feat: 建立三项目机器身份与安全传输 v1 (#151)

docs: 同步 #150 标准事件与证据 v1 契约

Bell/server/app/bell/integration/machine_identity/registry.go

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+type registryDocument struct {
+	Version    string              `json:"version"`
+	Audience   string              `json:"audience"`
+	Principals []registryPrincipal `json:"principals"`
+}
+
+type registryPrincipal struct {
+	PrincipalID string        `json:"principal_id"`
+	Enabled     bool          `json:"enabled"`
+	Keys        []registryKey `json:"keys"`
+}
+
+type registryKey struct {
+	KeyID     string   `json:"kid"`
+	PublicKey string   `json:"public_key_base64url"`
+	Status    string   `json:"status"`
+	Scopes    []string `json:"scopes"`
+}
+
+func LoadRegistry(filePath, expectedAudience string) (*Registry, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(filePath) == "" || !validAudiences[expectedAudience] {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine principal registry path and audience are required")
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filePath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("read machine principal registry")
+	}
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	var document registryDocument
+	if err = decoder.Decode(&document); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	if err = decoder.Decode(&struct{}{}); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	if document.Version != "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1" || document.Audience != expectedAudience || len(document.Principals) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	records := make([]KeyRecord, 0)
+	for _, principal := range document.Principals {
+		if len(principal.Keys) == 0 {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+		}
+		for _, key := range principal.Keys {
+			publicKey, decodeErr := base64.RawURLEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(key.PublicKey)
+			if decodeErr != nil || len(publicKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize || (key.Status != "active" && key.Status != "revoked") {
+				return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+			}
+			records = append(records, KeyRecord{Principal: principal.PrincipalID, KeyID: key.KeyID, PublicKey: ed25519.PublicKey(publicKey), Audience: document.Audience,
+				Scopes: key.Scopes, Enabled: principal.Enabled, Revoked: key.Status == "revoked"})
+		}
+	}
+	return NewRegistry(records...)
+}

Bell/server/app/bell/integration/machine_identity/token.go

@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"path"
+	"regexp"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+)
+
+var (
+	principalPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$`)
+	keyIDPattern     = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$`)
+	tokenIDPattern   = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,64}$`)
+	validAudiences   = map[string]bool{"yovision-sense": true, "yovision-brain": true, "yovision-bell": true}
+	validScopes      = map[string]bool{"source-config:write": true, "runtime-status:write": true, "events:ingest": true, "evidence:read": true}
+)
+
+const (
+	Version       = "yovision.machine-identity/v1"
+	TokenType     = "YOVISION-MACHINE+JWT"
+	MaxLifetime   = 5 * time.Minute
+	AllowedSkew   = 30 * time.Second
+	MaxKeyOverlap = 24 * time.Hour
+)
+
+type Error struct{ Code string }
+
+func (e *Error) Error() string { return e.Code }
+
+func codeError(code string) error { return &Error{Code: code} }
+
+// BearerToken deliberately has no cookie or query fallback.
+func BearerToken(authorization string) (string, error) {
+	parts := strings.Split(authorization, " ")
+	if len(parts) != 2 || !strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "Bearer") || parts[1] == "" || strings.ContainsAny(parts[1], " \t\r\n,") {
+		return "", codeError("machine_token_missing")
+	}
+	return parts[1], nil
+}
+
+type Claims struct {
+	Version    string   `json:"ver"`
+	Issuer     string   `json:"iss"`
+	Subject    string   `json:"sub"`
+	Audience   string   `json:"aud"`
+	Scopes     []string `json:"scope"`
+	IssuedAt   int64    `json:"iat"`
+	NotBefore  int64    `json:"nbf"`
+	ExpiresAt  int64    `json:"exp"`
+	TokenID    string   `json:"jti"`
+	Method     string   `json:"htm"`
+	Path       string   `json:"htu"`
+	BodySHA256 string   `json:"body_sha256"`
+}
+
+type protectedHeader struct {
+	Algorithm string `json:"alg"`
+	Type      string `json:"typ"`
+	KeyID     string `json:"kid"`
+	Version   string `json:"ver"`
+}
+
+type KeyRecord struct {
+	Principal string
+	KeyID     string
+	PublicKey ed25519.PublicKey
+	Audience  string
+	Scopes    []string
+	Enabled   bool
+	Revoked   bool
+}
+
+type Registry struct {
+	mu   sync.RWMutex
+	keys map[string]KeyRecord
+}
+
+func NewRegistry(records ...KeyRecord) (*Registry, error) {
+	r := &Registry{keys: make(map[string]KeyRecord, len(records))}
+	for _, record := range records {
+		if !keyIDPattern.MatchString(record.KeyID) || !principalPattern.MatchString(record.Principal) || !validAudiences[record.Audience] || len(record.PublicKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize || !validScopeList(record.Scopes) {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid machine key record")
+		}
+		if _, exists := r.keys[record.KeyID]; exists {
+			return nil, errors.New("duplicate machine key id")
+		}
+		record.PublicKey = slices.Clone(record.PublicKey)
+		record.Scopes = slices.Clone(record.Scopes)
+		r.keys[record.KeyID] = record
+	}
+	return r, nil
+}
+
+func (r *Registry) Lookup(keyID string) (KeyRecord, bool) {
+	r.mu.RLock()
+	defer r.mu.RUnlock()
+	record, ok := r.keys[keyID]
+	record.PublicKey = slices.Clone(record.PublicKey)
+	record.Scopes = slices.Clone(record.Scopes)
+	return record, ok
+}
+
+func (r *Registry) Revoke(keyID string) bool {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	record, ok := r.keys[keyID]
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	record.Revoked = true
+	r.keys[keyID] = record
+	return true
+}
+
+type ReplayStore struct {
+	mu   sync.Mutex
+	used map[string]time.Time
+}
+
+// ReplayCache must atomically persist accepted (principal, jti) pairs until
+// expiry. ReplayStore is process-local and intended for tests or a single
+// uninterrupted process; connector implementations inject a durable store.
+type ReplayCache interface {
+	Consume(principal, tokenID string, expiresAt, now time.Time) bool
+}
+
+func NewReplayStore() *ReplayStore { return &ReplayStore{used: map[string]time.Time{}} }
+
+func (s *ReplayStore) Consume(principal, tokenID string, expiresAt, now time.Time) bool {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	for key, expiry := range s.used {
+		if !expiry.After(now) {
+			delete(s.used, key)
+		}
+	}
+	key := principal + "\x00" + tokenID
+	if _, exists := s.used[key]; exists {
+		return false
+	}
+	s.used[key] = expiresAt
+	return true
+}
+
+type Signer struct {
+	Principal  string
+	KeyID      string
+	PrivateKey ed25519.PrivateKey
+	Now        func() time.Time
+}
+
+func LoadPrivateKey(path string) (ed25519.PrivateKey, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(path) == "" {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key path is required")
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("read machine private key")
+	}
+	block, rest := pem.Decode(raw)
+	if block == nil || len(bytes.TrimSpace(rest)) != 0 || block.Type != "PRIVATE KEY" {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key must be one PKCS#8 PEM block")
+	}
+	parsed, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("parse machine private key")
+	}
+	key, ok := parsed.(ed25519.PrivateKey)
+	if !ok || len(key) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key is not Ed25519")
+	}
+	return slices.Clone(key), nil
+}
+
+func (s Signer) Mint(audience string, scopes []string, method, requestPath string, body []byte) (string, error) {
+	if !principalPattern.MatchString(s.Principal) || !keyIDPattern.MatchString(s.KeyID) || len(s.PrivateKey) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize || !validAudiences[audience] || !validScopeList(scopes) {
+		return "", errors.New("incomplete machine signer configuration")
+	}
+	normalizedPath, err := normalizePath(requestPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	method = strings.ToUpper(method)
+	if !allowedMethod(method) {
+		return "", errors.New("unsupported machine request method")
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	if s.Now != nil {
+		now = s.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	tokenID, err := randomTokenID()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	claims := Claims{Version: Version, Issuer: s.Principal, Subject: s.Principal, Audience: audience,
+		Scopes: slices.Clone(scopes), IssuedAt: now.Unix(), NotBefore: now.Unix(), ExpiresAt: now.Add(MaxLifetime).Unix(),
+		TokenID: tokenID, Method: method, Path: normalizedPath, BodySHA256: hex.EncodeToString(digest[:])}
+	header := protectedHeader{Algorithm: "EdDSA", Type: TokenType, KeyID: s.KeyID, Version: Version}
+	headerJSON, _ := json.Marshal(header)
+	claimsJSON, _ := json.Marshal(claims)
+	signingInput := rawBase64(headerJSON) + "." + rawBase64(claimsJSON)
+	signature := ed25519.Sign(s.PrivateKey, []byte(signingInput))
+	return signingInput + "." + rawBase64(signature), nil
+}
+
+type Verifier struct {
+	Registry *Registry
+	Replay   ReplayCache
+	Now      func() time.Time
+}
+
+func (v Verifier) Verify(token, audience, requiredScope, method, requestPath string, body []byte) (Claims, error) {
+	if v.Registry == nil || v.Replay == nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
+	if len(parts) != 3 || strings.Contains(token, "=") {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	headerBytes, err := decodeRaw(parts[0])
+	if err != nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	var header protectedHeader
+	if err = decodeClosed(headerBytes, &header); err != nil || header.Algorithm != "EdDSA" || header.Type != TokenType || header.Version != Version || !keyIDPattern.MatchString(header.KeyID) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	record, ok := v.Registry.Lookup(header.KeyID)
+	if !ok {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	signature, err := decodeRaw(parts[2])
+	if err != nil || len(signature) != ed25519.SignatureSize || !ed25519.Verify(record.PublicKey, []byte(parts[0]+"."+parts[1]), signature) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if !record.Enabled || record.Revoked {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_identity_revoked")
+	}
+	claimsBytes, err := decodeRaw(parts[1])
+	if err != nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	var claims Claims
+	if err = decodeClosed(claimsBytes, &claims); err != nil || !validClaimsShape(claims) || claims.Issuer != record.Principal || claims.Subject != record.Principal {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	if v.Now != nil {
+		now = v.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	nowUnix := now.Unix()
+	if claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt <= 0 || claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt > int64(MaxLifetime/time.Second) ||
+		claims.NotBefore < claims.IssuedAt || claims.NotBefore > claims.ExpiresAt || claims.IssuedAt > nowUnix+int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if claims.NotBefore > nowUnix+int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) || claims.ExpiresAt < nowUnix-int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_expired")
+	}
+	if claims.Audience != audience || record.Audience != audience {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_audience_denied")
+	}
+	if !slices.Contains(claims.Scopes, requiredScope) || !slices.Contains(record.Scopes, requiredScope) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_scope_denied")
+	}
+	normalizedPath, err := normalizePath(requestPath)
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	if err != nil || claims.Method != strings.ToUpper(method) || claims.Path != normalizedPath || claims.BodySHA256 != hex.EncodeToString(digest[:]) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if !v.Replay.Consume(claims.Issuer, claims.TokenID, time.Unix(claims.ExpiresAt, 0).Add(AllowedSkew), now) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_replayed")
+	}
+	return claims, nil
+}
+
+func decodeClosed(raw []byte, target any) error {
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	if err := decoder.Decode(target); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := decoder.Decode(&struct{}{}); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		if err == nil {
+			return errors.New("trailing JSON value")
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func validClaimsShape(claims Claims) bool {
+	if claims.Version != Version || !principalPattern.MatchString(claims.Issuer) || claims.Subject != claims.Issuer || !validAudiences[claims.Audience] || !tokenIDPattern.MatchString(claims.TokenID) ||
+		len(claims.Scopes) == 0 || len(claims.Scopes) > 4 || !allowedMethod(claims.Method) || claims.Path == "" || len(claims.BodySHA256) != 64 {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !validScopeList(claims.Scopes) {
+		return false
+	}
+	_, err := hex.DecodeString(claims.BodySHA256)
+	return err == nil
+}
+
+func validScopeList(scopes []string) bool {
+	if len(scopes) == 0 || len(scopes) > 4 {
+		return false
+	}
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, scope := range scopes {
+		if !validScopes[scope] || seen[scope] {
+			return false
+		}
+		seen[scope] = true
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func normalizePath(value string) (string, error) {
+	parsed, err := url.ParseRequestURI(value)
+	if err != nil || parsed.IsAbs() || parsed.Host != "" || parsed.RawQuery != "" || parsed.Fragment != "" || parsed.Path == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(parsed.Path, "/") || strings.Contains(parsed.Path, "\\") || strings.Contains(parsed.Path, "//") || path.Clean(parsed.Path) != parsed.Path {
+		return "", errors.New("machine request path must be a normalized absolute path without query or fragment")
+	}
+	return parsed.EscapedPath(), nil
+}
+
+func allowedMethod(method string) bool {
+	switch method {
+	case "GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE":
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
+func randomTokenID() (string, error) {
+	raw := make([]byte, 16)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("generate machine token id: %w", err)
+	}
+	return rawBase64(raw), nil
+}
+
+func rawBase64(value []byte) string { return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(value) }
+
+func decodeRaw(value string) ([]byte, error) {
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(value)
+}

