| Brain or Sense | `yovision-bell` | `events:ingest` |
+| Bell | `yovision-sense` | `evidence:read` |
+
+No wildcard audience or scope exists. A relay authenticates as its own transport principal and never replaces the original event producer identity.
+
+## Key lifecycle
+
+Private Ed25519 keys are generated per product instance and stored outside the repository in an OS-protected file or secret store. Runtime configuration contains only the private-key path. Public registries are local consumer configuration, not a shared database.
+
+Rotation first registers a new `kid`, switches the caller, and removes the old key after an overlap no longer than 24 hours. A disabled principal or revoked `kid` is rejected on every request, including tokens that have not expired. Emergency rollback disables the connector; it never enables a shared password, browser token, query token, plaintext transport or signature bypass.
+
+## Threat boundary
+
+v1 protects against token modification, wrong audience/scope, expired or premature tokens, captured-token replay, key/principal revocation and accidental credential mixing. It does not protect a host after administrator/root compromise, a stolen usable private key before revocation, compromised TLS trust roots, endpoint implementation flaws or denial of service. Rate and body-size limits remain consumer responsibilities.
+
+See `../transport/v1/README.md` for HTTPS and request policy. Stable failures are defined in `errors.md`; callers and logs must expose only the stable code, principal/kid when already authenticated, and correlation ID—never the token, signature, private/public key material or complete Authorization header.
+
+## Compatibility
+
+v1 is closed. New optional claims require all consumers to accept them before producers emit them. Any change to signing input, algorithm, claim meaning, replay semantics, maximum lifetime, audience or scope meaning publishes a new major version. Consumers keep the last accepted major during a controlled migration; rollback disables the new producer version without weakening verification.
+
+## Reproducible verification
+
+From the repository root:
+
+```powershell
+pwsh -NoProfile -File contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/run.ps1
+
+cd Sense/server
+go test -race ./app/sense/integration/machine_identity
+
+cd ../../Bell/server
+go test -race ./app/bell/integration/machine_identity
+```
+
+The isolated contract test validates both JSON Schemas, the fixed Go/Python Ed25519 vector, request binding, exact audience/scope, expiry, replay, rotation overlap, revocation, bearer-only extraction and verified TLS policy. Product connector tasks remain responsible for injecting a durable replay store and testing restart recovery.

contracts/machine-identity/v1/errors.md

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Machine identity v1 stable errors
+
+| Code | Meaning | Retry |
+|---|---|---|
+| `machine_token_missing` | Authorization bearer token is absent or malformed | No, fix request |
+| `machine_token_invalid` | Header, claims, signature, request binding or key is invalid | No |
+| `machine_token_expired` | Token is outside its accepted time window | Mint a new token |
+| `machine_audience_denied` | Exact audience does not match | No |
+| `machine_scope_denied` | Required scope is absent or not granted to the key | No |
+| `machine_identity_revoked` | Principal or key is disabled/revoked | No; operator action |
+| `machine_token_replayed` | The same principal/jti was already accepted | Retry with a new token and the same business idempotency key |
+| `machine_transport_required` | HTTPS policy is not satisfied | No; fix deployment |
+
+Responses and audit facts never include the token, signature, key material or Authorization header.

contracts/machine-identity/v1/machine-token.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/machine-identity/v1/machine-token.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision machine token claims v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": ["ver", "iss", "sub", "aud", "scope", "iat", "nbf", "exp", "jti", "htm", "htu", "body_sha256"],
+  "properties": {
+    "ver": {"const": "yovision.machine-identity/v1"},
+    "iss": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$"},
+    "sub": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$"},
+    "aud": {"enum": ["yovision-sense", "yovision-brain", "yovision-bell"]},
+    "scope": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "minItems": 1,
+      "maxItems": 4,
+      "uniqueItems": true,
+      "items": {"enum": ["source-config:write", "runtime-status:write", "events:ingest", "evidence:read"]}
+    },
+    "iat": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 0},
+    "nbf": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 0},
+    "exp": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 0},
+    "jti": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,64}$"},
+    "htm": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^(GET|POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)$"},
+    "htu": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^/[A-Za-z0-9._~!$&'()*+,;=:@%/-]*$"},
+    "body_sha256": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-f0-9]{64}$"}
+  }
+}