Bell/server/app/bell/integration/machine_identity/token_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type crossLanguageVector struct {
+	PublicKey string `json:"public_key_base64url"`
+	Token     string `json:"token"`
+	Now       int64  `json:"now"`
+	Audience  string `json:"audience"`
+	Scope     string `json:"required_scope"`
+	Method    string `json:"method"`
+	Path      string `json:"path"`
+	Body      string `json:"body_base64"`
+}
+
+func testIdentity(t *testing.T) (Signer, *Registry, time.Time) {
+	t.Helper()
+	publicKey, privateKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	now := time.Unix(1_800_000_000, 0).UTC()
+	registry, err := NewRegistry(KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:sense:site-a", KeyID: "sense-key-0001", PublicKey: publicKey,
+		Audience: "yovision-brain", Scopes: []string{"source-config:write"}, Enabled: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return Signer{Principal: "yv:sense:site-a", KeyID: "sense-key-0001", PrivateKey: privateKey, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}, registry, now
+}
+
+func errorCode(t *testing.T, err error) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	var coded *Error
+	if !errors.As(err, &coded) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected coded error, got %v", err)
+	}
+	return coded.Code
+}
+
+func TestMintAndVerifyRequestBoundToken(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte(`{"revision":7}`)
+	token, err := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	claims, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if claims.Issuer != signer.Principal || claims.Subject != signer.Principal || claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt != 300 {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected claims: %+v", claims)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBearerTokenHasNoCookieOrQueryFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	if token, err := BearerToken("Bearer compact.token.value"); err != nil || token != "compact.token.value" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, value := range []string{"", "compact.token.value", "Bearer", "Bearer one two", "Cookie compact.token.value"} {
+		if _, err := BearerToken(value); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_missing" {
+			t.Fatalf("accepted %q", value)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRejectsReplayWrongAudienceScopeAndRequest(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte(`{"revision":7}`)
+	mint := func() string {
+		token, err := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		return token
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	token := mint()
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_replayed" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-bell", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_audience_denied" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-brain", "events:ingest", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_scope_denied" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", []byte("changed")); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_invalid" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExpiryRevocationAndRotation(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte("{}")
+	token, _ := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	expired := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now.Add(6 * time.Minute) }}
+	if _, err := expired.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_expired" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	oldPublic, oldPrivate, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	newPublic, newPrivate, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	rotation, err := NewRegistry(
+		KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-old-0001", PublicKey: oldPublic, Audience: "yovision-sense", Scopes: []string{"runtime-status:write"}, Enabled: true},
+		KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-new-0002", PublicKey: newPublic, Audience: "yovision-sense", Scopes: []string{"runtime-status:write"}, Enabled: true},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	oldSigner := Signer{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-old-0001", PrivateKey: oldPrivate, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	newSigner := Signer{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-new-0002", PrivateKey: newPrivate, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	oldToken, _ := oldSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	newToken, _ := newSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	verify := Verifier{Registry: rotation, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(oldToken, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(newToken, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !rotation.Revoke("brain-old-0001") {
+		t.Fatal("old key was not revoked")
+	}
+	oldAfterRevoke, _ := oldSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(oldAfterRevoke, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_identity_revoked" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTransportPolicyRejectsUnsafeTLS(t *testing.T) {
+	safe := TransportPolicy{TLSMinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12, VerifyCertificate: true, VerifyHostname: true,
+		ConnectTimeout: time.Second, ResponseHeaderTimeout: time.Second, RequestTimeout: 2 * time.Second, MaxRequestBytes: 1024}
+	if err := safe.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	unsafe := safe
+	unsafe.VerifyHostname = false
+	if err := unsafe.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unsafe hostname policy accepted")
+	}
+	unsafe = safe
+	unsafe.TLSMinVersion = tls.VersionTLS11
+	if err := unsafe.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("TLS 1.1 accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifiesCrossLanguageVector(t *testing.T) {
+	vectorPath := filepath.Join("..", "..", "..", "..", "..", "..", "contracts", "tests", "machine-identity-v1", "cross-language-vector.json")
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(vectorPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var vector crossLanguageVector
+	if err = json.Unmarshal(raw, &vector); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	publicKey, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(vector.PublicKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	body, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(vector.Body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	registry, err := NewRegistry(KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:vector", KeyID: "brain-vector-0001", PublicKey: ed25519.PublicKey(publicKey), Audience: vector.Audience, Scopes: []string{vector.Scope}, Enabled: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return time.Unix(vector.Now, 0) }}
+	claims, err := verifier.Verify(vector.Token, vector.Audience, vector.Scope, vector.Method, vector.Path, body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if claims.Issuer != "yv:brain:vector" {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected issuer: %s", claims.Issuer)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadsExternalPublicRegistryAndRejectsWrongAudience(t *testing.T) {
+	publicKey, _, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	document := map[string]any{
+		"version": "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1", "audience": "yovision-bell",
+		"principals": []any{map[string]any{"principal_id": "yv:sense:site-a", "enabled": true, "keys": []any{map[string]any{
+			"kid": "sense-key-0001", "public_key_base64url": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(publicKey), "status": "active", "scopes": []string{"events:ingest"},
+		}}}},
+	}
+	raw, _ := json.Marshal(document)
+	file := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "principals.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(file, raw, 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	registry, err := LoadRegistry(file, "yovision-bell")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if record, ok := registry.Lookup("sense-key-0001"); !ok || record.Principal != "yv:sense:site-a" {
+		t.Fatal("registry record missing")
+	}
+	if _, err = LoadRegistry(file, "yovision-sense"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("wrong registry audience accepted")
+	}
+}

Bell/server/app/bell/integration/machine_identity/transport.go

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type TransportPolicy struct {
+	TLSMinVersion         uint16
+	VerifyCertificate     bool
+	VerifyHostname        bool
+	ConnectTimeout        time.Duration
+	ResponseHeaderTimeout time.Duration
+	RequestTimeout        time.Duration
+	MaxRequestBytes       int64
+}
+
+func (p TransportPolicy) Validate() error {
+	if p.TLSMinVersion < tls.VersionTLS12 || !p.VerifyCertificate || !p.VerifyHostname || p.ConnectTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.ConnectTimeout > 30*time.Second ||
+		p.ResponseHeaderTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.ResponseHeaderTimeout > 30*time.Second || p.RequestTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.RequestTimeout > 60*time.Second ||
+		p.MaxRequestBytes < 1 || p.MaxRequestBytes > 10*1024*1024 {
+		return errors.New("machine transport policy is unsafe")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (p TransportPolicy) HTTPClient() (*http.Client, error) {
+	if err := p.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	transport := &http.Transport{
+		TLSClientConfig:       &tls.Config{MinVersion: p.TLSMinVersion},
+		TLSHandshakeTimeout:   p.ConnectTimeout,
+		ResponseHeaderTimeout: p.ResponseHeaderTimeout,
+	}
+	return &http.Client{Transport: transport, Timeout: p.RequestTimeout}, nil
+}

Brain/pyproject.toml

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ version = "0.1.0"
 description = "Headless inference delivery unit for YoVision"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = "==3.11.*"
-dependencies = []
+dependencies = ["cryptography==50.0.1"]
 
 [project.optional-dependencies]
 # The wheel backend is selected by the official PyTorch index documented in

Brain/src/yovision_brain/integration/machine_identity/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+"""Independent service-to-service machine identity for Brain connectors."""
+
+from .token import (
+    ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS,
+    MAX_KEY_OVERLAP_SECONDS,
+    MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS,
+    VERSION,
+    Claims,
+    KeyRecord,
+    MachineIdentityError,
+    Registry,
+    ReplayStore,
+    Signer,
+    Verifier,
+    load_private_key,
+    load_registry,
+    bearer_token,
+)
+from .transport import TransportPolicy
+
+__all__ = [
+    "ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS",
+    "MAX_KEY_OVERLAP_SECONDS",
+    "MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS",
+    "VERSION",
+    "Claims",
+    "KeyRecord",
+    "MachineIdentityError",
+    "Registry",
+    "ReplayStore",
+    "Signer",
+    "TransportPolicy",
+    "Verifier",
+    "load_private_key",
+    "load_registry",
+    "bearer_token",
+]

Brain/src/yovision_brain/integration/machine_identity/token.py

@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+"""Ed25519 request-bound machine tokens.
+
+This module never accepts browser cookies, GoAdmin JWTs, query tokens, or
+shared secrets. HTTP adapters must obtain the compact token exclusively from
+the Authorization bearer header and pass the request body unchanged.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import json
+import posixpath
+import re
+import secrets
+import threading
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Callable, Iterable, Protocol
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import (
+    Ed25519PrivateKey,
+    Ed25519PublicKey,
+)
+
+VERSION = "yovision.machine-identity/v1"
+TOKEN_TYPE = "YOVISION-MACHINE+JWT"
+MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS = 300
+ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS = 30
+MAX_KEY_OVERLAP_SECONDS = 24 * 60 * 60
+_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"})
+_AUDIENCES = frozenset({"yovision-sense", "yovision-brain", "yovision-bell"})
+_SCOPES = frozenset({"source-config:write", "runtime-status:write", "events:ingest", "evidence:read"})
+_PRINCIPAL = re.compile(r"^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$")
+_KEY_ID = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$")
+_TOKEN_ID = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,64}$")
+
+
+class MachineIdentityError(ValueError):
+    """A stable, non-secret authentication failure."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+def bearer_token(authorization: str) -> str:
+    """Extract only an Authorization bearer token; there is no cookie/query fallback."""
+    parts = authorization.split(" ")
+    if len(parts) != 2 or parts[0].lower() != "bearer" or not parts[1] or any(character in parts[1] for character in " \t\r\n,"):
+        raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_missing")
+    return parts[1]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Claims:
+    ver: str
+    iss: str
+    sub: str
+    aud: str
+    scope: tuple[str, ...]
+    iat: int
+    nbf: int
+    exp: int
+    jti: str
+    htm: str
+    htu: str
+    body_sha256: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class KeyRecord:
+    principal: str
+    key_id: str
+    public_key: Ed25519PublicKey
+    audience: str
+    scopes: frozenset[str]
+    enabled: bool = True
+    revoked: bool = False
+
+
+class Registry:
+    def __init__(self, records: Iterable[KeyRecord]) -> None:
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self._records: dict[str, KeyRecord] = {}
+        for record in records:
+            if not _KEY_ID.fullmatch(record.key_id) or not _PRINCIPAL.fullmatch(record.principal) or record.audience not in _AUDIENCES or not _valid_scopes(record.scopes):
+                raise ValueError("invalid machine key record")
+            if record.key_id in self._records:
+                raise ValueError("duplicate machine key id")
+            self._records[record.key_id] = record
+
+    def lookup(self, key_id: str) -> KeyRecord | None:
+        with self._lock:
+            return self._records.get(key_id)
+
+    def revoke(self, key_id: str) -> bool:
+        with self._lock:
+            record = self._records.get(key_id)
+            if record is None:
+                return False
+            self._records[key_id] = KeyRecord(
+                principal=record.principal,
+                key_id=record.key_id,
+                public_key=record.public_key,
+                audience=record.audience,
+                scopes=record.scopes,
+                enabled=record.enabled,
+                revoked=True,
+            )
+            return True
+
+
+class ReplayStore:
+    """Process-local replay cache for tests or one uninterrupted process."""
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+        self._used: dict[tuple[str, str], int] = {}
+
+    def consume(self, principal: str, token_id: str, expires_at: int, now: int) -> bool:
+        with self._lock:
+            self._used = {key: expiry for key, expiry in self._used.items() if expiry > now}
+            key = (principal, token_id)
+            if key in self._used:
+                return False
+            self._used[key] = expires_at
+            return True
+
+
+class ReplayCache(Protocol):
+    """Connector implementations provide an atomic durable implementation."""
+
+    def consume(self, principal: str, token_id: str, expires_at: int, now: int) -> bool: ...
+
+
+def load_private_key(path: str | Path) -> Ed25519PrivateKey:
+    if not str(path).strip():
+        raise ValueError("machine private key path is required")
+    try:
+        raw = Path(path).read_bytes()
+        key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(raw, password=None)
+    except (OSError, ValueError, TypeError) as exc:
+        raise ValueError("invalid machine private key file") from exc
+    if not isinstance(key, Ed25519PrivateKey):
+        raise ValueError("machine private key is not Ed25519")
+    return key
+
+
+def load_registry(path: str | Path, expected_audience: str) -> Registry:
+    if not str(path).strip() or expected_audience not in _AUDIENCES:
+        raise ValueError("machine principal registry path and audience are required")
+    try:
+        document = json.loads(Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise ValueError("invalid machine principal registry") from exc
+    if not isinstance(document, dict) or set(document) != {"version", "audience", "principals"} or document["version"] != "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1" or document["audience"] != expected_audience or not isinstance(document["principals"], list) or not document["principals"]:
+        raise ValueError("invalid machine principal registry")
+    records: list[KeyRecord] = []
+    try:
+        for principal in document["principals"]:
+            if not isinstance(principal, dict) or set(principal) != {"principal_id", "enabled", "keys"} or not isinstance(principal["enabled"], bool) or not isinstance(principal["keys"], list) or not principal["keys"]:
+                raise ValueError
+            for key in principal["keys"]:
+                if not isinstance(key, dict) or set(key) != {"kid", "public_key_base64url", "status", "scopes"} or key["status"] not in {"active", "revoked"} or not isinstance(key["scopes"], list):
+                    raise ValueError
+                public_key = Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(_b64decode(key["public_key_base64url"]))
+                records.append(KeyRecord(principal["principal_id"], key["kid"], public_key, expected_audience, frozenset(key["scopes"]), principal["enabled"], key["status"] == "revoked"))
+    except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
+        raise ValueError("invalid machine principal registry") from None
+    return Registry(records)
+
+
+class Signer:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        principal: str,
+        key_id: str,
+        private_key: Ed25519PrivateKey,
+        *,
+        clock: Callable[[], int] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        if not _PRINCIPAL.fullmatch(principal) or not _KEY_ID.fullmatch(key_id) or not isinstance(private_key, Ed25519PrivateKey):
+            raise ValueError("incomplete machine signer configuration")
+        self._principal = principal
+        self._key_id = key_id
+        self._private_key = private_key
+        self._clock = clock or (lambda: int(time.time()))
+
+    def mint(self, audience: str, scopes: Iterable[str], method: str, request_path: str, body: bytes) -> str:
+        normalized_path = _normalize_path(request_path)
+        normalized_method = method.upper()
+        scope_values = tuple(scopes)
+        if audience not in _AUDIENCES or not _valid_scopes(scope_values) or normalized_method not in _METHODS:
+            raise ValueError("invalid machine token request")
+        now = int(self._clock())
+        header = {"alg": "EdDSA", "typ": TOKEN_TYPE, "kid": self._key_id, "ver": VERSION}
+        claims = {
+            "ver": VERSION,
+            "iss": self._principal,
+            "sub": self._principal,
+            "aud": audience,
+            "scope": list(scope_values),
+            "iat": now,
+            "nbf": now,
+            "exp": now + MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS,
+            "jti": secrets.token_urlsafe(16),
+            "htm": normalized_method,
+            "htu": normalized_path,
+            "body_sha256": hashlib.sha256(body).hexdigest(),
+        }
+        encoded_header = _encode_json(header)
+        encoded_claims = _encode_json(claims)
+        signing_input = f"{encoded_header}.{encoded_claims}".encode("ascii")
+        signature = self._private_key.sign(signing_input)
+        return f"{encoded_header}.{encoded_claims}.{_b64encode(signature)}"
+
+
+class Verifier:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        registry: Registry,
+        replay_store: ReplayCache,
+        *,
+        clock: Callable[[], int] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self._registry = registry
+        self._replay_store = replay_store
+        self._clock = clock or (lambda: int(time.time()))
+
+    def verify(
+        self,
+        token: str,
+        audience: str,
+        required_scope: str,
+        method: str,
+        request_path: str,
+        body: bytes,
+    ) -> Claims:
+        parts = token.split(".")
+        if len(parts) != 3 or "=" in token:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        header = _decode_object(parts[0], {"alg", "typ", "kid", "ver"})
+        if header.get("alg") != "EdDSA" or header.get("typ") != TOKEN_TYPE or header.get("ver") != VERSION or not isinstance(header.get("kid"), str) or not _KEY_ID.fullmatch(header["kid"]):
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        record = self._registry.lookup(header["kid"])
+        if record is None:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        try:
+            record.public_key.verify(_b64decode(parts[2]), f"{parts[0]}.{parts[1]}".encode("ascii"))
+        except (InvalidSignature, ValueError):
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid") from None
+        if not record.enabled or record.revoked:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_identity_revoked")
+
+        raw = _decode_object(parts[1], {"ver", "iss", "sub", "aud", "scope", "iat", "nbf", "exp", "jti", "htm", "htu", "body_sha256"})
+        claims = _claims_from_object(raw)
+        if claims.iss != record.principal or claims.sub != record.principal:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        now = int(self._clock())
+        if claims.exp - claims.iat <= 0 or claims.exp - claims.iat > MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS or claims.nbf < claims.iat or claims.nbf > claims.exp or claims.iat > now + ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        if claims.nbf > now + ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS or claims.exp < now - ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_expired")
+        if claims.aud != audience or record.audience != audience:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_audience_denied")
+        if required_scope not in claims.scope or required_scope not in record.scopes:
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_scope_denied")
+        if claims.htm != method.upper() or claims.htu != _normalize_path(request_path) or claims.body_sha256 != hashlib.sha256(body).hexdigest():
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+        if not self._replay_store.consume(claims.iss, claims.jti, claims.exp + ALLOWED_SKEW_SECONDS, now):
+            raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_replayed")
+        return claims
+
+
+def _claims_from_object(value: dict[str, object]) -> Claims:
+    try:
+        scope = value["scope"]
+        if not isinstance(scope, list) or not _valid_scopes(scope):
+            raise ValueError
+        integer_fields = ("iat", "nbf", "exp")
+        if any(not isinstance(value[field], int) or isinstance(value[field], bool) for field in integer_fields):
+            raise ValueError
+        string_fields = ("ver", "iss", "sub", "aud", "jti", "htm", "htu", "body_sha256")
+        if any(not isinstance(value[field], str) for field in string_fields):
+            raise ValueError
+        claims = Claims(scope=tuple(scope), **{key: value[key] for key in string_fields + integer_fields})
+        if claims.ver != VERSION or not _PRINCIPAL.fullmatch(claims.iss) or claims.iss != claims.sub or claims.aud not in _AUDIENCES or not _TOKEN_ID.fullmatch(claims.jti) or claims.htm not in _METHODS or len(claims.body_sha256) != 64:
+            raise ValueError
+        bytes.fromhex(claims.body_sha256)
+        _normalize_path(claims.htu)
+        return claims
+    except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
+        raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid") from None
+
+
+def _normalize_path(value: str) -> str:
+    split = urlsplit(value)
+    if not value.startswith("/") or split.scheme or split.netloc or split.query or split.fragment or "\\" in split.path or "//" in split.path or posixpath.normpath(split.path) != split.path:
+        raise ValueError("machine request path must be normalized and contain no query or fragment")
+    return split.path
+
+
+def _valid_scopes(scopes: Iterable[str]) -> bool:
+    values = tuple(scopes)
+    return 1 <= len(values) <= 4 and len(set(values)) == len(values) and all(scope in _SCOPES for scope in values)
+
+
+def _encode_json(value: dict[str, object]) -> str:
+    return _b64encode(json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=True, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True).encode("utf-8"))
+
+
+def _decode_object(value: str, expected_keys: set[str]) -> dict[str, object]:
+    try:
+        decoded = json.loads(_b64decode(value).decode("utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid") from None
+    if not isinstance(decoded, dict) or set(decoded) != expected_keys:
+        raise MachineIdentityError("machine_token_invalid")
+    return decoded
+
+
+def _b64encode(value: bytes) -> str:
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(value).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
+
+
+def _b64decode(value: str) -> bytes:
+    if not value or "=" in value:
+        raise ValueError("invalid base64url")
+    decoded = base64.b64decode(value + "=" * (-len(value) % 4), altchars=b"-_", validate=True)
+    if _b64encode(decoded) != value:
+        raise ValueError("non-canonical base64url")
+    return decoded

Brain/src/yovision_brain/integration/machine_identity/transport.py

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+"""Fail-closed HTTPS transport policy for Brain connectors."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ssl
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TransportPolicy:
+    tls_min_version: str
+    verify_certificate: bool
+    verify_hostname: bool
+    connect_timeout_ms: int
+    response_header_timeout_ms: int
+    request_timeout_ms: int
+    max_request_bytes: int
+
+    def validate(self) -> None:
+        if (
+            self.tls_min_version not in {"1.2", "1.3"}
+            or not self.verify_certificate
+            or not self.verify_hostname
+            or not 100 <= self.connect_timeout_ms <= 30_000
+            or not 100 <= self.response_header_timeout_ms <= 30_000
+            or not 100 <= self.request_timeout_ms <= 60_000
+            or not 1 <= self.max_request_bytes <= 10 * 1024 * 1024
+        ):
+            raise ValueError("machine transport policy is unsafe")
+
+    def ssl_context(self) -> ssl.SSLContext:
+        self.validate()
+        context = ssl.create_default_context(ssl.Purpose.SERVER_AUTH)
+        context.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_3 if self.tls_min_version == "1.3" else ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
+        context.check_hostname = True
+        context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
+        return context

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/machine_identity/registry.go

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+type registryDocument struct {
+	Version    string              `json:"version"`
+	Audience   string              `json:"audience"`
+	Principals []registryPrincipal `json:"principals"`
+}
+
+type registryPrincipal struct {
+	PrincipalID string        `json:"principal_id"`
+	Enabled     bool          `json:"enabled"`
+	Keys        []registryKey `json:"keys"`
+}
+
+type registryKey struct {
+	KeyID     string   `json:"kid"`
+	PublicKey string   `json:"public_key_base64url"`
+	Status    string   `json:"status"`
+	Scopes    []string `json:"scopes"`
+}
+
+func LoadRegistry(filePath, expectedAudience string) (*Registry, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(filePath) == "" || !validAudiences[expectedAudience] {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine principal registry path and audience are required")
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filePath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("read machine principal registry")
+	}
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	var document registryDocument
+	if err = decoder.Decode(&document); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	if err = decoder.Decode(&struct{}{}); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	if document.Version != "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1" || document.Audience != expectedAudience || len(document.Principals) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+	}
+	records := make([]KeyRecord, 0)
+	for _, principal := range document.Principals {
+		if len(principal.Keys) == 0 {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+		}
+		for _, key := range principal.Keys {
+			publicKey, decodeErr := base64.RawURLEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(key.PublicKey)
+			if decodeErr != nil || len(publicKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize || (key.Status != "active" && key.Status != "revoked") {
+				return nil, errors.New("invalid machine principal registry")
+			}
+			records = append(records, KeyRecord{Principal: principal.PrincipalID, KeyID: key.KeyID, PublicKey: ed25519.PublicKey(publicKey), Audience: document.Audience,
+				Scopes: key.Scopes, Enabled: principal.Enabled, Revoked: key.Status == "revoked"})
+		}
+	}
+	return NewRegistry(records...)
+}

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/machine_identity/token.go

@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"path"
+	"regexp"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+)
+
+var (
+	principalPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$`)
+	keyIDPattern     = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$`)
+	tokenIDPattern   = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,64}$`)
+	validAudiences   = map[string]bool{"yovision-sense": true, "yovision-brain": true, "yovision-bell": true}
+	validScopes      = map[string]bool{"source-config:write": true, "runtime-status:write": true, "events:ingest": true, "evidence:read": true}
+)
+
+const (
+	Version       = "yovision.machine-identity/v1"
+	TokenType     = "YOVISION-MACHINE+JWT"
+	MaxLifetime   = 5 * time.Minute
+	AllowedSkew   = 30 * time.Second
+	MaxKeyOverlap = 24 * time.Hour
+)
+
+type Error struct{ Code string }
+
+func (e *Error) Error() string { return e.Code }
+
+func codeError(code string) error { return &Error{Code: code} }
+
+// BearerToken deliberately has no cookie or query fallback.
+func BearerToken(authorization string) (string, error) {
+	parts := strings.Split(authorization, " ")
+	if len(parts) != 2 || !strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "Bearer") || parts[1] == "" || strings.ContainsAny(parts[1], " \t\r\n,") {
+		return "", codeError("machine_token_missing")
+	}
+	return parts[1], nil
+}
+
+type Claims struct {
+	Version    string   `json:"ver"`
+	Issuer     string   `json:"iss"`
+	Subject    string   `json:"sub"`
+	Audience   string   `json:"aud"`
+	Scopes     []string `json:"scope"`
+	IssuedAt   int64    `json:"iat"`
+	NotBefore  int64    `json:"nbf"`
+	ExpiresAt  int64    `json:"exp"`
+	TokenID    string   `json:"jti"`
+	Method     string   `json:"htm"`
+	Path       string   `json:"htu"`
+	BodySHA256 string   `json:"body_sha256"`
+}
+
+type protectedHeader struct {
+	Algorithm string `json:"alg"`
+	Type      string `json:"typ"`
+	KeyID     string `json:"kid"`
+	Version   string `json:"ver"`
+}
+
+type KeyRecord struct {
+	Principal string
+	KeyID     string
+	PublicKey ed25519.PublicKey
+	Audience  string
+	Scopes    []string
+	Enabled   bool
+	Revoked   bool
+}
+
+type Registry struct {
+	mu   sync.RWMutex
+	keys map[string]KeyRecord
+}
+
+func NewRegistry(records ...KeyRecord) (*Registry, error) {
+	r := &Registry{keys: make(map[string]KeyRecord, len(records))}
+	for _, record := range records {
+		if !keyIDPattern.MatchString(record.KeyID) || !principalPattern.MatchString(record.Principal) || !validAudiences[record.Audience] || len(record.PublicKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize || !validScopeList(record.Scopes) {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid machine key record")
+		}
+		if _, exists := r.keys[record.KeyID]; exists {
+			return nil, errors.New("duplicate machine key id")
+		}
+		record.PublicKey = slices.Clone(record.PublicKey)
+		record.Scopes = slices.Clone(record.Scopes)
+		r.keys[record.KeyID] = record
+	}
+	return r, nil
+}
+
+func (r *Registry) Lookup(keyID string) (KeyRecord, bool) {
+	r.mu.RLock()
+	defer r.mu.RUnlock()
+	record, ok := r.keys[keyID]
+	record.PublicKey = slices.Clone(record.PublicKey)
+	record.Scopes = slices.Clone(record.Scopes)
+	return record, ok
+}
+
+func (r *Registry) Revoke(keyID string) bool {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	record, ok := r.keys[keyID]
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	record.Revoked = true
+	r.keys[keyID] = record
+	return true
+}
+
+type ReplayStore struct {
+	mu   sync.Mutex
+	used map[string]time.Time
+}
+
+// ReplayCache must atomically persist accepted (principal, jti) pairs until
+// expiry. ReplayStore is process-local and intended for tests or a single
+// uninterrupted process; connector implementations inject a durable store.
+type ReplayCache interface {
+	Consume(principal, tokenID string, expiresAt, now time.Time) bool
+}
+
+func NewReplayStore() *ReplayStore { return &ReplayStore{used: map[string]time.Time{}} }
+
+func (s *ReplayStore) Consume(principal, tokenID string, expiresAt, now time.Time) bool {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	for key, expiry := range s.used {
+		if !expiry.After(now) {
+			delete(s.used, key)
+		}
+	}
+	key := principal + "\x00" + tokenID
+	if _, exists := s.used[key]; exists {
+		return false
+	}
+	s.used[key] = expiresAt
+	return true
+}
+
+type Signer struct {
+	Principal  string
+	KeyID      string
+	PrivateKey ed25519.PrivateKey
+	Now        func() time.Time
+}
+
+func LoadPrivateKey(path string) (ed25519.PrivateKey, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(path) == "" {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key path is required")
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("read machine private key")
+	}
+	block, rest := pem.Decode(raw)
+	if block == nil || len(bytes.TrimSpace(rest)) != 0 || block.Type != "PRIVATE KEY" {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key must be one PKCS#8 PEM block")
+	}
+	parsed, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("parse machine private key")
+	}
+	key, ok := parsed.(ed25519.PrivateKey)
+	if !ok || len(key) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
+		return nil, errors.New("machine private key is not Ed25519")
+	}
+	return slices.Clone(key), nil
+}
+
+func (s Signer) Mint(audience string, scopes []string, method, requestPath string, body []byte) (string, error) {
+	if !principalPattern.MatchString(s.Principal) || !keyIDPattern.MatchString(s.KeyID) || len(s.PrivateKey) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize || !validAudiences[audience] || !validScopeList(scopes) {
+		return "", errors.New("incomplete machine signer configuration")
+	}
+	normalizedPath, err := normalizePath(requestPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	method = strings.ToUpper(method)
+	if !allowedMethod(method) {
+		return "", errors.New("unsupported machine request method")
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	if s.Now != nil {
+		now = s.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	tokenID, err := randomTokenID()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	claims := Claims{Version: Version, Issuer: s.Principal, Subject: s.Principal, Audience: audience,
+		Scopes: slices.Clone(scopes), IssuedAt: now.Unix(), NotBefore: now.Unix(), ExpiresAt: now.Add(MaxLifetime).Unix(),
+		TokenID: tokenID, Method: method, Path: normalizedPath, BodySHA256: hex.EncodeToString(digest[:])}
+	header := protectedHeader{Algorithm: "EdDSA", Type: TokenType, KeyID: s.KeyID, Version: Version}
+	headerJSON, _ := json.Marshal(header)
+	claimsJSON, _ := json.Marshal(claims)
+	signingInput := rawBase64(headerJSON) + "." + rawBase64(claimsJSON)
+	signature := ed25519.Sign(s.PrivateKey, []byte(signingInput))
+	return signingInput + "." + rawBase64(signature), nil
+}
+
+type Verifier struct {
+	Registry *Registry
+	Replay   ReplayCache
+	Now      func() time.Time
+}
+
+func (v Verifier) Verify(token, audience, requiredScope, method, requestPath string, body []byte) (Claims, error) {
+	if v.Registry == nil || v.Replay == nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
+	if len(parts) != 3 || strings.Contains(token, "=") {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	headerBytes, err := decodeRaw(parts[0])
+	if err != nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	var header protectedHeader
+	if err = decodeClosed(headerBytes, &header); err != nil || header.Algorithm != "EdDSA" || header.Type != TokenType || header.Version != Version || !keyIDPattern.MatchString(header.KeyID) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	record, ok := v.Registry.Lookup(header.KeyID)
+	if !ok {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	signature, err := decodeRaw(parts[2])
+	if err != nil || len(signature) != ed25519.SignatureSize || !ed25519.Verify(record.PublicKey, []byte(parts[0]+"."+parts[1]), signature) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if !record.Enabled || record.Revoked {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_identity_revoked")
+	}
+	claimsBytes, err := decodeRaw(parts[1])
+	if err != nil {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	var claims Claims
+	if err = decodeClosed(claimsBytes, &claims); err != nil || !validClaimsShape(claims) || claims.Issuer != record.Principal || claims.Subject != record.Principal {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	if v.Now != nil {
+		now = v.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	nowUnix := now.Unix()
+	if claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt <= 0 || claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt > int64(MaxLifetime/time.Second) ||
+		claims.NotBefore < claims.IssuedAt || claims.NotBefore > claims.ExpiresAt || claims.IssuedAt > nowUnix+int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if claims.NotBefore > nowUnix+int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) || claims.ExpiresAt < nowUnix-int64(AllowedSkew/time.Second) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_expired")
+	}
+	if claims.Audience != audience || record.Audience != audience {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_audience_denied")
+	}
+	if !slices.Contains(claims.Scopes, requiredScope) || !slices.Contains(record.Scopes, requiredScope) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_scope_denied")
+	}
+	normalizedPath, err := normalizePath(requestPath)
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	if err != nil || claims.Method != strings.ToUpper(method) || claims.Path != normalizedPath || claims.BodySHA256 != hex.EncodeToString(digest[:]) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_invalid")
+	}
+	if !v.Replay.Consume(claims.Issuer, claims.TokenID, time.Unix(claims.ExpiresAt, 0).Add(AllowedSkew), now) {
+		return Claims{}, codeError("machine_token_replayed")
+	}
+	return claims, nil
+}
+
+func decodeClosed(raw []byte, target any) error {
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	if err := decoder.Decode(target); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := decoder.Decode(&struct{}{}); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		if err == nil {
+			return errors.New("trailing JSON value")
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func validClaimsShape(claims Claims) bool {
+	if claims.Version != Version || !principalPattern.MatchString(claims.Issuer) || claims.Subject != claims.Issuer || !validAudiences[claims.Audience] || !tokenIDPattern.MatchString(claims.TokenID) ||
+		len(claims.Scopes) == 0 || len(claims.Scopes) > 4 || !allowedMethod(claims.Method) || claims.Path == "" || len(claims.BodySHA256) != 64 {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !validScopeList(claims.Scopes) {
+		return false
+	}
+	_, err := hex.DecodeString(claims.BodySHA256)
+	return err == nil
+}
+
+func validScopeList(scopes []string) bool {
+	if len(scopes) == 0 || len(scopes) > 4 {
+		return false
+	}
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, scope := range scopes {
+		if !validScopes[scope] || seen[scope] {
+			return false
+		}
+		seen[scope] = true
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func normalizePath(value string) (string, error) {
+	parsed, err := url.ParseRequestURI(value)
+	if err != nil || parsed.IsAbs() || parsed.Host != "" || parsed.RawQuery != "" || parsed.Fragment != "" || parsed.Path == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(parsed.Path, "/") || strings.Contains(parsed.Path, "\\") || strings.Contains(parsed.Path, "//") || path.Clean(parsed.Path) != parsed.Path {
+		return "", errors.New("machine request path must be a normalized absolute path without query or fragment")
+	}
+	return parsed.EscapedPath(), nil
+}
+
+func allowedMethod(method string) bool {
+	switch method {
+	case "GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE":
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
+func randomTokenID() (string, error) {
+	raw := make([]byte, 16)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("generate machine token id: %w", err)
+	}
+	return rawBase64(raw), nil
+}
+
+func rawBase64(value []byte) string { return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(value) }
+
+func decodeRaw(value string) ([]byte, error) {
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(value)
+}