contracts/machine-identity/v1/principal-registry.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/machine-identity/v1/principal-registry.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision machine principal registry v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": ["version", "audience", "principals"],
+  "properties": {
+    "version": {"const": "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1"},
+    "audience": {"enum": ["yovision-sense", "yovision-brain", "yovision-bell"]},
+    "principals": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "items": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "additionalProperties": false,
+        "required": ["principal_id", "enabled", "keys"],
+        "properties": {
+          "principal_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$"},
+          "enabled": {"type": "boolean"},
+          "keys": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "items": {
+              "type": "object",
+              "additionalProperties": false,
+              "required": ["kid", "public_key_base64url", "status", "scopes"],
+              "properties": {
+                "kid": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$"},
+                "public_key_base64url": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$"},
+                "status": {"enum": ["active", "revoked"]},
+                "scopes": {"type": "array", "minItems": 1, "maxItems": 4, "uniqueItems": true, "items": {"enum": ["source-config:write", "runtime-status:write", "events:ingest", "evidence:read"]}}
+              }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/cross-language-vector.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "version": "yovision.machine-token-vector/v1",
+  "public_key_base64url": "ebVWLo_mVPlAeLES6KmLp5AfhTrmlb7X4OORC60ElmQ",
+  "token": "eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIsImtpZCI6ImJyYWluLXZlY3Rvci0wMDAxIiwidHlwIjoiWU9WSVNJT04tTUFDSElORStKV1QiLCJ2ZXIiOiJ5b3Zpc2lvbi5tYWNoaW5lLWlkZW50aXR5L3YxIn0.eyJhdWQiOiJ5b3Zpc2lvbi1zZW5zZSIsImJvZHlfc2hhMjU2IjoiNDA5NDQzYTZlZTVhYTI5NmRjY2Q2YzBkMTkzZTIxNDU2OGRhYTAwNTNiNjYxNTVmYmE4YWRjYTk5NWI3ODIzZCIsImV4cCI6MTgwMDAwMDMwMCwiaHRtIjoiUE9TVCIsImh0dSI6Ii9tYWNoaW5lL3YxL3J1bnRpbWUtc3RhdHVzIiwiaWF0IjoxODAwMDAwMDAwLCJpc3MiOiJ5djpicmFpbjp2ZWN0b3IiLCJqdGkiOiJBUUlEQkFVR0J3Z0pDZ3NNRFE0UEVBIiwibmJmIjoxODAwMDAwMDAwLCJzY29wZSI6WyJydW50aW1lLXN0YXR1czp3cml0ZSJdLCJzdWIiOiJ5djpicmFpbjp2ZWN0b3IiLCJ2ZXIiOiJ5b3Zpc2lvbi5tYWNoaW5lLWlkZW50aXR5L3YxIn0.zrvo_7lRiDX1D6po6OlfQg4hDg6XXlyUEmNMYgpuRl3ArXSjvGuOLivDousIyLtRO4bYJu9xMAWX1cea7MdVBQ",
+  "now": 1800000000,
+  "audience": "yovision-sense",
+  "required_scope": "runtime-status:write",
+  "method": "POST",
+  "path": "/machine/v1/runtime-status",
+  "body_base64": "eyJzdGF0dXMiOiJydW5uaW5nIn0="
+}

contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/requirements.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+cryptography==50.0.1
+jsonschema==4.25.1

contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/run.ps1

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+[CmdletBinding()]
+param()
+
+$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
+$testDirectory = $PSScriptRoot
+$requirements = Join-Path $testDirectory 'requirements.txt'
+$tempRoot = [IO.Path]::GetFullPath([IO.Path]::GetTempPath())
+$workDirectory = Join-Path $tempRoot ("yovision-machine-identity-v1-{0}" -f [Guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N'))
+
+try {
+    New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $workDirectory | Out-Null
+    $virtualEnvironment = Join-Path $workDirectory '.venv'
+    python -m venv $virtualEnvironment
+    if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'Failed to create the isolated Python environment.' }
+
+    $python = Join-Path $virtualEnvironment 'Scripts\python.exe'
+    $env:PIP_DISABLE_PIP_VERSION_CHECK = '1'
+    $env:PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE = '1'
+    & $python -m pip install --quiet --requirement $requirements
+    if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'Failed to install pinned machine-identity test dependencies.' }
+
+    & $python $testDirectory\test_contract.py
+    if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'Machine-identity v1 contract tests failed.' }
+}
+finally {
+    $resolvedWorkDirectory = [IO.Path]::GetFullPath($workDirectory)
+    if (-not $resolvedWorkDirectory.StartsWith($tempRoot, [StringComparison]::OrdinalIgnoreCase)) {
+        throw "Refusing to remove a temporary directory outside $tempRoot"
+    }
+    if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $resolvedWorkDirectory) {
+        Remove-Item -LiteralPath $resolvedWorkDirectory -Recurse -Force
+    }
+}

contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/test_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import base64
+import ssl
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "Brain" / "src"))
+
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
+from jsonschema import Draft202012Validator
+
+from yovision_brain.integration.machine_identity import (
+    KeyRecord,
+    MachineIdentityError,
+    Registry,
+    ReplayStore,
+    Signer,
+    TransportPolicy,
+    Verifier,
+    load_registry,
+    bearer_token,
+)
+
+
+class ContractFilesTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_closed_claim_and_registry_schemas(self) -> None:
+        claims = json.loads((ROOT / "contracts/machine-identity/v1/machine-token.schema.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        registry = json.loads((ROOT / "contracts/machine-identity/v1/principal-registry.schema.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        transport = json.loads((ROOT / "contracts/transport/v1/transport-policy.schema.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        Draft202012Validator.check_schema(claims)
+        Draft202012Validator.check_schema(registry)
+        Draft202012Validator.check_schema(transport)
+        self.assertFalse(claims["additionalProperties"])
+        self.assertEqual(claims["properties"]["ver"]["const"], "yovision.machine-identity/v1")
+        self.assertEqual(claims["properties"]["scope"]["items"]["enum"], [
+            "source-config:write", "runtime-status:write", "events:ingest", "evidence:read"
+        ])
+        self.assertFalse(registry["additionalProperties"])
+        self.assertEqual(transport["properties"]["verify_certificate"]["const"], True)
+        self.assertEqual(transport["properties"]["verify_hostname"]["const"], True)
+
+        vector = json.loads((ROOT / "contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/cross-language-vector.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        claims_object = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(vector["token"].split(".")[1] + "=="))
+        Draft202012Validator(claims).validate(claims_object)
+        Draft202012Validator(transport).validate({
+            "version": "yovision.transport/v1", "tls_min_version": "1.2", "verify_certificate": True,
+            "verify_hostname": True, "connect_timeout_ms": 1000, "response_header_timeout_ms": 1000,
+            "request_timeout_ms": 5000, "max_request_bytes": 1048576,
+        })
+
+    def test_brain_dependency_is_frozen(self) -> None:
+        pyproject = (ROOT / "Brain/pyproject.toml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        self.assertIn('dependencies = ["cryptography==50.0.1"]', pyproject)
+
+    def test_contract_documents_fail_closed(self) -> None:
+        identity = (ROOT / "contracts/machine-identity/v1/README.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        transport = (ROOT / "contracts/transport/v1/README.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        for required in ("300 seconds", "30 seconds", "24 hours", "jti", "revoked", "browser token"):
+            self.assertIn(required, identity)
+        for required in ("TLS 1.2", "hostname verification", "query-string credentials", "disables the connector"):
+            self.assertIn(required, transport)
+
+    def test_python_verifies_cross_language_vector(self) -> None:
+        vector = json.loads((ROOT / "contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/cross-language-vector.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        raw_key = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(vector["public_key_base64url"] + "=")
+        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PublicKey
+        registry = Registry([KeyRecord("yv:brain:vector", "brain-vector-0001", Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(raw_key), vector["audience"], frozenset({vector["required_scope"]}))])
+        verifier = Verifier(registry, ReplayStore(), clock=lambda: vector["now"])
+        claims = verifier.verify(vector["token"], vector["audience"], vector["required_scope"], vector["method"], vector["path"], base64.b64decode(vector["body_base64"]))
+        self.assertEqual(claims.iss, "yv:brain:vector")
+
+
+class BrainAdapterTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.now = 1_800_000_000
+        self.private = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
+        self.record = KeyRecord(
+            principal="yv:brain:node-a",
+            key_id="brain-key-0001",
+            public_key=self.private.public_key(),
+            audience="yovision-sense",
+            scopes=frozenset({"runtime-status:write"}),
+        )
+        self.registry = Registry([self.record])
+        self.signer = Signer("yv:brain:node-a", "brain-key-0001", self.private, clock=lambda: self.now)
+
+    def mint(self, body: bytes = b"{}") -> str:
+        return self.signer.mint("yovision-sense", ["runtime-status:write"], "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+
+    def verify(self, token: str, body: bytes = b"{}", **changes: str):
+        verifier = Verifier(self.registry, changes.pop("replay", ReplayStore()), clock=lambda: int(changes.pop("now", self.now)))
+        return verifier.verify(
+            token,
+            changes.pop("audience", "yovision-sense"),
+            changes.pop("scope", "runtime-status:write"),
+            changes.pop("method", "POST"),
+            changes.pop("path", "/machine/v1/runtime-status"),
+            body,
+        )
+
+    def assert_code(self, code: str, callback) -> None:
+        with self.assertRaises(MachineIdentityError) as caught:
+            callback()
+        self.assertEqual(caught.exception.code, code)
+        self.assertEqual(str(caught.exception), code)
+
+    def test_valid_token_and_replay_rejection(self) -> None:
+        token = self.mint()
+        replay = ReplayStore()
+        first = Verifier(self.registry, replay, clock=lambda: self.now)
+        claims = first.verify(token, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", b"{}")
+        self.assertEqual(claims.iss, "yv:brain:node-a")
+        self.assert_code("machine_token_replayed", lambda: first.verify(token, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", b"{}"))
+
+    def test_bearer_token_has_no_cookie_or_query_fallback(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(bearer_token("Bearer compact.token.value"), "compact.token.value")
+        for value in ("", "compact.token.value", "Bearer", "Bearer one two", "Cookie compact.token.value"):
+            self.assert_code("machine_token_missing", lambda value=value: bearer_token(value))
+
+    def test_wrong_audience_scope_body_and_expiry(self) -> None:
+        self.assert_code("machine_audience_denied", lambda: self.verify(self.mint(), audience="yovision-bell"))
+        self.assert_code("machine_scope_denied", lambda: self.verify(self.mint(), scope="events:ingest"))
+        self.assert_code("machine_token_invalid", lambda: self.verify(self.mint(), body=b"changed"))
+        self.assert_code("machine_token_expired", lambda: self.verify(self.mint(), now=str(self.now + 361)))
+
+    def test_tampering_revocation_and_rotation(self) -> None:
+        token = self.mint()
+        parts = token.split(".")
+        tampered = f"{parts[0]}.{parts[1][:-1]}A.{parts[2]}"
+        self.assert_code("machine_token_invalid", lambda: self.verify(tampered))
+        self.assertTrue(self.registry.revoke("brain-key-0001"))
+        self.assert_code("machine_identity_revoked", lambda: self.verify(self.mint()))
+
+        new_private = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
+        overlap = Registry([
+            self.record,
+            KeyRecord("yv:brain:node-a", "brain-key-0002", new_private.public_key(), "yovision-sense", frozenset({"runtime-status:write"})),
+        ])
+        new_signer = Signer("yv:brain:node-a", "brain-key-0002", new_private, clock=lambda: self.now)
+        verifier = Verifier(overlap, ReplayStore(), clock=lambda: self.now)
+        verifier.verify(self.mint(), "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", b"{}")
+        verifier.verify(new_signer.mint("yovision-sense", ["runtime-status:write"], "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", b"{}"), "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", b"{}")
+
+    def test_transport_policy_requires_verified_tls(self) -> None:
+        policy = TransportPolicy("1.2", True, True, 1000, 1000, 2000, 1024)
+        context = policy.ssl_context()
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(context.minimum_version, ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2)
+        self.assertTrue(context.check_hostname)
+        self.assertEqual(context.verify_mode, ssl.CERT_REQUIRED)
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            TransportPolicy("1.1", True, True, 1000, 1000, 2000, 1024).validate()
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            TransportPolicy("1.2", True, False, 1000, 1000, 2000, 1024).validate()
+
+    def test_loads_external_public_registry_and_rejects_wrong_audience(self) -> None:
+        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+        raw_public = self.private.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.Raw, serialization.PublicFormat.Raw)
+        document = {
+            "version": "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1",
+            "audience": "yovision-sense",
+            "principals": [{
+                "principal_id": "yv:brain:node-a", "enabled": True,
+                "keys": [{"kid": "brain-key-0001", "public_key_base64url": base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw_public).rstrip(b"=").decode(), "status": "active", "scopes": ["runtime-status:write"]}],
+            }],
+        }
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
+            path = Path(directory) / "principals.json"
+            path.write_text(json.dumps(document), encoding="utf-8")
+            registry = load_registry(path, "yovision-sense")
+            self.assertIsNotNone(registry.lookup("brain-key-0001"))
+            with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+                load_registry(path, "yovision-bell")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main(verbosity=2)