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/machine_identity/token_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type crossLanguageVector struct {
+	PublicKey string `json:"public_key_base64url"`
+	Token     string `json:"token"`
+	Now       int64  `json:"now"`
+	Audience  string `json:"audience"`
+	Scope     string `json:"required_scope"`
+	Method    string `json:"method"`
+	Path      string `json:"path"`
+	Body      string `json:"body_base64"`
+}
+
+func testIdentity(t *testing.T) (Signer, *Registry, time.Time) {
+	t.Helper()
+	publicKey, privateKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	now := time.Unix(1_800_000_000, 0).UTC()
+	registry, err := NewRegistry(KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:sense:site-a", KeyID: "sense-key-0001", PublicKey: publicKey,
+		Audience: "yovision-brain", Scopes: []string{"source-config:write"}, Enabled: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return Signer{Principal: "yv:sense:site-a", KeyID: "sense-key-0001", PrivateKey: privateKey, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}, registry, now
+}
+
+func errorCode(t *testing.T, err error) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	var coded *Error
+	if !errors.As(err, &coded) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected coded error, got %v", err)
+	}
+	return coded.Code
+}
+
+func TestMintAndVerifyRequestBoundToken(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte(`{"revision":7}`)
+	token, err := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	claims, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if claims.Issuer != signer.Principal || claims.Subject != signer.Principal || claims.ExpiresAt-claims.IssuedAt != 300 {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected claims: %+v", claims)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBearerTokenHasNoCookieOrQueryFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	if token, err := BearerToken("Bearer compact.token.value"); err != nil || token != "compact.token.value" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, value := range []string{"", "compact.token.value", "Bearer", "Bearer one two", "Cookie compact.token.value"} {
+		if _, err := BearerToken(value); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_missing" {
+			t.Fatalf("accepted %q", value)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRejectsReplayWrongAudienceScopeAndRequest(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte(`{"revision":7}`)
+	mint := func() string {
+		token, err := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		return token
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	token := mint()
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_replayed" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-bell", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_audience_denied" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-brain", "events:ingest", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_scope_denied" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := verifier.Verify(mint(), "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", []byte("changed")); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_invalid" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExpiryRevocationAndRotation(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, registry, now := testIdentity(t)
+	body := []byte("{}")
+	token, _ := signer.Mint("yovision-brain", []string{"source-config:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body)
+	expired := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now.Add(6 * time.Minute) }}
+	if _, err := expired.Verify(token, "yovision-brain", "source-config:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/source-config", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_token_expired" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	oldPublic, oldPrivate, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	newPublic, newPrivate, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	rotation, err := NewRegistry(
+		KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-old-0001", PublicKey: oldPublic, Audience: "yovision-sense", Scopes: []string{"runtime-status:write"}, Enabled: true},
+		KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-new-0002", PublicKey: newPublic, Audience: "yovision-sense", Scopes: []string{"runtime-status:write"}, Enabled: true},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	oldSigner := Signer{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-old-0001", PrivateKey: oldPrivate, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	newSigner := Signer{Principal: "yv:brain:node-a", KeyID: "brain-new-0002", PrivateKey: newPrivate, Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	oldToken, _ := oldSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	newToken, _ := newSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	verify := Verifier{Registry: rotation, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return now }}
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(oldToken, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(newToken, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !rotation.Revoke("brain-old-0001") {
+		t.Fatal("old key was not revoked")
+	}
+	oldAfterRevoke, _ := oldSigner.Mint("yovision-sense", []string{"runtime-status:write"}, "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+	if _, err = verify.Verify(oldAfterRevoke, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body); errorCode(t, err) != "machine_identity_revoked" {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTransportPolicyRejectsUnsafeTLS(t *testing.T) {
+	safe := TransportPolicy{TLSMinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12, VerifyCertificate: true, VerifyHostname: true,
+		ConnectTimeout: time.Second, ResponseHeaderTimeout: time.Second, RequestTimeout: 2 * time.Second, MaxRequestBytes: 1024}
+	if err := safe.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	unsafe := safe
+	unsafe.VerifyHostname = false
+	if err := unsafe.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unsafe hostname policy accepted")
+	}
+	unsafe = safe
+	unsafe.TLSMinVersion = tls.VersionTLS11
+	if err := unsafe.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("TLS 1.1 accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifiesCrossLanguageVector(t *testing.T) {
+	vectorPath := filepath.Join("..", "..", "..", "..", "..", "..", "contracts", "tests", "machine-identity-v1", "cross-language-vector.json")
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(vectorPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var vector crossLanguageVector
+	if err = json.Unmarshal(raw, &vector); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	publicKey, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(vector.PublicKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	body, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(vector.Body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	registry, err := NewRegistry(KeyRecord{Principal: "yv:brain:vector", KeyID: "brain-vector-0001", PublicKey: ed25519.PublicKey(publicKey), Audience: vector.Audience, Scopes: []string{vector.Scope}, Enabled: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	verifier := Verifier{Registry: registry, Replay: NewReplayStore(), Now: func() time.Time { return time.Unix(vector.Now, 0) }}
+	claims, err := verifier.Verify(vector.Token, vector.Audience, vector.Scope, vector.Method, vector.Path, body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if claims.Issuer != "yv:brain:vector" {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected issuer: %s", claims.Issuer)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadsExternalPublicRegistryAndRejectsWrongAudience(t *testing.T) {
+	publicKey, _, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	document := map[string]any{
+		"version": "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1", "audience": "yovision-bell",
+		"principals": []any{map[string]any{"principal_id": "yv:sense:site-a", "enabled": true, "keys": []any{map[string]any{
+			"kid": "sense-key-0001", "public_key_base64url": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(publicKey), "status": "active", "scopes": []string{"events:ingest"},
+		}}}},
+	}
+	raw, _ := json.Marshal(document)
+	file := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "principals.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(file, raw, 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	registry, err := LoadRegistry(file, "yovision-bell")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if record, ok := registry.Lookup("sense-key-0001"); !ok || record.Principal != "yv:sense:site-a" {
+		t.Fatal("registry record missing")
+	}
+	if _, err = LoadRegistry(file, "yovision-sense"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("wrong registry audience accepted")
+	}
+}

Sense/server/app/sense/integration/machine_identity/transport.go

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+package machine_identity
+
+import (
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type TransportPolicy struct {
+	TLSMinVersion         uint16
+	VerifyCertificate     bool
+	VerifyHostname        bool
+	ConnectTimeout        time.Duration
+	ResponseHeaderTimeout time.Duration
+	RequestTimeout        time.Duration
+	MaxRequestBytes       int64
+}
+
+func (p TransportPolicy) Validate() error {
+	if p.TLSMinVersion < tls.VersionTLS12 || !p.VerifyCertificate || !p.VerifyHostname || p.ConnectTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.ConnectTimeout > 30*time.Second ||
+		p.ResponseHeaderTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.ResponseHeaderTimeout > 30*time.Second || p.RequestTimeout < 100*time.Millisecond || p.RequestTimeout > 60*time.Second ||
+		p.MaxRequestBytes < 1 || p.MaxRequestBytes > 10*1024*1024 {
+		return errors.New("machine transport policy is unsafe")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (p TransportPolicy) HTTPClient() (*http.Client, error) {
+	if err := p.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	transport := &http.Transport{
+		TLSClientConfig:       &tls.Config{MinVersion: p.TLSMinVersion},
+		TLSHandshakeTimeout:   p.ConnectTimeout,
+		ResponseHeaderTimeout: p.ResponseHeaderTimeout,
+	}
+	return &http.Client{Transport: transport, Timeout: p.RequestTimeout}, nil
+}

contracts/events/v1/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+# Standard event contract v1
+
+`yovision.event/v1` is the only shared representation of an anonymous safety event. It is an immutable fact, not a Bell Alert. Bell owns all rule matching, Alert, acknowledgement, close, notification and user/audit state.
+
+## Identity and idempotency
+
+The permanent idempotency key is the exact UTF-8 pair `(producer_id, source_event_id)`. `producer_id` always names the original producer. A Sense gateway/relay sends its own authenticated transport identity and optional `X-YoVision-Relay-ID`, but it must forward both key fields and the business payload unchanged. A retry is not a new event.
+
+After schema validation, calculate `payload_sha256` from the RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme representation of the complete Event. The checked-in vector fixes the expected digest for supported implementations. Bell stores key, digest and Bell `event_id` permanently:
+
+- absent key: atomically create Event/Receipt and return `201` with `disposition=created`;
+- same key and digest: return the original `event_id` and digest with `200`, `disposition=duplicate`;
+- same key but another digest: return `409 idempotency_conflict`, append an audit fact, and mutate neither Event nor Alert;
+- identity lookup and insert must share a transaction/unique constraint so concurrent duplicates have the same result.
+
+Canonical timestamps in Event v1 are UTC RFC 3339 with exactly three fractional digits and `Z`. Optional members are omitted, never sent as `null`. Producers must reject non-finite numbers before canonicalization.
+
+## Mapper responsibilities
+
+| Role | Required responsibility | Must not do |
+|---|---|---|
+| Brain producer mapper | Convert `brain.internal.event-candidate/v1` into stable original identity, logical site/device/profile/rule/region refs, model version and anonymous observation; generate one `source_event_id` once and persist/reuse it across retries. | Expose internal candidate fields, face/person identity, camera credentials, file paths, Alert state, or regenerate identity during retry. |
+| Sense producer/evidence mapper | When Sense originates an event, apply the same original-identity rule; map its internal evidence record to a logical evidence reference and own later status resolution. | Put local path, RTSP URL, signed URL, credential or Outbox attempt ID into Event. |
+| Sense relay | Authenticate as a transport hop, preserve original `producer_id`, `source_event_id` and payload, retain retry/audit state outside the Event, and return Bell's response unchanged enough for deterministic retry handling. | Replace producer identity, create a new source ID, enrich/reorder semantics, or treat `409`/`422` as a transient retry. |
+| Bell consumer mapper | Validate before persistence; canonicalize; enforce permanent idempotency; map the immutable shared Event into Bell's private Event/Receipt and then independently evaluate rules to create an Alert. Unknown evidence becomes degraded evidence, not a rejected Event. | Persist arbitrary extension fields, import producer internals, or accept shared ack/close/notification/user state. |
+
+Field ownership is deliberately narrow:
+
+| Contract fields | Authoritative writer | Relay/Bell responsibility |
+|---|---|---|
+| `schema_version`, `producer_id`, `source_event_id` | Original Brain or Sense producer mapper | Relay preserves; Bell uses version gate and permanent idempotency key. |
+| `site_ref`, `device_ref`, `profile_ref` | Producer mapper from versioned logical configuration | Relay preserves; Bell treats as opaque external refs. |
+| `event_type`, `occurred_at`, `severity`, `rule`, `model`, `observation`, `region` | Brain/Sense mapper at the detection decision | Relay preserves; Bell validates and stores the immutable snapshot. |
+| `evidence[]` identity and initial status | Evidence-owning producer, normally Sense | Relay preserves; Bell stores the Event snapshot and resolves current metadata separately. |
+| `X-YoVision-Relay-ID` | Authenticated Sense transport hop | Bell audits transport metadata outside the immutable Event. |
+| `event_id`, `disposition`, `payload_sha256` | Bell ingest boundary | Producer/relay retain the receipt for deterministic retries. |
+
+## Errors, compatibility and fallback
+
+- `400 invalid_event`: schema, canonical form, or sensitive/unknown member violation. Terminal until the producer fixes the payload.
+- `409 idempotency_conflict`: same permanent key with a different payload. Terminal and audited; never overwrite the first Event.
+- `422 unsupported_schema_version`: unknown major/revision. Terminal for that payload.
+- Evidence `pending`, `processing`, `success` and `failed` are valid Event states. Bell keeps the Event and resolves/degrades evidence independently.
+
+v1 is closed (`additionalProperties=false`). Producers may enable a compatible revision only after all relays and Bell validate it. Any removed/renamed required field, changed meaning, enum narrowing, identity/canonicalization change, or new required member publishes a new major path such as `/v2`. During the compatibility window Bell keeps the previous version endpoint. Rollback disables the new producer version and resumes the last accepted version; it does not delete Event, Receipt, Outbox or audit facts.
+
+Unknown-version fallback is explicit: Bell returns `422`; relay records the terminal rejection without rewriting the payload; producer may remap the same internal candidate into a supported v1 payload only if it has not previously assigned that `(producer_id, source_event_id)` to a different canonical payload. Otherwise it must stop and require operator reconciliation.
+
+## Reproducible verification
+
+No third-party package is needed:
+
+```powershell
+python contracts/tests/events-v1/test_contract.py
+python contracts/tests/evidence-v1/test_contract.py
+```
+
+The tests validate Schema/OpenAPI references, mapper fixtures, RFC 8785-compatible canonical vectors used by v1 examples, duplicate/conflict behavior, unknown versions and sensitive-field rejection.