contracts/transport/v1/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# Machine transport policy v1
+
+`yovision.transport/v1` applies to every connector protected by machine identity v1.
+
+- HTTPS is mandatory. TLS 1.2 is the minimum and TLS 1.3 is preferred.
+- Certificate-chain and hostname verification are mandatory. `InsecureSkipVerify`, plaintext fallback and query-string credentials are forbidden.
+- Connection, response-header and total request timeouts are explicit and bounded; consumers enforce a route-specific body limit before decoding.
+- `X-Request-ID` is an opaque 16–128 character correlation value. It may be generated by the caller or first trusted hop, is never an authentication factor, and must not contain credentials or personal data.
+- Retry only timeout, connection loss, `429` and `5xx` according to the connector policy. Authentication/authorization failures and contract `4xx` responses are terminal until configuration changes.
+- Each retry signs a new machine token and `jti`. The business idempotency key and payload remain unchanged.
+
+Transport failures must not start Sense, Brain or Bell with weakened authentication. Rollback disables the connector and preserves local facts, Outbox/Receipt state and last-known-good configuration.

contracts/transport/v1/transport-policy.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/transport/v1/transport-policy.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision machine transport policy v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": ["version", "tls_min_version", "verify_certificate", "verify_hostname", "connect_timeout_ms", "response_header_timeout_ms", "request_timeout_ms", "max_request_bytes"],
+  "properties": {
+    "version": {"const": "yovision.transport/v1"},
+    "tls_min_version": {"enum": ["1.2", "1.3"]},
+    "verify_certificate": {"const": true},
+    "verify_hostname": {"const": true},
+    "connect_timeout_ms": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 100, "maximum": 30000},
+    "response_header_timeout_ms": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 100, "maximum": 30000},
+    "request_timeout_ms": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 100, "maximum": 60000},
+    "max_request_bytes": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 10485760}
+  }
+}