contracts/events/v1/event.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/events/v1/event.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision anonymous safety event v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": [
+    "schema_version", "producer_id", "source_event_id", "site_ref", "device_ref",
+    "profile_ref", "event_type", "occurred_at", "severity", "rule", "model",
+    "observation", "region", "evidence"
+  ],
+  "properties": {
+    "schema_version": {"const": "yovision.event/v1"},
+    "producer_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "source_event_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "site_ref": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "device_ref": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "profile_ref": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "event_type": {"enum": ["dangerous_area_entered", "directional_line_crossed"]},
+    "occurred_at": {"type": "string", "format": "date-time", "pattern": "^[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}T[0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2}\\.[0-9]{3}Z$"},
+    "severity": {"enum": ["low", "medium", "high", "critical"]},
+    "rule": {
+      "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["rule_id", "version"],
+      "properties": {
+        "rule_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+        "version": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 64}
+      }
+    },
+    "model": {
+      "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["name", "version"],
+      "properties": {
+        "name": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 128},
+        "version": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 64}
+      }
+    },
+    "observation": {
+      "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": ["track_id", "category", "confidence"],
+      "properties": {
+        "track_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+        "category": {"enum": ["person", "vehicle", "other"]},
+        "confidence": {"type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 1},
+        "bbox_normalized": {
+          "type": "array", "minItems": 4, "maxItems": 4,
+          "items": {"type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 1}
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "region": {
+      "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": ["region_id", "kind"],
+      "properties": {
+        "region_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+        "kind": {"enum": ["area", "line"]},
+        "crossing_direction": {"enum": ["a_to_b", "b_to_a"]}
+      },
+      "allOf": [
+        {"if": {"properties": {"kind": {"const": "line"}}, "required": ["kind"]}, "then": {"required": ["crossing_direction"]}},
+        {"if": {"properties": {"kind": {"const": "area"}}, "required": ["kind"]}, "then": {"not": {"required": ["crossing_direction"]}}}
+      ]
+    },
+    "evidence": {
+      "type": "array", "maxItems": 8, "uniqueItems": true,
+      "items": {"$ref": "../../evidence/v1/evidence-reference.schema.json"}
+    }
+  },
+  "allOf": [
+    {
+      "if": {"properties": {"event_type": {"const": "dangerous_area_entered"}}, "required": ["event_type"]},
+      "then": {"properties": {"region": {"properties": {"kind": {"const": "area"}}}}}
+    },
+    {
+      "if": {"properties": {"event_type": {"const": "directional_line_crossed"}}, "required": ["event_type"]},
+      "then": {"properties": {"region": {"properties": {"kind": {"const": "line"}}}}}
+    }
+  ]
+}

contracts/events/v1/examples/dangerous-area.json

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.event/v1",
+  "producer_id": "brain-school-a",
+  "source_event_id": "evt-area-20260831-0001",
+  "site_ref": "site-school-a",
+  "device_ref": "camera-east-gate",
+  "profile_ref": "profile-main-stream",
+  "event_type": "dangerous_area_entered",
+  "occurred_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z",
+  "severity": "high",
+  "rule": {"rule_id": "rule-east-danger", "version": "3"},
+  "model": {"name": "anonymous-detector", "version": "2026.08"},
+  "observation": {"track_id": "track-0042", "category": "person", "confidence": 0.93, "bbox_normalized": [0.12, 0.2, 0.31, 0.74]},
+  "region": {"region_id": "region-east-danger", "kind": "area"},
+  "evidence": [
+    {
+      "schema_version": "yovision.evidence-reference/v1",
+      "evidence_id": "ev-school-east-0001",
+      "owner_id": "sense-school-a",
+      "type": "snapshot",
+      "status": "pending",
+      "captured_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z",
+      "status_updated_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z"
+    }
+  ]
+}

contracts/events/v1/examples/directional-line-crossed.json

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.event/v1",
+  "producer_id": "brain-school-a",
+  "source_event_id": "evt-line-20260831-0002",
+  "site_ref": "site-school-a",
+  "device_ref": "camera-north-corridor",
+  "profile_ref": "profile-main-stream",
+  "event_type": "directional_line_crossed",
+  "occurred_at": "2026-08-31T00:03:10.000Z",
+  "severity": "medium",
+  "rule": {"rule_id": "rule-north-one-way", "version": "1"},
+  "model": {"name": "anonymous-detector", "version": "2026.08"},
+  "observation": {"track_id": "track-0088", "category": "person", "confidence": 0.88},
+  "region": {"region_id": "line-north-one-way", "kind": "line", "crossing_direction": "b_to_a"},
+  "evidence": [
+    {
+      "schema_version": "yovision.evidence-reference/v1",
+      "evidence_id": "ev-school-east-0002",
+      "owner_id": "sense-school-a",
+      "type": "clip",
+      "status": "failed",
+      "captured_at": "2026-08-31T00:03:10.000Z",
+      "status_updated_at": "2026-08-31T00:03:13.100Z",
+      "failure": {"code": "processing_failed", "retryable": true}
+    }
+  ]
+}

contracts/events/v1/examples/duplicate-result.json

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{
+  "event_id": "bell-event-00000042",
+  "producer_id": "brain-school-a",
+  "source_event_id": "evt-area-20260831-0001",
+  "disposition": "duplicate",
+  "payload_sha256": "4cc1e93820195caf713ea675ff33f178c9d4997dd8a81cb61287e9fea0e3d5e1"
+}

contracts/events/v1/examples/idempotency-conflict-problem.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "code": "idempotency_conflict",
+  "message": "idempotency key already belongs to another canonical payload",
+  "existing_event_id": "bell-event-00000042"
+}

contracts/events/v1/examples/unsupported-version-problem.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "code": "unsupported_schema_version",
+  "message": "schema_version yovision.event/v2 is not accepted",
+  "field": "schema_version"
+}

contracts/events/v1/ingest-result.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/events/v1/ingest-result.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision Bell event ingest result v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": ["event_id", "producer_id", "source_event_id", "disposition", "payload_sha256"],
+  "properties": {
+    "event_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "producer_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "source_event_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "disposition": {"enum": ["created", "duplicate"]},
+    "payload_sha256": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-f0-9]{64}$"}
+  }
+}

contracts/events/v1/openapi.json

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+{
+  "openapi": "3.1.0",
+  "info": {"title": "YoVision standard event ingest API", "version": "1.0.0"},
+  "paths": {
+    "/v1/events": {
+      "post": {
+        "summary": "Ingest one immutable anonymous safety event",
+        "parameters": [
+          {"name": "X-YoVision-Relay-ID", "in": "header", "required": false, "description": "Audited transport hop. A relay must not change producer_id or source_event_id.", "schema": {"type": "string", "maxLength": 128}}
+        ],
+        "requestBody": {"required": true, "content": {"application/json": {"schema": {"$ref": "./event.schema.json"}}}},
+        "responses": {
+          "201": {"description": "Created", "content": {"application/json": {"schema": {"$ref": "./ingest-result.schema.json"}}}},
+          "200": {"description": "Exact duplicate; returns the original Bell Event identity", "content": {"application/json": {"schema": {"$ref": "./ingest-result.schema.json"}}}},
+          "400": {"description": "Invalid or sensitive payload", "content": {"application/problem+json": {"schema": {"$ref": "./problem.schema.json"}}}},
+          "409": {"description": "Same idempotency key with a different canonical payload", "content": {"application/problem+json": {"schema": {"$ref": "./problem.schema.json"}}}},
+          "422": {"description": "Unsupported schema major version", "content": {"application/problem+json": {"schema": {"$ref": "./problem.schema.json"}}}}
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

contracts/events/v1/problem.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/events/v1/problem.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision contract problem v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": ["code", "message"],
+  "properties": {
+    "code": {"enum": ["invalid_event", "unsupported_schema_version", "idempotency_conflict", "evidence_not_found", "evidence_expired"]},
+    "message": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 512},
+    "field": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9_.\\[\\]-]{1,128}$"},
+    "existing_event_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"}
+  }
+}

contracts/evidence/v1/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# Evidence reference contract v1
+
+This contract shares metadata about a logical evidence object. It never grants object access. `owner_id` identifies the service that owns resolution; `evidence_id` is opaque to every consumer. Neither field may be interpreted as a URL or local path.
+
+## State and degradation
+
+- `pending`: capture was accepted but no processing started.
+- `processing`: capture or encoding is in progress.
+- `success`: capture completed; `content_type` and SHA-256 `integrity` are required. Access authorization is negotiated outside this payload by the machine-identity/connector work.
+- `failed`: `failure.code` and `retryable` are required. Bell keeps the immutable Event and renders evidence unavailable; it must not reject or close the Alert because evidence failed.
+- HTTP `404` means an unknown logical reference. `410` means expired evidence. Both degrade evidence only, not the Event.
+
+The payload forbids arbitrary properties, so filesystem paths, camera credentials, bearer/user tokens, signed URLs, face templates and notification/Alert state fail schema validation. Do not add access URLs to v1. A short-lived download grant, if later required, needs a separately reviewed endpoint and security contract.
+
+## Ownership
+
+- Brain may request evidence but maps only logical metadata it actually knows.
+- Sense is the default evidence owner and advances the status monotonically for a given capture attempt: `pending -> processing -> success|failed`. It must retain the same `evidence_id` while status changes.
+- A relay transports the reference unchanged and must not resolve it into a path or URL.
+- Bell stores the latest evidence metadata separately from its immutable Event. Evidence failure/expiry never changes Alert ack/close state.
+
+## Compatibility and rollback
+
+v1 consumers ignore no unknown fields because the v1 schema is closed. Additive fields therefore require a new schema revision that producers enable only after consumers accept it. Changed meaning, removed fields, or new required fields require `/v2`. Rollback disables the new producer and continues resolving stored v1 references; it never deletes Event, Receipt, Outbox, or evidence audit facts.
+
+Run the standalone contract check from the repository root:
+
+```powershell
+python contracts/tests/evidence-v1/test_contract.py
+```

contracts/evidence/v1/evidence-reference.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/evidence/v1/evidence-reference.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision evidence logical reference v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": [
+    "schema_version",
+    "evidence_id",
+    "owner_id",
+    "type",
+    "status",
+    "captured_at",
+    "status_updated_at"
+  ],
+  "properties": {
+    "schema_version": {"const": "yovision.evidence-reference/v1"},
+    "evidence_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "owner_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
+    "type": {"enum": ["snapshot", "clip"]},
+    "status": {"enum": ["pending", "processing", "success", "failed"]},
+    "captured_at": {"type": "string", "format": "date-time"},
+    "status_updated_at": {"type": "string", "format": "date-time"},
+    "expires_at": {"type": "string", "format": "date-time"},
+    "content_type": {"enum": ["image/jpeg", "image/png", "video/mp4"]},
+    "integrity": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": ["algorithm", "digest", "size_bytes"],
+      "properties": {
+        "algorithm": {"const": "sha256"},
+        "digest": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-f0-9]{64}$"},
+        "size_bytes": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 0}
+      }
+    },
+    "failure": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": ["code", "retryable"],
+      "properties": {
+        "code": {"enum": ["capture_failed", "processing_failed", "expired", "unavailable"]},
+        "retryable": {"type": "boolean"}
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "allOf": [
+    {
+      "if": {"properties": {"status": {"const": "success"}}, "required": ["status"]},
+      "then": {"required": ["content_type", "integrity"], "not": {"required": ["failure"]}}
+    },
+    {
+      "if": {"properties": {"status": {"const": "failed"}}, "required": ["status"]},
+      "then": {"required": ["failure"], "not": {"anyOf": [{"required": ["content_type"]}, {"required": ["integrity"]}]}}
+    },
+    {
+      "if": {"properties": {"status": {"enum": ["pending", "processing"]}}, "required": ["status"]},
+      "then": {"not": {"anyOf": [{"required": ["content_type"]}, {"required": ["integrity"]}, {"required": ["failure"]}]}}
+    }
+  ]
+}

contracts/evidence/v1/examples/failed.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.evidence-reference/v1",
+  "evidence_id": "ev-school-east-0002",
+  "owner_id": "sense-school-a",
+  "type": "clip",
+  "status": "failed",
+  "captured_at": "2026-08-31T00:03:10.000Z",
+  "status_updated_at": "2026-08-31T00:03:13.100Z",
+  "failure": {"code": "processing_failed", "retryable": true}
+}

contracts/evidence/v1/examples/pending.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.evidence-reference/v1",
+  "evidence_id": "ev-school-east-0001",
+  "owner_id": "sense-school-a",
+  "type": "snapshot",
+  "status": "pending",
+  "captured_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z",
+  "status_updated_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z"
+}

contracts/evidence/v1/examples/success.json

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.evidence-reference/v1",
+  "evidence_id": "ev-school-east-0001",
+  "owner_id": "sense-school-a",
+  "type": "snapshot",
+  "status": "success",
+  "captured_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z",
+  "status_updated_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:02.450Z",
+  "expires_at": "2026-09-07T00:00:01.125Z",
+  "content_type": "image/jpeg",
+  "integrity": {
+    "algorithm": "sha256",
+    "digest": "2f77668a9dfbf8d5848b9e6d7da867800b7b6790625f16b45a101f1ca1f7da75",
+    "size_bytes": 48215
+  }
+}

contracts/evidence/v1/openapi.json

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+{
+  "openapi": "3.1.0",
+  "info": {"title": "YoVision evidence reference API", "version": "1.0.0"},
+  "paths": {
+    "/v1/evidence/{evidence_id}": {
+      "get": {
+        "summary": "Resolve current metadata for a logical evidence reference",
+        "parameters": [
+          {"name": "evidence_id", "in": "path", "required": true, "schema": {"type": "string"}}
+        ],
+        "responses": {
+          "200": {"description": "Current metadata, including pending, processing, success or failed states", "content": {"application/json": {"schema": {"$ref": "./evidence-reference.schema.json"}}}},
+          "404": {"description": "Unknown logical reference", "content": {"application/problem+json": {"schema": {"$ref": "../../events/v1/problem.schema.json"}}}},
+          "410": {"description": "Evidence expired; event remains valid", "content": {"application/problem+json": {"schema": {"$ref": "../../events/v1/problem.schema.json"}}}}
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

contracts/machine-identity/v1/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# Machine identity contract v1
+
+`yovision.machine-identity/v1` defines service-to-service identity for YoVision connectors. It is deliberately separate from Sense and Bell users, GoAdmin JWT/Cookie state, database roles and operating-system accounts.
+
+## Authentication mechanism
+
+Every request uses HTTPS and one compact Ed25519 JWS in `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. The protected header is closed and contains `alg=EdDSA`, `typ=YOVISION-MACHINE+JWT`, `kid` and `ver=yovision.machine-identity/v1`. The closed claims object contains:
+
+mTLS is not the primary v1 identity mechanism. A customer PKI may add mTLS later as transport hardening, but it cannot replace or weaken the v1 principal, audience, scope, request binding, replay and revocation checks.
+
+- one instance-specific `iss`/`sub` principal;
+- one exact service `aud`;
+- the minimum required `scope` values;
+- `iat`, `nbf`, `exp` and a single-use random `jti`;
+- uppercase HTTP method `htm`, normalized absolute-path reference `htu`, and lowercase SHA-256 `body_sha256`.
+
+Tokens live for at most 300 seconds. Consumers allow at most 30 seconds of clock skew, verify the signature and active key/principal before authorization, then atomically consume `jti` until `exp + skew`. Retrying transport creates a new token and `jti`; business idempotency keys remain unchanged.
+
+Production consumers persist the replay key `(principal, jti)` in their own durable store so a process restart cannot reopen the replay window. The checked-in process-local replay stores are adapter test/default primitives only; connector tasks must inject an atomic durable implementation and test restart behavior without sharing a database across products.
+
+The v1 scopes are:
+
+| Caller | Audience | Scope |
+|---|---|---|
+| Sense | `yovision-brain` | `source-config:write` |
+| Brain | `yovision-sense` | `runtime-status:write` |
+| Brain or Sense | `yovision-bell` | `events:ingest` |
+| Bell | `yovision-sense` | `evidence:read` |
+
+No wildcard audience or scope exists. A relay authenticates as its own transport principal and never replaces the original event producer identity.
+
+## Key lifecycle
+
+Private Ed25519 keys are generated per product instance and stored outside the repository in an OS-protected file or secret store. Runtime configuration contains only the private-key path. Public registries are local consumer configuration, not a shared database.
+
+Rotation first registers a new `kid`, switches the caller, and removes the old key after an overlap no longer than 24 hours. A disabled principal or revoked `kid` is rejected on every request, including tokens that have not expired. Emergency rollback disables the connector; it never enables a shared password, browser token, query token, plaintext transport or signature bypass.
+
+## Threat boundary
+
+v1 protects against token modification, wrong audience/scope, expired or premature tokens, captured-token replay, key/principal revocation and accidental credential mixing. It does not protect a host after administrator/root compromise, a stolen usable private key before revocation, compromised TLS trust roots, endpoint implementation flaws or denial of service. Rate and body-size limits remain consumer responsibilities.
+
+See `../transport/v1/README.md` for HTTPS and request policy. Stable failures are defined in `errors.md`; callers and logs must expose only the stable code, principal/kid when already authenticated, and correlation ID—never the token, signature, private/public key material or complete Authorization header.
+
+## Compatibility
+
+v1 is closed. New optional claims require all consumers to accept them before producers emit them. Any change to signing input, algorithm, claim meaning, replay semantics, maximum lifetime, audience or scope meaning publishes a new major version. Consumers keep the last accepted major during a controlled migration; rollback disables the new producer version without weakening verification.
+
+## Reproducible verification
+
+From the repository root:
+
+```powershell
+pwsh -NoProfile -File contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/run.ps1
+
+cd Sense/server
+go test -race ./app/sense/integration/machine_identity
+
+cd ../../Bell/server
+go test -race ./app/bell/integration/machine_identity
+```
+
+The isolated contract test validates both JSON Schemas, the fixed Go/Python Ed25519 vector, request binding, exact audience/scope, expiry, replay, rotation overlap, revocation, bearer-only extraction and verified TLS policy. Product connector tasks remain responsible for injecting a durable replay store and testing restart recovery.

contracts/machine-identity/v1/errors.md

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Machine identity v1 stable errors
+
+| Code | Meaning | Retry |
+|---|---|---|
+| `machine_token_missing` | Authorization bearer token is absent or malformed | No, fix request |
+| `machine_token_invalid` | Header, claims, signature, request binding or key is invalid | No |
+| `machine_token_expired` | Token is outside its accepted time window | Mint a new token |
+| `machine_audience_denied` | Exact audience does not match | No |
+| `machine_scope_denied` | Required scope is absent or not granted to the key | No |
+| `machine_identity_revoked` | Principal or key is disabled/revoked | No; operator action |
+| `machine_token_replayed` | The same principal/jti was already accepted | Retry with a new token and the same business idempotency key |
+| `machine_transport_required` | HTTPS policy is not satisfied | No; fix deployment |
+
+Responses and audit facts never include the token, signature, key material or Authorization header.

contracts/machine-identity/v1/machine-token.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/machine-identity/v1/machine-token.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision machine token claims v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": ["ver", "iss", "sub", "aud", "scope", "iat", "nbf", "exp", "jti", "htm", "htu", "body_sha256"],
+  "properties": {
+    "ver": {"const": "yovision.machine-identity/v1"},
+    "iss": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$"},
+    "sub": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$"},
+    "aud": {"enum": ["yovision-sense", "yovision-brain", "yovision-bell"]},
+    "scope": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "minItems": 1,
+      "maxItems": 4,
+      "uniqueItems": true,
+      "items": {"enum": ["source-config:write", "runtime-status:write", "events:ingest", "evidence:read"]}
+    },
+    "iat": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 0},
+    "nbf": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 0},
+    "exp": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 0},
+    "jti": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,64}$"},
+    "htm": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^(GET|POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)$"},
+    "htu": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^/[A-Za-z0-9._~!$&'()*+,;=:@%/-]*$"},
+    "body_sha256": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-f0-9]{64}$"}
+  }
+}

contracts/machine-identity/v1/principal-registry.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/machine-identity/v1/principal-registry.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision machine principal registry v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": ["version", "audience", "principals"],
+  "properties": {
+    "version": {"const": "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1"},
+    "audience": {"enum": ["yovision-sense", "yovision-brain", "yovision-bell"]},
+    "principals": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "items": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "additionalProperties": false,
+        "required": ["principal_id", "enabled", "keys"],
+        "properties": {
+          "principal_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^yv:(sense|brain|bell):[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,62}$"},
+          "enabled": {"type": "boolean"},
+          "keys": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "items": {
+              "type": "object",
+              "additionalProperties": false,
+              "required": ["kid", "public_key_base64url", "status", "scopes"],
+              "properties": {
+                "kid": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$"},
+                "public_key_base64url": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$"},
+                "status": {"enum": ["active", "revoked"]},
+                "scopes": {"type": "array", "minItems": 1, "maxItems": 4, "uniqueItems": true, "items": {"enum": ["source-config:write", "runtime-status:write", "events:ingest", "evidence:read"]}}
+              }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

contracts/tests/events-v1/contract_support.py

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+"""Small dependency-free validator for the JSON Schema keywords used by v1 contracts."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import math
+import re
+from datetime import datetime
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+
+def load_json(path: Path) -> Any:
+    return json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+
+
+def canonical_bytes(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    """Canonical bytes for checked-in JCS vectors (all vector numbers are JCS-safe)."""
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), allow_nan=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def validate(instance: Any, schema: dict[str, Any], schema_path: Path, location: str = "$") -> list[str]:
+    if "$ref" in schema:
+        ref = schema["$ref"]
+        if ref.startswith("#"):
+            return [f"{location}: local fragments are not supported by the contract checker"]
+        target = (schema_path.parent / ref).resolve()
+        return validate(instance, load_json(target), target, location)
+
+    errors: list[str] = []
+    for subschema in schema.get("allOf", []):
+        errors.extend(validate(instance, subschema, schema_path, location))
+    if "anyOf" in schema and not any(not validate(instance, item, schema_path, location) for item in schema["anyOf"]):
+        errors.append(f"{location}: does not match anyOf")
+    if "not" in schema and not validate(instance, schema["not"], schema_path, location):
+        errors.append(f"{location}: matches forbidden schema")
+    if "if" in schema and not validate(instance, schema["if"], schema_path, location):
+        errors.extend(validate(instance, schema.get("then", {}), schema_path, location))
+
+    expected = schema.get("type")
+    type_ok = {
+        "object": lambda x: isinstance(x, dict),
+        "array": lambda x: isinstance(x, list),
+        "string": lambda x: isinstance(x, str),
+        "integer": lambda x: isinstance(x, int) and not isinstance(x, bool),
+        "number": lambda x: isinstance(x, (int, float)) and not isinstance(x, bool) and math.isfinite(x),
+        "boolean": lambda x: isinstance(x, bool),
+    }
+    if expected and (expected not in type_ok or not type_ok[expected](instance)):
+        return errors + [f"{location}: expected {expected}"]
+    if "const" in schema and instance != schema["const"]:
+        errors.append(f"{location}: expected constant {schema['const']!r}")
+    if "enum" in schema and instance not in schema["enum"]:
+        errors.append(f"{location}: value not in enum")
+
+    if isinstance(instance, dict):
+        required = schema.get("required", [])
+        errors.extend(f"{location}: missing {name}" for name in required if name not in instance)
+        properties = schema.get("properties", {})
+        if schema.get("additionalProperties") is False:
+            errors.extend(f"{location}: unknown property {name}" for name in instance if name not in properties)
+        for name, value in instance.items():
+            if name in properties:
+                errors.extend(validate(value, properties[name], schema_path, f"{location}.{name}"))
+    elif isinstance(instance, list):
+        if len(instance) < schema.get("minItems", 0):
+            errors.append(f"{location}: too few items")
+        if "maxItems" in schema and len(instance) > schema["maxItems"]:
+            errors.append(f"{location}: too many items")
+        if schema.get("uniqueItems") and len({canonical_bytes(item) for item in instance}) != len(instance):
+            errors.append(f"{location}: duplicate items")
+        for index, value in enumerate(instance):
+            errors.extend(validate(value, schema.get("items", {}), schema_path, f"{location}[{index}]"))
+    elif isinstance(instance, str):
+        if len(instance) < schema.get("minLength", 0):
+            errors.append(f"{location}: string too short")
+        if "maxLength" in schema and len(instance) > schema["maxLength"]:
+            errors.append(f"{location}: string too long")
+        if "pattern" in schema and re.fullmatch(schema["pattern"], instance) is None:
+            errors.append(f"{location}: pattern mismatch")
+        if schema.get("format") == "date-time":
+            try:
+                datetime.fromisoformat(instance.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+            except ValueError:
+                errors.append(f"{location}: invalid date-time")
+    elif isinstance(instance, (int, float)) and not isinstance(instance, bool):
+        if "minimum" in schema and instance < schema["minimum"]:
+            errors.append(f"{location}: below minimum")
+        if "maximum" in schema and instance > schema["maximum"]:
+            errors.append(f"{location}: above maximum")
+    return errors

contracts/tests/events-v1/fixtures/sensitive-field.json

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.event/v1",
+  "producer_id": "brain-school-a",
+  "source_event_id": "evt-sensitive-0001",
+  "site_ref": "site-school-a",
+  "device_ref": "camera-east-gate",
+  "profile_ref": "profile-main-stream",
+  "event_type": "dangerous_area_entered",
+  "occurred_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z",
+  "severity": "high",
+  "rule": {"rule_id": "rule-east-danger", "version": "3"},
+  "model": {"name": "anonymous-detector", "version": "2026.08"},
+  "observation": {"track_id": "track-0042", "category": "person", "confidence": 0.93, "face_feature": "forbidden"},
+  "region": {"region_id": "region-east-danger", "kind": "area"},
+  "evidence": [],
+  "camera_password": "forbidden"
+}

contracts/tests/events-v1/fixtures/unknown-version.json

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.event/v2",
+  "producer_id": "brain-school-a",
+  "source_event_id": "evt-unknown-version-0001",
+  "site_ref": "site-school-a",
+  "device_ref": "camera-east-gate",
+  "profile_ref": "profile-main-stream",
+  "event_type": "dangerous_area_entered",
+  "occurred_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z",
+  "severity": "high",
+  "rule": {"rule_id": "rule-east-danger", "version": "3"},
+  "model": {"name": "anonymous-detector", "version": "2026.08"},
+  "observation": {"track_id": "track-0042", "category": "person", "confidence": 0.93},
+  "region": {"region_id": "region-east-danger", "kind": "area"},
+  "evidence": []
+}

contracts/tests/events-v1/idempotency-vectors.json

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "algorithm": "RFC8785-JCS+SHA-256",
+  "vectors": [
+    {
+      "name": "dangerous-area-original-and-reordered-duplicate",
+      "fixture": "../../events/v1/examples/dangerous-area.json",
+      "idempotency_key": ["brain-school-a", "evt-area-20260831-0001"],
+      "payload_sha256": "4cc1e93820195caf713ea675ff33f178c9d4997dd8a81cb61287e9fea0e3d5e1",
+      "conflict_patch": {"severity": "critical"},
+      "conflict_payload_sha256": "7076771f7827d97ef45831ae221046b8cb347f152dd222c2edd6f14a58e173b2"
+    }
+  ]
+}