docs/02-architecture-and-code-map.md

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 generated: true (请先修改 Gitea Wiki，禁止直接编辑本文件)
 wiki_page: Architecture-and-Code-Map
 wiki_url: https://git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/wiki/Architecture-and-Code-Map.-
-wiki_revision: 812e822990d8c8e82445bd19ced67aca8c10aba4
-synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:58:55Z
+wiki_revision: 41c2193b2f1edb37abe1e8994d65d02207549039
+synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T03:18:12Z
 <!-- gitea-wiki-mirror:end -->
 
 # 架构与代码地图
@@ -344,3 +344,13 @@ Brain internal candidate / Sense local event
 
 Brain candidate、Sense candidate/Outbox 与 Bell Event/Receipt/Alert 继续是各自内部模型。当前没有新增可运行的跨端 ingress/relay，不能把冻结 Schema 解释为端到端链路已完成。
 <!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:end -->
+
+<!-- machine-identity-v1:start -->
+## 三项目机器身份与安全传输 v1
+
+工单 #151 已于 2026-08-31 验收并通过 PR #162 合入 `dev`。共享事实源为 `contracts/machine-identity/v1/**` 与 `contracts/transport/v1/**`；Sense、Brain、Bell 分别在自己的 `integration/machine_identity/` 中保留独立适配，不共享用户、JWT、Cookie、Casbin、数据库或业务实现。
+
+v1 使用 HTTPS 上的 Ed25519 短期请求绑定 JWS。每个部署实例拥有独立 principal、`kid` 和仓库外私钥；消费者使用本地外部公钥注册表，按精确 audience 与最小 scope 授权。令牌绑定 HTTP 方法、规范化路径和正文 SHA-256，有效期最多 300 秒、时钟偏差最多 30 秒，并以 `(principal,jti)` 原子防重放。TLS 最低 1.2，证书链与主机名验证不可关闭。
+
+Sense/Bell 使用 Go 标准库 Ed25519，Brain 冻结 `cryptography==50.0.1`。固定跨语言向量证明 Go/Python 可互相验签。#151 只提供身份、注册表、传输策略及可注入 replay 接口；#152/#153 才注册业务 endpoint，并必须使用各产品独立的持久原子 replay store验证重启，不能共享数据库。
+<!-- machine-identity-v1:end -->

docs/03-business-rules-and-glossary.md

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 generated: true (请先修改 Gitea Wiki，禁止直接编辑本文件)
 wiki_page: Business-Rules-and-Glossary
 wiki_url: https://git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/wiki/Business-Rules-and-Glossary.-
-wiki_revision: bc4a1a7be268028fa85717b71f48f7dd75cc7e52
-synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:59:04Z
+wiki_revision: 7a91edf3ca35ade3e254937c4a68b53d816a3eea
+synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T03:18:24Z
 <!-- gitea-wiki-mirror:end -->
 
 # 业务规则与术语
@@ -262,3 +262,15 @@ synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:59:04Z
 - **Bell 所有权**：Bell 独占内部 Event/Receipt、规则、Alert、ack、close、通知与用户审计；上游不得写入这些状态。
 - **兼容与回退**：未知主版本终止接收但保留已有事实；破坏性变化发布新主版本。回退停用新生产者版本，不删除 Outbox、Receipt、Event 或审计。
 <!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:end -->
+
+<!-- machine-identity-v1:start -->
+## 机器身份、权限和重放规则
+
+- 机器 principal 格式为 `yv:<sense|brain|bell>:<instance>`，每个产品实例独立；不得替代、携带或映射 Sense/Bell 用户身份。
+- v1 audience 只允许 `yovision-sense`、`yovision-brain`、`yovision-bell`；scope 只允许 `source-config:write`、`runtime-status:write`、`events:ingest`、`evidence:read`，没有通配符。
+- 机器令牌只能从 Authorization Bearer 读取，不接受管理员密码、浏览器 JWT/Cookie、query token、共享 secret 或其他产品用户身份。
+- 相同 `(principal,jti)` 只能成功一次；传输重试必须签发新令牌和 jti，但业务幂等键与载荷保持不变。
+- 私钥只存在于仓库外受操作系统保护的文件或秘密存储；运行配置只引用路径。公钥注册表属于各消费者本地配置，不是共享数据库。
+- 轮换先登记新 `kid`，最多并存 24 小时，切换后移除旧 key；禁用 principal 或吊销 `kid` 对每次请求即时生效。
+- 回退只能关闭 connector 并恢复三端独立运行，不得降级为明文、共享管理员身份、共享 JWT 或跳过签名/TLS 验证。
+<!-- machine-identity-v1:end -->