contracts/tests/events-v1/test_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import copy
+import hashlib
+import sys
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+CONTRACTS = HERE.parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(HERE))
+
+from contract_support import canonical_bytes, load_json, validate  # noqa: E402
+
+
+class EventV1ContractTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    schema_path = CONTRACTS / "events" / "v1" / "event.schema.json"
+    schema = load_json(schema_path)
+
+    def assert_valid(self, payload: object) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual([], validate(payload, self.schema, self.schema_path))
+
+    def test_anonymous_area_and_line_examples_are_valid(self) -> None:
+        for name in ("dangerous-area.json", "directional-line-crossed.json"):
+            with self.subTest(name=name):
+                self.assert_valid(load_json(CONTRACTS / "events" / "v1" / "examples" / name))
+
+    def test_idempotency_vector_duplicate_and_conflict(self) -> None:
+        vectors = load_json(HERE / "idempotency-vectors.json")["vectors"]
+        for vector in vectors:
+            payload = load_json((HERE / vector["fixture"]).resolve())
+            self.assertEqual(vector["idempotency_key"], [payload["producer_id"], payload["source_event_id"]])
+            digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_bytes(payload)).hexdigest()
+            self.assertEqual(vector["payload_sha256"], digest)
+            reordered = dict(reversed(list(payload.items())))
+            self.assertEqual(digest, hashlib.sha256(canonical_bytes(reordered)).hexdigest())
+            conflict = copy.deepcopy(payload)
+            conflict.update(vector["conflict_patch"])
+            conflict_digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_bytes(conflict)).hexdigest()
+            self.assertEqual(vector["conflict_payload_sha256"], conflict_digest)
+            self.assertNotEqual(digest, conflict_digest)
+
+    def test_unknown_version_is_rejected(self) -> None:
+        payload = load_json(HERE / "fixtures" / "unknown-version.json")
+        self.assertTrue(validate(payload, self.schema, self.schema_path))
+
+    def test_brain_producer_sense_relay_and_bell_consumer_fixture(self) -> None:
+        produced = load_json(CONTRACTS / "events" / "v1" / "examples" / "dangerous-area.json")
+        self.assert_valid(produced)
+        relayed = copy.deepcopy(produced)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            (produced["producer_id"], produced["source_event_id"]),
+            (relayed["producer_id"], relayed["source_event_id"]),
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(canonical_bytes(produced), canonical_bytes(relayed))
+        bell_allowed = set(self.schema["properties"])
+        self.assertEqual(set(produced), bell_allowed)
+        self.assertNotIn("alert", produced)
+        self.assertNotIn("receipt", produced)
+
+    def test_sensitive_and_internal_fields_are_rejected(self) -> None:
+        payload = load_json(HERE / "fixtures" / "sensitive-field.json")
+        errors = validate(payload, self.schema, self.schema_path)
+        self.assertTrue(any("camera_password" in error for error in errors))
+        self.assertTrue(any("face_feature" in error for error in errors))
+        base = load_json(CONTRACTS / "events" / "v1" / "examples" / "dangerous-area.json")
+        for forbidden, value in {
+            "user_token": "forbidden", "ack_state": "acked", "local_path": "C:/forbidden",
+            "signed_url": "https://forbidden.invalid/object?signature=forbidden"
+        }.items():
+            with self.subTest(forbidden=forbidden):
+                candidate = copy.deepcopy(base)
+                candidate[forbidden] = value
+                self.assertTrue(validate(candidate, self.schema, self.schema_path))
+
+    def test_openapi_references_exist_and_responses_are_explicit(self) -> None:
+        path = CONTRACTS / "events" / "v1" / "openapi.json"
+        spec = load_json(path)
+        operation = spec["paths"]["/v1/events"]["post"]
+        self.assertEqual({"200", "201", "400", "409", "422"}, set(operation["responses"]))
+        refs: list[str] = []
+
+        def collect(value: object) -> None:
+            if isinstance(value, dict):
+                refs.extend(item for key, item in value.items() if key == "$ref")
+                for item in value.values(): collect(item)
+            elif isinstance(value, list):
+                for item in value: collect(item)
+
+        collect(spec)
+        self.assertTrue(refs)
+        for ref in refs:
+            self.assertTrue((path.parent / ref).resolve().is_file(), ref)
+
+    def test_duplicate_conflict_and_unknown_version_response_examples(self) -> None:
+        directory = CONTRACTS / "events" / "v1"
+        cases = (
+            ("duplicate-result.json", "ingest-result.schema.json"),
+            ("idempotency-conflict-problem.json", "problem.schema.json"),
+            ("unsupported-version-problem.json", "problem.schema.json"),
+        )
+        for fixture_name, schema_name in cases:
+            with self.subTest(fixture=fixture_name):
+                schema_path = directory / schema_name
+                errors = validate(load_json(directory / "examples" / fixture_name), load_json(schema_path), schema_path)
+                self.assertEqual([], errors)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main(verbosity=2)

contracts/tests/evidence-v1/fixtures/sensitive-field.json

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "yovision.evidence-reference/v1",
+  "evidence_id": "ev-sensitive-0001",
+  "owner_id": "sense-school-a",
+  "type": "snapshot",
+  "status": "success",
+  "captured_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:01.125Z",
+  "status_updated_at": "2026-08-31T00:00:02.450Z",
+  "content_type": "image/jpeg",
+  "integrity": {"algorithm": "sha256", "digest": "2f77668a9dfbf8d5848b9e6d7da867800b7b6790625f16b45a101f1ca1f7da75", "size_bytes": 48215},
+  "local_path": "forbidden"
+}

contracts/tests/evidence-v1/test_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import copy
+import sys
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+CONTRACTS = HERE.parents[1]
+EVENT_SUPPORT = HERE.parent / "events-v1"
+sys.path.insert(0, str(EVENT_SUPPORT))
+
+from contract_support import load_json, validate  # noqa: E402
+
+
+class EvidenceV1ContractTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    schema_path = CONTRACTS / "evidence" / "v1" / "evidence-reference.schema.json"
+    schema = load_json(schema_path)
+
+    def errors_for(self, payload: object) -> list[str]:
+        return validate(payload, self.schema, self.schema_path)
+
+    def test_pending_success_and_failed_examples_are_valid(self) -> None:
+        for name in ("pending.json", "success.json", "failed.json"):
+            with self.subTest(name=name):
+                payload = load_json(CONTRACTS / "evidence" / "v1" / "examples" / name)
+                self.assertEqual([], self.errors_for(payload))
+
+    def test_state_specific_metadata_is_enforced(self) -> None:
+        success = load_json(CONTRACTS / "evidence" / "v1" / "examples" / "success.json")
+        for required in ("content_type", "integrity"):
+            with self.subTest(success_requires=required):
+                candidate = copy.deepcopy(success)
+                del candidate[required]
+                self.assertTrue(self.errors_for(candidate))
+
+        legacy_available = copy.deepcopy(success)
+        legacy_available["status"] = "available"
+        self.assertTrue(self.errors_for(legacy_available))
+
+        failed = load_json(CONTRACTS / "evidence" / "v1" / "examples" / "failed.json")
+        del failed["failure"]
+        self.assertTrue(self.errors_for(failed))
+
+        pending = load_json(CONTRACTS / "evidence" / "v1" / "examples" / "pending.json")
+        pending["content_type"] = "image/jpeg"
+        self.assertTrue(self.errors_for(pending))
+
+    def test_sensitive_access_material_and_unknown_version_are_rejected(self) -> None:
+        fixture = load_json(HERE / "fixtures" / "sensitive-field.json")
+        self.assertTrue(any("local_path" in error for error in self.errors_for(fixture)))
+        base = load_json(CONTRACTS / "evidence" / "v1" / "examples" / "pending.json")
+        for forbidden, value in {
+            "camera_password": "forbidden",
+            "user_token": "forbidden",
+            "signed_url": "https://forbidden.invalid/object?signature=forbidden",
+            "face_feature": "forbidden",
+            "alert_state": "acked"
+        }.items():
+            with self.subTest(forbidden=forbidden):
+                candidate = copy.deepcopy(base)
+                candidate[forbidden] = value
+                self.assertTrue(self.errors_for(candidate))
+        unknown = copy.deepcopy(base)
+        unknown["schema_version"] = "yovision.evidence-reference/v2"
+        self.assertTrue(self.errors_for(unknown))
+
+    def test_openapi_refs_and_degradation_responses(self) -> None:
+        path = CONTRACTS / "evidence" / "v1" / "openapi.json"
+        spec = load_json(path)
+        operation = spec["paths"]["/v1/evidence/{evidence_id}"]["get"]
+        self.assertEqual({"200", "404", "410"}, set(operation["responses"]))
+        refs: list[str] = []
+
+        def collect(value: object) -> None:
+            if isinstance(value, dict):
+                refs.extend(item for key, item in value.items() if key == "$ref")
+                for item in value.values(): collect(item)
+            elif isinstance(value, list):
+                for item in value: collect(item)
+
+        collect(spec)
+        for ref in refs:
+            self.assertTrue((path.parent / ref).resolve().is_file(), ref)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main(verbosity=2)

contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/cross-language-vector.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "version": "yovision.machine-token-vector/v1",
+  "public_key_base64url": "ebVWLo_mVPlAeLES6KmLp5AfhTrmlb7X4OORC60ElmQ",
+  "token": "eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIsImtpZCI6ImJyYWluLXZlY3Rvci0wMDAxIiwidHlwIjoiWU9WSVNJT04tTUFDSElORStKV1QiLCJ2ZXIiOiJ5b3Zpc2lvbi5tYWNoaW5lLWlkZW50aXR5L3YxIn0.eyJhdWQiOiJ5b3Zpc2lvbi1zZW5zZSIsImJvZHlfc2hhMjU2IjoiNDA5NDQzYTZlZTVhYTI5NmRjY2Q2YzBkMTkzZTIxNDU2OGRhYTAwNTNiNjYxNTVmYmE4YWRjYTk5NWI3ODIzZCIsImV4cCI6MTgwMDAwMDMwMCwiaHRtIjoiUE9TVCIsImh0dSI6Ii9tYWNoaW5lL3YxL3J1bnRpbWUtc3RhdHVzIiwiaWF0IjoxODAwMDAwMDAwLCJpc3MiOiJ5djpicmFpbjp2ZWN0b3IiLCJqdGkiOiJBUUlEQkFVR0J3Z0pDZ3NNRFE0UEVBIiwibmJmIjoxODAwMDAwMDAwLCJzY29wZSI6WyJydW50aW1lLXN0YXR1czp3cml0ZSJdLCJzdWIiOiJ5djpicmFpbjp2ZWN0b3IiLCJ2ZXIiOiJ5b3Zpc2lvbi5tYWNoaW5lLWlkZW50aXR5L3YxIn0.zrvo_7lRiDX1D6po6OlfQg4hDg6XXlyUEmNMYgpuRl3ArXSjvGuOLivDousIyLtRO4bYJu9xMAWX1cea7MdVBQ",
+  "now": 1800000000,
+  "audience": "yovision-sense",
+  "required_scope": "runtime-status:write",
+  "method": "POST",
+  "path": "/machine/v1/runtime-status",
+  "body_base64": "eyJzdGF0dXMiOiJydW5uaW5nIn0="
+}

contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/requirements.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+cryptography==50.0.1
+jsonschema==4.25.1

contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/run.ps1

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+[CmdletBinding()]
+param()
+
+$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
+$testDirectory = $PSScriptRoot
+$requirements = Join-Path $testDirectory 'requirements.txt'
+$tempRoot = [IO.Path]::GetFullPath([IO.Path]::GetTempPath())
+$workDirectory = Join-Path $tempRoot ("yovision-machine-identity-v1-{0}" -f [Guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N'))
+
+try {
+    New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $workDirectory | Out-Null
+    $virtualEnvironment = Join-Path $workDirectory '.venv'
+    python -m venv $virtualEnvironment
+    if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'Failed to create the isolated Python environment.' }
+
+    $python = Join-Path $virtualEnvironment 'Scripts\python.exe'
+    $env:PIP_DISABLE_PIP_VERSION_CHECK = '1'
+    $env:PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE = '1'
+    & $python -m pip install --quiet --requirement $requirements
+    if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'Failed to install pinned machine-identity test dependencies.' }
+
+    & $python $testDirectory\test_contract.py
+    if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'Machine-identity v1 contract tests failed.' }
+}
+finally {
+    $resolvedWorkDirectory = [IO.Path]::GetFullPath($workDirectory)
+    if (-not $resolvedWorkDirectory.StartsWith($tempRoot, [StringComparison]::OrdinalIgnoreCase)) {
+        throw "Refusing to remove a temporary directory outside $tempRoot"
+    }
+    if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $resolvedWorkDirectory) {
+        Remove-Item -LiteralPath $resolvedWorkDirectory -Recurse -Force
+    }
+}

contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/test_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import base64
+import ssl
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "Brain" / "src"))
+
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
+from jsonschema import Draft202012Validator
+
+from yovision_brain.integration.machine_identity import (
+    KeyRecord,
+    MachineIdentityError,
+    Registry,
+    ReplayStore,
+    Signer,
+    TransportPolicy,
+    Verifier,
+    load_registry,
+    bearer_token,
+)
+
+
+class ContractFilesTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_closed_claim_and_registry_schemas(self) -> None:
+        claims = json.loads((ROOT / "contracts/machine-identity/v1/machine-token.schema.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        registry = json.loads((ROOT / "contracts/machine-identity/v1/principal-registry.schema.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        transport = json.loads((ROOT / "contracts/transport/v1/transport-policy.schema.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        Draft202012Validator.check_schema(claims)
+        Draft202012Validator.check_schema(registry)
+        Draft202012Validator.check_schema(transport)
+        self.assertFalse(claims["additionalProperties"])
+        self.assertEqual(claims["properties"]["ver"]["const"], "yovision.machine-identity/v1")
+        self.assertEqual(claims["properties"]["scope"]["items"]["enum"], [
+            "source-config:write", "runtime-status:write", "events:ingest", "evidence:read"
+        ])
+        self.assertFalse(registry["additionalProperties"])
+        self.assertEqual(transport["properties"]["verify_certificate"]["const"], True)
+        self.assertEqual(transport["properties"]["verify_hostname"]["const"], True)
+
+        vector = json.loads((ROOT / "contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/cross-language-vector.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        claims_object = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(vector["token"].split(".")[1] + "=="))
+        Draft202012Validator(claims).validate(claims_object)
+        Draft202012Validator(transport).validate({
+            "version": "yovision.transport/v1", "tls_min_version": "1.2", "verify_certificate": True,
+            "verify_hostname": True, "connect_timeout_ms": 1000, "response_header_timeout_ms": 1000,
+            "request_timeout_ms": 5000, "max_request_bytes": 1048576,
+        })
+
+    def test_brain_dependency_is_frozen(self) -> None:
+        pyproject = (ROOT / "Brain/pyproject.toml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        self.assertIn('dependencies = ["cryptography==50.0.1"]', pyproject)
+
+    def test_contract_documents_fail_closed(self) -> None:
+        identity = (ROOT / "contracts/machine-identity/v1/README.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        transport = (ROOT / "contracts/transport/v1/README.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        for required in ("300 seconds", "30 seconds", "24 hours", "jti", "revoked", "browser token"):
+            self.assertIn(required, identity)
+        for required in ("TLS 1.2", "hostname verification", "query-string credentials", "disables the connector"):
+            self.assertIn(required, transport)
+
+    def test_python_verifies_cross_language_vector(self) -> None:
+        vector = json.loads((ROOT / "contracts/tests/machine-identity-v1/cross-language-vector.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        raw_key = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(vector["public_key_base64url"] + "=")
+        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PublicKey
+        registry = Registry([KeyRecord("yv:brain:vector", "brain-vector-0001", Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(raw_key), vector["audience"], frozenset({vector["required_scope"]}))])
+        verifier = Verifier(registry, ReplayStore(), clock=lambda: vector["now"])
+        claims = verifier.verify(vector["token"], vector["audience"], vector["required_scope"], vector["method"], vector["path"], base64.b64decode(vector["body_base64"]))
+        self.assertEqual(claims.iss, "yv:brain:vector")
+
+
+class BrainAdapterTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.now = 1_800_000_000
+        self.private = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
+        self.record = KeyRecord(
+            principal="yv:brain:node-a",
+            key_id="brain-key-0001",
+            public_key=self.private.public_key(),
+            audience="yovision-sense",
+            scopes=frozenset({"runtime-status:write"}),
+        )
+        self.registry = Registry([self.record])
+        self.signer = Signer("yv:brain:node-a", "brain-key-0001", self.private, clock=lambda: self.now)
+
+    def mint(self, body: bytes = b"{}") -> str:
+        return self.signer.mint("yovision-sense", ["runtime-status:write"], "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", body)
+
+    def verify(self, token: str, body: bytes = b"{}", **changes: str):
+        verifier = Verifier(self.registry, changes.pop("replay", ReplayStore()), clock=lambda: int(changes.pop("now", self.now)))
+        return verifier.verify(
+            token,
+            changes.pop("audience", "yovision-sense"),
+            changes.pop("scope", "runtime-status:write"),
+            changes.pop("method", "POST"),
+            changes.pop("path", "/machine/v1/runtime-status"),
+            body,
+        )
+
+    def assert_code(self, code: str, callback) -> None:
+        with self.assertRaises(MachineIdentityError) as caught:
+            callback()
+        self.assertEqual(caught.exception.code, code)
+        self.assertEqual(str(caught.exception), code)
+
+    def test_valid_token_and_replay_rejection(self) -> None:
+        token = self.mint()
+        replay = ReplayStore()
+        first = Verifier(self.registry, replay, clock=lambda: self.now)
+        claims = first.verify(token, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", b"{}")
+        self.assertEqual(claims.iss, "yv:brain:node-a")
+        self.assert_code("machine_token_replayed", lambda: first.verify(token, "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", b"{}"))
+
+    def test_bearer_token_has_no_cookie_or_query_fallback(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(bearer_token("Bearer compact.token.value"), "compact.token.value")
+        for value in ("", "compact.token.value", "Bearer", "Bearer one two", "Cookie compact.token.value"):
+            self.assert_code("machine_token_missing", lambda value=value: bearer_token(value))
+
+    def test_wrong_audience_scope_body_and_expiry(self) -> None:
+        self.assert_code("machine_audience_denied", lambda: self.verify(self.mint(), audience="yovision-bell"))
+        self.assert_code("machine_scope_denied", lambda: self.verify(self.mint(), scope="events:ingest"))
+        self.assert_code("machine_token_invalid", lambda: self.verify(self.mint(), body=b"changed"))
+        self.assert_code("machine_token_expired", lambda: self.verify(self.mint(), now=str(self.now + 361)))
+
+    def test_tampering_revocation_and_rotation(self) -> None:
+        token = self.mint()
+        parts = token.split(".")
+        tampered = f"{parts[0]}.{parts[1][:-1]}A.{parts[2]}"
+        self.assert_code("machine_token_invalid", lambda: self.verify(tampered))
+        self.assertTrue(self.registry.revoke("brain-key-0001"))
+        self.assert_code("machine_identity_revoked", lambda: self.verify(self.mint()))
+
+        new_private = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
+        overlap = Registry([
+            self.record,
+            KeyRecord("yv:brain:node-a", "brain-key-0002", new_private.public_key(), "yovision-sense", frozenset({"runtime-status:write"})),
+        ])
+        new_signer = Signer("yv:brain:node-a", "brain-key-0002", new_private, clock=lambda: self.now)
+        verifier = Verifier(overlap, ReplayStore(), clock=lambda: self.now)
+        verifier.verify(self.mint(), "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", b"{}")
+        verifier.verify(new_signer.mint("yovision-sense", ["runtime-status:write"], "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", b"{}"), "yovision-sense", "runtime-status:write", "POST", "/machine/v1/runtime-status", b"{}")
+
+    def test_transport_policy_requires_verified_tls(self) -> None:
+        policy = TransportPolicy("1.2", True, True, 1000, 1000, 2000, 1024)
+        context = policy.ssl_context()
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(context.minimum_version, ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2)
+        self.assertTrue(context.check_hostname)
+        self.assertEqual(context.verify_mode, ssl.CERT_REQUIRED)
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            TransportPolicy("1.1", True, True, 1000, 1000, 2000, 1024).validate()
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            TransportPolicy("1.2", True, False, 1000, 1000, 2000, 1024).validate()
+
+    def test_loads_external_public_registry_and_rejects_wrong_audience(self) -> None:
+        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+        raw_public = self.private.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.Raw, serialization.PublicFormat.Raw)
+        document = {
+            "version": "yovision.machine-principal-registry/v1",
+            "audience": "yovision-sense",
+            "principals": [{
+                "principal_id": "yv:brain:node-a", "enabled": True,
+                "keys": [{"kid": "brain-key-0001", "public_key_base64url": base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw_public).rstrip(b"=").decode(), "status": "active", "scopes": ["runtime-status:write"]}],
+            }],
+        }
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
+            path = Path(directory) / "principals.json"
+            path.write_text(json.dumps(document), encoding="utf-8")
+            registry = load_registry(path, "yovision-sense")
+            self.assertIsNotNone(registry.lookup("brain-key-0001"))
+            with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+                load_registry(path, "yovision-bell")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main(verbosity=2)

contracts/transport/v1/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# Machine transport policy v1
+
+`yovision.transport/v1` applies to every connector protected by machine identity v1.
+
+- HTTPS is mandatory. TLS 1.2 is the minimum and TLS 1.3 is preferred.
+- Certificate-chain and hostname verification are mandatory. `InsecureSkipVerify`, plaintext fallback and query-string credentials are forbidden.
+- Connection, response-header and total request timeouts are explicit and bounded; consumers enforce a route-specific body limit before decoding.
+- `X-Request-ID` is an opaque 16–128 character correlation value. It may be generated by the caller or first trusted hop, is never an authentication factor, and must not contain credentials or personal data.
+- Retry only timeout, connection loss, `429` and `5xx` according to the connector policy. Authentication/authorization failures and contract `4xx` responses are terminal until configuration changes.
+- Each retry signs a new machine token and `jti`. The business idempotency key and payload remain unchanged.
+
+Transport failures must not start Sense, Brain or Bell with weakened authentication. Rollback disables the connector and preserves local facts, Outbox/Receipt state and last-known-good configuration.

contracts/transport/v1/transport-policy.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://yovision.local/contracts/transport/v1/transport-policy.schema.json",
+  "title": "YoVision machine transport policy v1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": ["version", "tls_min_version", "verify_certificate", "verify_hostname", "connect_timeout_ms", "response_header_timeout_ms", "request_timeout_ms", "max_request_bytes"],
+  "properties": {
+    "version": {"const": "yovision.transport/v1"},
+    "tls_min_version": {"enum": ["1.2", "1.3"]},
+    "verify_certificate": {"const": true},
+    "verify_hostname": {"const": true},
+    "connect_timeout_ms": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 100, "maximum": 30000},
+    "response_header_timeout_ms": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 100, "maximum": 30000},
+    "request_timeout_ms": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 100, "maximum": 60000},
+    "max_request_bytes": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 10485760}
+  }
+}

docs/02-architecture-and-code-map.md

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 generated: true (请先修改 Gitea Wiki，禁止直接编辑本文件)
 wiki_page: Architecture-and-Code-Map
 wiki_url: https://git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/wiki/Architecture-and-Code-Map.-
-wiki_revision: 3327861dbd77ae63fd10246533b87e0b99a69220
+wiki_revision: 812e822990d8c8e82445bd19ced67aca8c10aba4
-synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:38:23Z
+synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:58:55Z
 <!-- gitea-wiki-mirror:end -->
 
 # 架构与代码地图
@@ -320,3 +320,27 @@ Sense Device/Profile/Area 内部事实
 
 协议不得包含摄像头凭据、RTSP URL、query token、内部绝对路径、数据库模型、用户/JWT/Cookie 或 Bell Alert 语义。当前只冻结契约，没有新增网络端点、机器身份或跨端 connector。
 <!-- sense-brain-contracts-v1:end -->
+
+<!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:start -->
+## 标准事件与证据 v1 契约边界
+
+- Event Schema：`contracts/events/v1/event.schema.json`，版本 `yovision.event/v1`。
+- Bell 接入描述：`contracts/events/v1/openapi.json`，返回创建、重复、幂等冲突和不支持版本等明确结果。
+- Evidence Schema/API：`contracts/evidence/v1/evidence-reference.schema.json`、`openapi.json`，版本 `yovision.evidence-reference/v1`。
+- 共同测试：`contracts/tests/events-v1/`、`contracts/tests/evidence-v1/`。
+
+后续 #153 的映射流固定为：
+
+```text
+Brain internal candidate / Sense local event
+  → yovision.event/v1 producer mapper
+  → Sense Outbox relay（默认拓扑，保持原 producer/source ID）
+  → Bell v1 ingress
+  → Bell private immutable Event + permanent Receipt
+  → Bell private Rule / Alert / ack / close
+```
+
+规范载荷使用 RFC 8785 JCS 与 SHA-256 形成稳定摘要。同键同摘要返回原 Event；同键不同摘要返回冲突并审计，不覆盖原事实。Evidence 只提供逻辑引用与状态/完整性元数据，不授予访问权限，不包含本机路径、签名 URL 或凭据；取证授权由后续机器身份和 connector 工单实现。
+
+Brain candidate、Sense candidate/Outbox 与 Bell Event/Receipt/Alert 继续是各自内部模型。当前没有新增可运行的跨端 ingress/relay，不能把冻结 Schema 解释为端到端链路已完成。
+<!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:end -->

docs/03-business-rules-and-glossary.md

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 generated: true (请先修改 Gitea Wiki，禁止直接编辑本文件)
 wiki_page: Business-Rules-and-Glossary
 wiki_url: https://git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/wiki/Business-Rules-and-Glossary.-
-wiki_revision: feca453cd0873c3ad4cef243acfada08ef3f1e33
+wiki_revision: bc4a1a7be268028fa85717b71f48f7dd75cc7e52
-synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:38:28Z
+synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:59:04Z
 <!-- gitea-wiki-mirror:end -->
 
 # 业务规则与术语
@@ -247,3 +247,18 @@ synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:38:28Z
 - **状态边界**：运行/健康错误只形成 Sense 运维投影，不是业务 Event 或 Bell Alert；不得包含用户会话、凭据、内部路径或客户视频。
 - **版本兼容**：v1 只接受已冻结语义；破坏性字段或语义变化发布新主版本。未知主版本停止摄取并保留上一有效事实。
 <!-- sense-brain-contracts-v1:end -->
+
+<!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:start -->
+## 标准事件、证据和幂等规则
+
+- **标准 Event**：匿名、不可变的跨产品安全事实，不是 Bell Alert，也不携带处置或通知状态。
+- **原始生产者**：`producer_id` 始终标识最初产生事件的 Brain 或 Sense 实例；relay 使用独立传输身份，但不得替换业务生产者。
+- **永久幂等键**：精确 UTF-8 对 `(producer_id, source_event_id)`。重试沿用同一键，不生成新事件。
+- **规范摘要**：完整 Event 使用 RFC 8785 JCS 规范化后计算 SHA-256。同键同摘要为重复成功；同键异摘要为终止性冲突，并追加脱敏审计。
+- **时间格式**：Event v1 使用 UTC RFC 3339、三位毫秒和 `Z`；可选字段缺失时省略，不发送 null。
+- **证据引用**：`evidence_id` 与 `owner_id` 是不透明逻辑引用，不是 URL、文件路径或访问凭据。
+- **证据状态**：`pending → processing → success|failed`。success 要求内容类型和摘要/大小；failed 要求稳定错误码和是否可重试。
+- **降级原则**：证据失败、未知或过期不删除 Event，不自动关闭 Alert，也不伪装成完整成功。
+- **Bell 所有权**：Bell 独占内部 Event/Receipt、规则、Alert、ack、close、通知与用户审计；上游不得写入这些状态。
+- **兼容与回退**：未知主版本终止接收但保留已有事实；破坏性变化发布新主版本。回退停用新生产者版本，不删除 Outbox、Receipt、Event 或审计。
+<!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:end -->

docs/04-local-development-and-verification.md

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 generated: true (请先修改 Gitea Wiki，禁止直接编辑本文件)
 wiki_page: Local-Development-and-Verification
 wiki_url: https://git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/wiki/Local-Development-and-Verification.-
-wiki_revision: 43eb0f69fbb4d573a5cd1c61b97dbc9fc9d2a49b
+wiki_revision: d11757b202117e028878802e1e8a9ba9df1a8e89
-synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:38:33Z
+synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:59:13Z
 <!-- gitea-wiki-mirror:end -->
 
 # 本地开发与验证
@@ -654,3 +654,28 @@ git diff --check
 
 这些命令只验证冻结契约，不验证 #152 产品 adapter、真实网络传输、机器身份、现场断网恢复或端到端链路。
 <!-- sense-brain-contracts-v1:end -->
+
+<!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:start -->
+## 标准事件与证据 v1 契约验证
+
+两组测试均只使用 Python 标准库：
+
+```powershell
+python contracts/tests/events-v1/test_contract.py
+python contracts/tests/evidence-v1/test_contract.py
+```
+
+事件测试覆盖匿名危险区域/方向越线样例、Brain producer→Sense relay→Bell consumer mapper fixture、RFC 8785/SHA-256 幂等向量、重复/冲突、未知版本、敏感字段拒绝和 OpenAPI 引用。
+
+证据测试覆盖 `pending/processing/success/failed` 状态约束、success 完整性、失败降级、旧 `available` 状态拒绝、敏感访问材料拒绝和证据 API 响应引用。
+
+仓库级复核：
+
+```powershell
+python -m unittest discover -s tests -v
+python dev_scripts/harness.py check --strict
+git diff --check
+```
+
+这些测试只验证冻结契约，不验证 #153 产品 mapper/relay/ingress、#151 机器身份、实际证据存储/授权、网络断线补投或跨项目 E2E。
+<!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:end -->

docs/09-product-requirements.md

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 generated: true (请先修改 Gitea Wiki，禁止直接编辑本文件)
 wiki_page: Product-Requirements
 wiki_url: https://git.ilapage.cn/ila/yovision/wiki/Product-Requirements.-
-wiki_revision: 28dce0d89804013411f8111ba421c93e9a1dfa2c
+wiki_revision: c9970b0ee8b677b6be13f31af67b3206a3faf956
-synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T01:39:04Z
+synchronized_at: 2026-08-31T02:00:00Z
 <!-- gitea-wiki-mirror:end -->
 
 # 产品需求
@@ -282,3 +282,13 @@ BRN-002 的首个解码阶段已通过工单 #13 验收。Brain 通过可替换
 
 这两项只冻结协议和测试，不表示 #152 connector 已实现。Sense 与 Brain 仍可独立运行；Brain 不读取 Sense 数据库，Sense 不读取 Brain 内部状态。既有 `brain.internal.*`、Sense GORM 模型和运维投影继续是项目内部实现，不得直接作为共享协议。
 <!-- sense-brain-contracts-v1:end -->
+
+<!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:start -->
+## 标准事件与证据引用冻结契约
+
+工单 #150 已于 2026-08-31 通过用户验收并合入 `dev`。Sense/Brain→Bell 标准匿名安全事件的唯一共享事实源为 `contracts/events/v1/`，版本标识 `yovision.event/v1`；证据逻辑引用的唯一共享事实源为 `contracts/evidence/v1/`，版本标识 `yovision.evidence-reference/v1`。
+
+事件以原始 `(producer_id, source_event_id)` 永久幂等，Sense relay 不改变原始身份或业务载荷。事件只携带逻辑站点/设备/Profile、事件类型、发生时间、规则/模型版本、匿名观测、区域和证据逻辑引用，不携带用户会话、摄像头凭据、内部路径、人脸特征或 Alert/ack/close 状态。
+
+证据状态为 `pending/processing/success/failed`；`success` 必须包含内容类型和 SHA-256 完整性元数据，失败或过期只降级证据，不改写不可变 Event 或 Bell Alert 生命周期。此工单只冻结契约和测试，#153 可靠 connector、机器身份、证据存储与实际授权取证尚未实现。
+<!-- standard-event-evidence-v1:end -->