docs/04-local-development-and-verification.md

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 generated: true (请先修改 Gitea Wiki，禁止直接编辑本文件)
 wiki_page: Local-Development-and-Verification
 wiki_url: https://git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/wiki/Local-Development-and-Verification.-
-wiki_revision: d11757b202117e028878802e1e8a9ba9df1a8e89
-synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:59:13Z
+wiki_revision: 771fdd92eb03e9dff7d3ae20b7cb89f1ca288959
+synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T03:18:34Z
 <!-- gitea-wiki-mirror:end -->
 
 # 本地开发与验证
@@ -679,3 +679,30 @@ git diff --check
 
 这些测试只验证冻结契约，不验证 #153 产品 mapper/relay/ingress、#151 机器身份、实际证据存储/授权、网络断线补投或跨项目 E2E。
 <!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:end -->
+
+<!-- machine-identity-v1:start -->
+## 机器身份与安全传输 v1 验证
+
+从仓库根目录执行隔离契约测试：
+
+```powershell
+pwsh -NoProfile -File contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/run.ps1
+```
+
+脚本在系统临时目录建立虚拟环境，按固定 `cryptography==50.0.1` 和 `jsonschema==4.25.1` 验证封闭 Schema、Go/Python 固定 Ed25519 向量、请求绑定、Bearer-only、错 audience/scope、过期、重放、轮换、吊销和 TLS policy，结束后删除所属临时目录。
+
+三端定向验证：
+
+```powershell
+cd Sense/server
+go test -race ./app/sense/integration/machine_identity
+
+cd ../../Bell/server
+go test -race ./app/bell/integration/machine_identity
+
+cd ../..
+Brain\.venv\Scripts\python.exe contracts\tests\machine-identity-v1\test_contract.py
+```
+
+这些测试只证明 #151 身份和传输基础。真实客户 PKI/网络、现场时钟漂移、业务 endpoint、断网补投以及持久 replay 重启恢复由 #152/#153/#155 验证；不得用进程内 replay store替代生产结论。
+<!-- machine-identity-v1:end -->

docs/06-troubleshooting.md

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 generated: true (请先修改 Gitea Wiki，禁止直接编辑本文件)
 wiki_page: Troubleshooting
 wiki_url: https://git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/wiki/Troubleshooting
-wiki_revision: 046624c1b2d7963ef733b4c9687d5dec14771388
-synchronized_at: 2026-08-27T09:05:32Z
+wiki_revision: 75bf70f375f58356e968b45139b54fcae391d1e8
+synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T03:18:53Z
 <!-- gitea-wiki-mirror:end -->
 
 # 故障排查
@@ -161,3 +161,18 @@ synchronized_at: 2026-08-27T09:05:32Z
 3. 若同步提示本地镜像有未提交修改，先核对改动归属并停止覆盖。
 4. Wiki 页面缺失、没有 revision、MCP/API 凭据不可用或映射准备删除/重命名时停止，由工单确认后处理。
 5. PowerShell 显示乱码时先区分文件编码和控制台输出编码，不默认另起 PowerShell 或使用 `-ExecutionPolicy Bypass`。
+
+<!-- machine-identity-v1:start -->
+## 机器身份 v1 排错
+
+| 现象/错误码 | 常见原因 | 检查 | 安全处理 |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `machine_token_missing` | 未使用 Authorization Bearer 或格式错误 | 检查 connector 配置，不粘贴令牌 | 修复调用方；不改用 Cookie/query token |
+| `machine_token_invalid` | 签名、kid、请求方法/路径/正文摘要或封闭字段不匹配 | 核对版本、kid 和请求绑定 | 停止重试，修复配置/实现 |
+| `machine_token_expired` | 时钟偏差或令牌超过 5 分钟 | 检查双方 UTC 时钟 | 校时并签发新令牌，不延长长期 token |
+| `machine_audience_denied` / `machine_scope_denied` | 目标产品或最小权限不匹配 | 核对公钥注册表和调用方向 | 修正精确授权，不添加通配符 |
+| `machine_identity_revoked` | principal/key 已禁用或吊销 | 核对当前 kid 与轮换状态 | 切换已批准新 key；不得恢复旧 key绕过吊销 |
+| `machine_token_replayed` | 同一 jti 被再次使用 | 检查重试是否重新签名 | 新建 jti，保留业务幂等键 |
+
+排错日志只记录稳定错误码、已认证 principal/kid 和 correlation ID；不得记录令牌、签名、密钥、完整 Authorization header 或秘密路径。无法安全恢复时关闭 connector，三端保持独立运行。
+<!-- machine-identity-v1:end -->

docs/delivery/deployment-and-operations.md

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 generated: true (请先修改 Gitea Wiki，禁止直接编辑本文件)
 wiki_page: Deployment-and-Operations
 wiki_url: https://git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/wiki/Deployment-and-Operations.-
-wiki_revision: 0a772b0511044d98430ebd93304faa3dee57183d
-synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:39:35Z
+wiki_revision: 54d720aa07d2c40684da3fc04378393c7f318a04
+synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T03:20:15Z
 <!-- gitea-wiki-mirror:end -->
 
 # YoVision 部署与运维
@@ -142,3 +142,15 @@ Sense\start_sense.bat
 
 因此现阶段部署仍按 Sense、Brain 各自独立入口进行，不得手工共享数据库、用户 JWT/Cookie、摄像头凭据、文件目录或临时 JSON 字段来提前打通。需要停用或回退时保持两端独立运行，并保留上一已确认的配置与最后已知状态；未知协议主版本必须停止摄取而不是覆盖投影。
 <!-- sense-brain-contracts-v1:end -->
+
+<!-- machine-identity-v1:start -->
+## 机器身份部署与轮换边界
+
+#151 已冻结机器身份和传输基础，但 #152/#153 尚未注册业务 connector，因此当前不得手工拼接 endpoint 或临时共享凭据提前打通。
+
+部署时为每个调用实例独立生成 Ed25519 私钥，保存到仓库外受 ACL/秘密存储保护的位置；产品配置只记录私钥路径、principal、kid、目标 audience 和最小 scope。消费者从仓库外公钥注册表读取受信 principal/kid。不得把私钥、完整令牌、Authorization header、管理员密码、浏览器 JWT/Cookie 或 query token写入配置样例、日志、工单和备份。
+
+传输固定使用 HTTPS，TLS 最低 1.2并验证证书链与主机名。轮换按“先登记新公钥 → 调用方切换新 kid → 验证流量 → 24 小时内移除旧 key”执行；应急吊销直接禁用 principal 或 key，并同时停用相关 connector。回退保持 Sense、Brain、Bell 独立运行，保留 Outbox、Receipt、Event 和最后已知状态。
+
+#152/#153 必须为各产品注入自己的持久原子 `(principal,jti)` replay store并验证重启；内存 replay store 只用于适配测试或不重启的单进程原语。
+<!-- machine-identity-v1:end -->